357.AK/6–651: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
priority
1613. Eyes only for Hickerson, UNA from Gross, and Rusk from Gross. Re the efforts of GOC (confirming Gross-Hickerson telecon, 4:00 p. m., June 6).
I have just had a phone call from Washington from Entezam and Padilla, who are meeting with Grafstrom in Entezam’s office. Padilla, who did most of the talking from their end, said that they were most anxious to have our comments concerning the suggestions which were in their minds and which were reported to Dept in ourtel No. 1607, June 5. I said that we had the following general reactions, pursuant to your phone conversation with me this a.m. I said that a subsequent conversation would be desirable before any action was taken.
[Page 520]General comments I made as follows:
With regard to their suggestion of approach to Malik, I said that my impression was that Dept felt that such a course did not have positive dangers, that the GOC would, we thought, run the risk of looking somewhat ridiculous, that Malik might make sport of the matter, and possibly hold them up to ridicule. But that in summarizing to the GOC what I understood to be the Dept’s general reaction, I said it was a “mild discouragement” of such an approach. At the same time I added that naturally we felt this was a matter which the GOC would want to decide for itself, and we were simply giving our general advice on the basis of their request for general advice.
With regard to the other alternative, that is, the suggested approach to the NK Amb at Peiping, I said that I myself saw no danger in that course either, provided that they were careful to avoid any implication of substance in their approach to the NK’s. In other words they made an approach to NK simply for the purpose of attempting to establish contact, which was course they took with Peiping regime in Feb, I could see no harm there. On the contrary, it seemed to me that if they got a reaction from NK’s that way, it might be interesting.
Finally, they wanted to know what our reaction would be to their sounding out Malik (assuming they succeeded in talking to Malik in their corporate capacity) as to his reaction to their approaching the NK’s. I said if they succeeded in meeting with Malik, I saw no danger in sounding out Malik to see what reaction they got from him, provided they did not get into any substantive questions in any of these approaches, but limited themselves at this time to establishing contact.
GOC understood we were to discuss matter again. Grafstrom and Padilla are returning to New York this evening and will telephone me then, at which time I will have further opportunity to clarify our views.