Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/5–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rush)

top secret

[Washington,] May 15, 1951.

Subject: Australian Views on Retaliatory Bombing of Manchurian Air Bases

Participants:	Mr. Colin Moodie, Chargé d’Affaires, Australian Embassy
	Mr. David McNichol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
	FE—Mr. Rusk
	BNA—Mr. Shullaw

Mr. Moodie, Australian Chargé d’Affaires, called on me today to deliver an aide-mémoire, copy attached,¹ setting forth the Australian views on the subject of retaliatory bombing of Manchurian air bases. Mr. Moodie said this matter had been considered by the new Australian Cabinet in its first meeting on May 11.² The Australian Government accepts in principle the view that if massive air attacks from Manchurian bases occur, counter attacks upon such bases may have to be made. Furthermore, Australia recognizes that it might be impracticable for the U.S. to consult all fourteen countries concerned before taking counter action, but it nevertheless assumes that the U.S. will do its utmost to consult Australia in advance. Mr. Moodie in elaborating on the aide-mémoire said that his Government believed any massive air attack, in order to warrant retaliatory action, should be of such a character as to seriously endanger U.N. forces. Mr. Moodie agreed, in response to a question which I raised concerning the meaning of the phrase “seriously endanger”, that an enemy attack which jeopardized the effective operation of U.N. forces would warrant retaliatory bombing.

The Australian Government, Mr. Moodie said, believes that counter attacks should be limited to the bases from which the enemy aircraft came and to the aircraft themselves wherever they might be found. He added that Australian acceptance in principle of retaliatory bombing is limited to Manchurian bases and does not relate to attacks from Russian territory. I asked whether consideration had been given by the Australian Government to the possibility of attacks from bases on the Shantung peninsula as well as from Manchuria. Mr. Moodie said that he would seek a clarification of this point.

I told Mr. Moodie that we will do our utmost to consult and that the need for such consultation is fully appreciated at the highest levels of our Government here in Washington and by General Ridgway. I said that it is difficult to determine how the attack, if it comes, will be delivered. It is possible that only part of the attack may be mounted from Manchurian bases and the balance from North Korean fields thus introducing an element of deception. We are attempting to knock out North Korean air fields and have achieved good results.

Mr. Moodie then raised several questions concerning the current Congressional inquiry on Far Eastern policy. He asked whether General Marshall’s testimony³ indicated that the Department of Defense considered the veto could be used to bar the seating in U.N. of Communist China. I said that I believed this was not quite correct; that the point General Marshall was making was that every resource available to us should be used to block the admission of Communist China. I asked Mr. Moodie what Australian thinking was on the question of whether or not a veto would be possible in this case. Mr. Moodie said that he doubted that his Government believed the veto could be exercised.

In discussing the question of military and economic aid to Formosa, I made the point that our efforts are directed toward increasing the defensibility of Formosa rather than toward preparing it for attacks on the mainland. I added, however, that were the Chinese Communists to spread hostilities elsewhere in the Far East we would not wish to be bound by the present policy of neutralization of Formosa. In reply to a question from Mr. Moodie concerning consultation in such an eventuality I pointed out that this would be dependent upon developments but that presumably there would not be the same urgency attaching to this question as is the case with possible retaliatory bombing of Manchurian bases.

1. Not printed.
2. The Australian general election of April 28 resulted in the continuation in office of the Liberal-Country Party Government of Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies. Richard Casey became Foreign Minister, succeeding Percy Spender who was appointed Australian Ambassador in Washington.
3. Secretary of Defense Marshall testified before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees daily from May 7 to 14, with the exception of Sunday, May 13; see Hearings, pp. 321–724.