Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/4–1951: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

New York, April 19, 1951—5:33 p. m.

1425. From Gross.¹ Conversation with Rau re Korean peaceful settlement. Rau called on me at his request to discuss possible steps looking toward peaceful settlement in Korea. Stressing that he was reflecting his own personal ideas which he had not discussed with Asian-Arab group or reported to his own govt, he requested my reaction to suggestion that the Asian-Arab group might address a communication to NK FonMin, suggesting that latter send to NY a representative to meet with Asian-Arab group and outline more specifically NK proposals. Rau said he had recd word from New Delhi that Panikkar had reported from Peiping that an air attack had been made by 200 Formosa-based US bombers on the China coast near Shanghai in the past few days and that this was taken in Peiping as evidence that US was committed to course of aggression against China. I made a flat denial and expressed astonishment that Panikkar would give credence to a report so palpably absurd.

Rau expressed gratitude for receiving this assurance and said he would communicate at once to New Delhi.

In response to questioning concerning further details of Panikkar’s report to New Delhi, Rau said his own info was limited to foregoing. It was not clear whether Rau was actually uninformed concerning details of Panikkar’s report or whether he was being evasive. Rau professed uncertainty whether Panikkar had made an approach to Peiping FonOff (ourtel 1410 Apr 14) or whether Panikkar’s report concerning alleged bombing reflected Peiping FonOff views rather than Panikkar’s own reaction to rumors current in Peiping. Dept may wish to ascertain through Henderson more exact info concerning nature of Panikkar’s approach to Peiping and report by Panikkar to GOI.

Re Rau’s personal suggestion of possible approach by Asian-Arab group to NK FonMin I urged Rau not to take such action nor suggest it to Asian-Arab group until we had had chance to discuss it again. I pointed out following disadvantages:

(1) Such an approach by informally constituted group of UN members would undercut prestige of GOC and in particular efforts of Entezam to establish contact with Peiping.

(2) It would tend to give weight and prestige to NK doc of 15 Apr 1951, which we regarded as a nauseating propaganda doc meriting nothing but disgust.

(3) I could think of nothing more damaging to prestige of UN or more infuriating to decent public opinion than spectacle of NK rep coming to US and behaving like Gen Wu,² which he surely wld do if he were given chance.

(4) Speaking frankly to Rau, it seemed to me that communications or appeals to NK by unauthorized UN members or groups of members could not fail to indicate disunity and weakening of UN solid front.

I added that we remained, as we always had been, anxious to support constructive efforts to reach peaceful solution in Korea. However, we felt that best hope for honorable peaceful settlement still lay in direction of maintaining firm and united polit front against aggression in UN and that as time went on this became increasingly important objective in itself.

To these comments, Rau emphasized tentative nature of his own thinking. He professed complete agreement that support should be given to efforts of GOC. However, he said he was most pessimistic concerning efficacy of their approaches to Peiping. At this point in conversation, Rau seemed to be intimating that Panikkar had actually been unsuccessful in attempt to elicit reaction from Peiping concerning Entezam’s communication of Feb 14. Although this was merely an impression on my part, Rau repeated several times during our conversation his own skepticism concerning likelihood of further reaction from Peiping on subject of Entezam’s communication.

Rau agreed with me that it is most difficult to attempt at this moment to formulate tactics of new approaches to Chi Commies and felt it wld be better to wait for several days in order to give Panikkar an opportunity to obtain reactions from Peiping concerning NK messages of 15 Apr to GA Pres.

Rau suggested as an alternative that Entezam might send a communication to NK FonMin requesting clarification of NK message of 15 Apr. Rau perceived difficulty that this might give status to NK authorities. I said it was my understanding that members of GOC had reached conclusion that it would not be desirable to reply to NK message.

Rau said he had also been giving thought to possibility that if a communication were sent by Asian-Arab group to NK FonMin suggesting that latter send rep to NY to talk with group, it might be suggested in same communication that NK agree to cease-fire at once. I took this occasion to remind Rau of necessity under any circumstances to avoid direct or indirect appeals for cease-fire unless they went thru appropriate channels and were carefully drawn so as to include conditions essential to security of UN forces. Rau said that he understood this and that in any event wld neither take action nor recommend to Asian-Arab group that any action be taken prior to further discussion with USUN. [Gross.]

Austin

1. The words “From Gross”, not present in the file copy of this message, were added to the source text in the light of a request for their insertion contained in telegram 1428, April 20, from New York (795.00/4–2051).
2. Wu Hsiu-chuan headed the delegation from the People’s Republic of China which appeared before the U.N. Security Council in November 1950 to discuss the questions of Korea and Taiwan; for related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, pp. 1237 ff.