Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

357.AK/6–751

Memorandum by John C. Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

top secret
eyes only

[New York,] June 7, 1951.

Subjects: GOC Decisions: Trygve Lie Program and GOC Reaction

Upon Grafstrom’s return from Washington last night Gross gave him the substance of the Department’s telegram #970, June 6, supplementing the observations Gross had made to Padilla yesterday (USUN’s #1613, June 6).

GOC Decisions

Grafstrom told Gross that Padilla expected to make an approach today to Soldatov (Russian representative on the Trusteeship Council) to find out if Malik would be willing to receive Grafstrom and Padilla sometime in the course of the day.

In conversation with me this morning Grafstrom elaborated as follows: The Good Offices Committee had decided yesterday that Padilla would ask Soldatov to find out if Malik would receive Grafstrom and Padilla as members of the GOC. If the response were affirmative Grafstrom and Padilla would see Malik and would say to him that the GOC had been unable to establish contact and would ask Malik if he had any ideas about establishing contact. If Malik were unwilling to see them as members of the GOC but indicated he would be willing to see them in their capacities as representatives of their governments, it would be explained that Grafstrom had to leave for Sweden tomorrow (Friday) morning; Padilla would then follow up in the course of the next two or three days to have what Grafstrom described as a “cocktail sort of conversation”, the objective being the same.

Grafstrom informed me this afternoon that the Trusteeship Council has been meeting all day and that Padilla has been unable to establish contact with Soldatov. Accordingly, Grafstrom plans to leave as scheduled tomorrow morning, and Padilla within the next day or two will try to find out through Soldatov whether Malik will receive Padilla as a member of the GOC, the rest of the procedure being as indicated above.

Grafstrom was authorized by the GOC yesterday to get in touch with the Swedish Ambassador Designate to Peiping and to brief him on the activities of the GOC. Assuming no objection on the part of the Swedish Government, Grafstrom is further authorized to ask the new Swedish Ambassador on behalf of the GOC to remind Mao on the occasion of presenting his credentials (which would probably be the only time he would see Mao) of Entezam’s February 14 communication, and to ask Mao if the Chinese Communist authorities wanted to establish contact with the United Nations or not. Grafstrom was further authorized to take up with the new Swedish Ambassador the possibility of the latter establishing an informal contact with the North Korean Ambassador in Peiping. Finally, and particularly in this case assuming no objection on the part of the Swedish Government, Grafstrom himself was authorized in his discretion to get in touch with the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Stockholm. Grafstrom recalled in this connection that at the time of Entezam’s February 14 communication it had been passed through the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Stockholm as well as through the Swedish Ambassador in Peiping.

Trygve Lie Program and GOC Reaction

Grafstrom also informed me this morning that Lie had informed him (apparently on Tuesday) of the points Lie had in mind for a peaceful settlement in Korea. Lie had given his “plan” to Pearson (who Lie said had a favorable reaction) and to Jebb and Lacoste (both of whom, Grafstrom gathered, made no comment but said they would forward Lie’s ideas to their governments). Lie’s “plan” as Grafstrom gave it to me follows:

1. The First Committee would be called into session. Its first step would be dissolution of the GOC on its own initiative on the basis of a GOC report of failure.

2. An Assembly declaration of aims for settlement of the Korean affair would be formulated. This would involve a cease-fire along the 38th parallel with appropriate guarantees.

3. There would be a “rejuvenation” of the General Assembly’s resolution of 19 September 1950 (A/1406) establishing a special committee to consider the question of Chinese representation.¹ Lie’s idea, as Grafstrom gave it to me, was that this resolution would be “rejuvenated” in the sense of an instruction to the Committee to report to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly.

4. The present session of the General Assembly would be dissolved.

The GOC discussed these ideas of Lie’s in Washington yesterday. They reached the following conclusions which Grafstrom, on behalf of the GOC, communicated to Lie last night:

1. The GOC would take no (repeat no) initiative to bring about its own dissolution and would not make a report of failure.

2. The GOC did not know what kind of a declaration of aims Lie had in mind and reserved their position on this point. (Lie commented that he had in mind the same kind of declaration of aims as the GOC had in mind; Grafstrom responded that this was strange since the GOC itself did not know what kind of a declaration it had in mind.)

3. The GOC felt that there was “hardly a less suitable time” to raise the question of Chinese representation by rejuvenating the 19 September Resolution. They were strongly opposed to this course. Furthermore they did not think that rejuvenating that resolution would “do any good so far as the other side is concerned” because the composition of the committee in question was such as to preclude a recommendation that the Chinese Communists be seated in the UN. Grafstrom added to me the observation that he thought this point of Lie’s was merely “stupid”.

4. The GOC had no opinion as to whether the present session of the General Assembly should be dissolved. That was a matter they supposed that the majority of the Assembly should decide.

Grafstrom told me that Lie was “very angry” and said that the GOC did not “want to recognize the fact that the GOC was an obstacle” to peaceful settlement.

Grafstrom said he laughed at Lie.²

1. For related documentation, see Foreign Relations. 1950, vol. ii, pp. 186 ff.

2. On June 12, Mr. Ross transmitted to Messrs. Hickerson and Rusk a subsequent memorandum on his talks that day with Jebb and Lacoste concerning Lie’s “program” for a peaceful settlement in Korea. The June 12 memorandum read in part as follows:

   “I told Jebb we had learned indirectly that Lie had some ideas on this subject; I expressed hope that we could discuss the matter a little more fully within the next few days but that meanwhile I wanted to let him know that we took a dim view of Lie’s ideas. Jebb was a little evasive until I told him that I understood, also indirectly, that Lie had discussed his ideas with Jebb. Jebb also queried about adjourning the present session of the Assembly, saying that of course the Assembly could always be reconvened on 24 hours notice. I told him we did not think it was a good idea at all to adjourn this session of the Assembly and that so far as reconvening it on 24 hours notice was concerned this would obviously get us involved in all sorts of complications such as election of officers, et cetera.

   “I had a somewhat fuller discussion with Lacoste, indicating our understanding of the points Lie has in mind and our understanding that Lie had spoken to both Jebb and Lacoste, as well as to Pearson. Lacoste said he was glad I had raised the question since he had been pledged to confidence and was uneasy about it. Since I raised the question he had no hesitation about discussing the matter. He said he had had a ‘preliminary’ instruction from his government which he had not yet communicated to Lie. His instructions were, and he understood that Jebb had similar instructions, to be ‘polite but critical’ of Lie’s ideas. I commented on the four points as we understood them along the lines set forth in Mr. Hickerson’s memorandum of June 8 [not printed]. Lacoste appeared to agree with all of these comments. He made, however, the following observations. He said that he thought Lie was motivated to a considerable degree by jealousy of Entezam. He said Lie had a negative attitude toward the Good Offices Committee and wanted to get rid of it because the GOC was a ‘tool’ of the United States which was not seeking to make peace. He said Lie had approached him in the spirit of trying to get France and the United Kingdom to adopt his ideas as their own and press them upon the United States.” (357.AK/6–1251)