795.00/4–1251
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)
Subject: Korea
| Participants: | UK | US |
| Sir Oliver Franks | General Bradley | |
| Lord Tedder | Col. Carns | |
| Mr. B. A. B. Burrows | Mr. Paul H. Nitze | |
| Capt. Richard Coleridge | Mr. Dean Rusk |
Sir Oliver said that he had received instructions from his government and that he had two points to make. Inasmuch as the first related [Page 339] primarily to military matters, he would ask Lord Tedder to give his views.
Lord Tedder said that even though there was close collaboration on intelligence matters between their people and ours in Washington, he found that there was more difference between London’s views and Washington’s than he had previously thought existed. London doubted whether the Chinese had the capability of a new offensive in the near future. He thought, perhaps, the difference arose from a difference in viewpoint as to the location of the 4th Army. General Bradley said that he thought it might arise out of more recent information which we have received as to the location of three units of the 1st Army. Lord Tedder went on to say that London felt that the Chinese would certainly not be ready for a major offensive before the end of May. General Bradley said that we had received one message, giving the date of April 16, but that he, himself, did not believe an offensive would take place prior to June, but that one could never be sure.
Lord Tedder said the difference as to combat numbers was not so important, but rather the British felt that the Chinese air capability, although not a flash in the pan, would not give them the capability of a really serious attack. He questioned, however, whether we had sufficient anti-aircraft, whether we had sufficient fields for dispersal, and whether we were not taking an unnecessary gamble. London thought that some weeks, perhaps some months, might elapse before the Chinese would have the capability of a serious air attack. This would give us time both for further conversations and to take necessary protective measures.
Sir Oliver indicated that his government would have been glad if we hadn’t felt it necessary to take up this question at this time, but understood that we wished to. He said that his government felt that whatever decision was taken, it must be taken by governments, not solely by military authorities, because it might cause general war in the Far East.
General Bradley emphasized that as to the U.S. this was a governmental decision and had been approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President. The only decision that the JCS might take would be that of determining that the conditions contemplated had actually taken place.
Sir Oliver said that even if the general authorization asked for was granted, his government felt that the effective decision as to the magnitude of the attack must be passed on by his government, and they could not give their agreement in advance of the event.
General Bradley said that the time lag under these circumstances might be very great. If there was time he anticipated that the JCS would go through regular channels to the President. There was a possibility [Page 340] that Sir Oliver and Lord Tedder might be out of town. Our planes are now wing tip to wing tip. Repeated attacks might be disastrous.
Lord Tedder asked whether there wasn’t time to build more fields to disperse planes and increase the anti-aircraft defenses. He said he thought we were taking a gamble in acting as though present conditions would continue indefinitely. General Bradley said that such action would decrease the effect of our air support by a half to a third. Lord Tedder said he thought we could operate more easily if we had more fields. General Bradley said that it was hard to build the necessary fields all over the world. Lord Tedder said that if we kept our planes as tightly packed as they are now we were inviting an initial blow which might be decisive.
General Bradley said that there was a further question of morale of our forces if the Chinese were to change their ground rules and we were not to change ours. Lord Tedder said he agreed that it might be necessary to have a decision within 24 hours. Sir Oliver said that the moment of decision might very well be it; we would be moving into an unknown expansion. Because of the inherent facts in the situation, his Ministers would feel that even if the general policies were agreed to in advance, they must ask that they be in on the final decision. General Bradley said that he agreed that a political decision was involved and if there was time it should be reaffirmed through political channels, but that if there was not time rapid action would be necessary.
Dean Rusk asked what would happen if Washington should say “yes” and London would say “no”. Lord Tedder said that the initial reports might be very much exaggerated. Dean Rusk asked whether the important factor was the scale of the effort or its effect. Lord Tedder said that the U.K. did not feel that the Chinese could produce damaging effects.
General Bradley said that if the Chinese changed their ground rules then we would have to change our ground rules, or get out. Lord Tedder said we were gambling on the other fellow continuing to limit his attack; we should take the proper precautions now.
General Bradley asked whether the British advocated going to all fourteen governments. Sir Oliver said that his instructions did not take him that far. He repeated that his government was interested in the application of the policy; that is carries real risks of an enlargement of the war, starting in the Far East. His government must look at it from the point of view of a country which will suffer most of the casualties. They felt that they ought to be in on the decision. Speaking personally, he felt that if one looked at it from [Page 341] their viewpoint, this looked right. He agreed that if one looked at it from the point of view of its effects in Korea it might be hard to say that it was right. If the U.K. has to go along with everything that follows from the decision, then the U.K. must be in on the decision.
General Bradley said that when we know that they have changed the ground rules we know they are prepared for general war. Sir Oliver said that if such were to be their decision, it is vital that the 50 million people in the U.K. go in in good heart.
Mr. Rusk suggested that it might be advisable to give a warning in advance along the lines of the Dutch suggestion.1 Sir Oliver said that if one could define the conditions then this might be possible. The British always hate deciding on general propositions and committing themselves to act on particular instances which fit within such a general proposition. They want to look at the general policy in the light of the specific situation. The decision in this case is so important that even with the best possible will, they must be in on the operative decision.
Mr. Rusk said that the U.K. might view the Far East differently than we do. We face on two oceans. Sir Oliver said that this is a fair point. The recent parliamentary debate showed that Churchill, Eden and the others were in agreement with the Labor Party on this point.
Mr. Rusk asked when the U.K. proposed to deal with Nehru, etc. Sir Oliver said that this might be an issue of peace or war. We will look at it from the standpoint of our geographic and political interest, but we won’t need to argue the fundamentals out again. We would look at the facts—not at what we would prefer to see. Sir Oliver said he did not think the Dominion office would send out telegrams to eight countries.
Lord Tedder said that it was important that they be able to say that they had been consulted and had agreed. General Bradley said that if Russian planes come in we must get out of Korea. In order to do so we must go after their bases. Sir Oliver said that this reinforced his case.
Mr. Rusk asked about an attack by the USSR on Japan. Sir Oliver said that he understood the question but was not going to give an answer. Mr. Rusk said that we have assumed that the occupation is an allied occupation; maybe we have assumed too much. Sir Oliver said that the record of the Jessup conversations of last fall gave the answer.2
General Bradley said that he wanted to raise a different question. There was a strong possibility that the Chinese would use North [Page 342] Korea fields as staging bases. Are we to accept this as no change in ground rules? He said that this was one we ought to think over, but should not try to answer now. What was worrying us now was the danger of a sudden attack. Lord Tedder suggested that, perhaps, we could set up some special machinery for consultation in time of emergency.
Mr. Nitze asked why the U.K. regretted that we had felt it necessary to raise this question at this time. Sir Oliver said that the U.K. Chiefs of Staff felt the danger of a Chinese air attack was not imminent. He also referred to the date of our inquiry.
- See circular telegram 601, April 9, p. 317.↩
- For text of the minutes of a political-military conversation, October 26, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, p. 1689.↩