Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/1–951: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur)

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, January 9, 1951—6:38 p. m.¹

JCS 80680. From JCS personal for MacArthur. A. Reur C 52391² and C 52712³ retaliatory measures you suggest have been and continue to be given careful consideration here. There is also full appreciation of contribution to the general situation made by current absorption of Chinese Communist forces in Korea.

B. Based on over-all considerations, however, the following must be accepted:

(1) There is little possibility of policy change or other external eventuality justifying strengthening of our effort in Korea.

(2) Blockade of China Coast, if undertaken, must await either stabilization of our position in Korea or our evacuation from Korea. However, a naval blockade of the coast of China would require negotiations with the British in view of the extent of British trade with China through Hongkong. It is considered necessary to obtain UN concurrence.

(3) Naval and Air attacks on objectives in Communist China probably can be authorized only if the Chinese Communists attack United States forces outside of Korea and decision must await that eventually [eventuality?].

(4) Favorable action cannot be taken on the proposal (see also your C 50021 and JCS 97594)⁴ to obtain Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist Garrison in Formosa, in view of improbability of their decisive effort on the Korean outcome and their probable greater usefulness elsewhere.

(5) If our position in Korea could be stabilized with forces now committed, 2 partly-trained National Guard Divisions could be deployed to Japan in order to increase the security of Japan. If our Korean position cannot be stabilized, this purpose must be served by part of the troops evacuated from Korea. This is final reply to your C 51559.⁵

(6) The program for the arming of Japanese Security Forces will be expedited.

(7) Effort is being made to intensify the economic blockade of trade with China.

C. In light of the foregoing and after full consideration of all pertinent factors, you are directed as follows:

(1) Defend in successive positions as required by JCS 99935,⁶ inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your basic mission of protecting Japan.

(2) Should it become evident in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid severe losses of men and materials you will at that time withdraw from Korea to Japan.

(3) Make every effort to restrict knowledge of this message to those who need to know.

D. Questions such as disposition of prisoners and ROK personnel will be handled separately.

E. All directives and instructions in conflict with the foregoing are revoked.

1. The time of dispatch of military telegrams outgoing from Washington is indicated in the source text in terms of Greenwich Mean Time. In this compilation, unless otherwise indicated, the hour is given in Eastern Standard Time.
2. For the text of this message from General MacArthur, dated December 30, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, p. 1630.
3. Not printed.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1253.
5. General MacArthur, in his telegram C–51559 dated December 18, 1950, not printed, had requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy at once to Japan the four National Guard divisions on active service in the United States in order to reassure the Japanese and safeguard against a sudden Soviet thrust at Japan while U.S. forces were committed in Korea. (JCS Files)
6. Dated December 29, 1950; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, p. 1625.