Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

S/S Files: NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

top secret

Washington, May 8, 1951.

Subject: United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action In Asia

Reference: NSC 48/4¹

The enclosed revision of paragraph 6–e, prepared by the Senior NSC Staff, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council in lieu of the version of that paragraph contained in NSC 48/4.²

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Revision of Paragraph 6—e, Pages 4 and 5 of NSC 48/4

6–e. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means a solution of the Korean problem which will provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek as a current objective a settlement, acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) deny Korea south of the 38th parallel to the Communists; (3) restore the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of the 38th parallel; (4) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; and (5) permit the build-up of sufficient Republic of Korea military power to repel a renewed North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea. In the absence of at least the aforementioned minimum settlement, and, recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.

1. See footnote 3, p. 388.

2. Paragraph 6-e of NSC 48/4, dated May 4, read as follows:

   “Seek a settlement, acceptable to the United States, of the Korean problem which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements, (2) deny Korea south of the 38th parallel to the Communists, (3) restore the authority of the Republic of Korea over all Korea south of the 38th parallel, (4) permit the building up of sufficient ROK military power, supplemented by the minimum possible amount of United States logistic support and combat forces, to deter or repel a renewed North Korean or Chinese Communist aggression, and (5) make possible, but not mandatory the eventual withdrawal of United States and other U.N. forces. Such a settlement should not preclude an eventual political settlement, under United Nations auspices, which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. In the absence of at least the aforementioned minimum settlement, and recognizing that currently there is no other acceptable alternative, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.”