795.00/3–3151
The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, March 31,
1951.
Dear Mr. Secretary: With reference to our
discussion regarding Korea on 19 March 1951 with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff,1 I am transmitting herewith, for your
information and consideration, a memorandum of 27 March 1951 from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the United States position regarding an
armistice in Korea. These views supersede those of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff which were submitted to the National Security Council on 13
December 1950 (NSC 95).2
I am in general agreement with the terms, conditions and arrangements
enumerated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Joint Chiefs memorandum.
However, I believe that the questions of Formosa and Chinese Communist
membership in the United Nations, as well as other general political and
security factors referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the memorandum of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be fitting topics in the consideration
of basic terms of settlement of the Korean situation, and might be taken
up in discussions between our two Departments on the overall question of
Korea.
Faithfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
top secret
Washington, 27 March
1951.
Subject: United States Position Regarding An
Armistice in Korea.
- 1.
- In the course of the meeting on 19 March 1951 which you
attended with the Secretary of State and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the question was posed by the Secretary of State as to
whether or not the armistice terms, as set forth in the
memorandum to you from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 12
December 1950, were still valid.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view,
have formulated the following views on the broader problem of
the termination of hostilities in Korea which supersede the
views furnished you in their memorandum dated 12 December
1950.
- 3.
- The Chinese Communists and the North Korean forces are now
suffering especially heavy losses. Any arrangement which did not
[Page 286]
prejudice their
position in Korea but which would end the infliction of large
losses on the Communists would be greatly to their advantage.
Conversely, an arrangement which would require United Nations
forces to remain in Korea, and which did not prejudice the
position of the Communist forces there, would be greatly to our
disadvantage. Such an arrangement would, in all probability,
jeopardize the security of our forces, constitute an unwarranted
drain on our military resources, and tie down our forces in
Korea almost as effectively as if they were engaged in combat.
From the military point of view, therefore, an armistice
arrangement of itself would not, even temporarily, constitute an
acceptable solution of the Korean situation.
- 4.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the present military
situation in Korea may be conducive to a satisfactory resolution
of the immediate over-all problem by political action.
Specifically, it may be possible to take political action to end
the aggression, to conclude the fighting and insure against its
resumption. Such a resolution of the situation, however, must
provide for, a termination of hostilities in Korea only under
circumstances which would make possible the ultimate attainment
of our objective without forfeiture of, or prejudice to, our
general position with respect to the USSR, and with specific
respect to Formosa, and to seating the Chinese Communists in the
United Nations.
- 5.
- In view of the foregoing, any armistice arrangement must, from
the military point of view, be contingent upon the acceptance of
a general agreement which protects the over-all security
interests of the United States. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff cannot concur in any armistice agreement which does not
include the terms, conditions, and arrangements set forth in
paragraphs 6 and 7 below, and particularly in subparagraph 6a. Further, these must be agreed to by
all governments and authorities concerned, including North Korea
and Communist China, prior to the implementation of any
armistice arrangement.
- 6.
- The armistice arrangement:
-
a.
- Must be contingent upon the acceptance by the
Communists of a general agreement to end the aggression
and to accept basic terms of settlement satisfactory to
the United States;
-
b.
- Shall be confined to Korea;
-
c.
- Shall require all governments and authorities
concerned, including North Korea and Communist China, to
order a cessation of all acts of armed force; the
establishment of a demilitarized area across Korea; and
all ground forces to remain in position or be withdrawn
to the rear except that all forces which may be in
advance of the demilitarized area shall be moved to
positions in the rear thereof;
-
d.
- Shall provide for supervision of the general
arrangements, as well as specific details, by an
Armistice Committee (under a Peace Commission designated
by the General Assembly of the United Nations),
[Page 287]
which
Committee shall have free and unlimited access to the
whole of Korea. This Committee may, if necessary, be
assisted by a limited number of observers designated by
the Chinese Communist and/or North Korean forces;
-
e.
- Shall require all governments and authorities
concerned to cease promptly the introduction into Korea
of any reinforcing units or personnel, including
volunteers, during the armistice period. This shall not
be interpreted as precluding the administrative relief
of individual personnel on a man-for-man basis;
-
f.
- Shall require all governments and authorities to
refrain from introducing additional war equipment and
material into Korea. Such equipment and material will
not include those supplies required for the maintenance
of health and welfare and such other supplies as may be
authorized by the Committee, and
-
g.
- Shall continue in effect until the details of a
permanent settlement of the Korean situation have been
arranged.
- 7.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the following specific
details to be essential to the above armistice arrangement:
-
a.
- The Armistice Committee must be competent to inspect
to insure that the terms, conditions and arrangements as
agreed to will be carried out by all armed forces,
including guerrillas in Korea. It shall be provided with
a sufficient number of competent military observers to
enable it to carry out its duties and functions;
-
b.
- Its provisions should not become effective until the
Committee has been organized and is in position to
exercise its functions. The Committee shall report
promptly to the General Assembly of the United Nations
all violations of the armistice arrangement;
-
c.
- The demilitarized area shall be a zone on the order of
20 miles in width, centered at or north of the 38th
parallel. Its exact location shall be determined by the
Armistice Committee on the basis of the position of the
opposing ground units in combat at the time;
-
d.
- The armistice arrangement shall apply to:
- (1)
- All opposing ground forces in Korea, wherever
located. In addition, those forces shall respect
the demilitarized zone and the areas in advance
thereof;
- (2)
- All opposing naval forces in the Korean area
which shall respect the waters contiguous to the
land areas occupied by the opposing armed forces,
to the limit of three miles offshore. Naval units
designated by the Committee for sea transport,
supply, evacuation, surveillance, and humanitarian
purposes shall be excepted from the foregoing
provision while such units are engaged in these
duties and have on board a representative of the
Committee; and
- (3)
- All opposing air forces which shall respect
the air space over the demilitarized zone and the
areas in advance thereof. Air units designated by
the Committee for air transport, supply,
evacuation, surveillance, and humanitarian
purposes shall be excepted from the foregoing
provision while such units are engaged in these
duties and have on board a representative of the
Committee.
-
e.
- Teams of military observers appointed by the committee
together with such United Nations Armed Guards as may be
available and considered appropriate by the Committee
shall have freedom of movement anywhere throughout all
Korea;
-
f.
- Prisoners of war shall be exchanged on a one-for-one
basis as expeditiously as possible;
-
g.
- Organized bodies of armed forces initially in advance
of the demilitarized zone shall be moved back or passed
through to the area of their own main forces.
Guerrillas, both north and south of the demilitarized
zone, shall be withdrawn and be granted safe conduct
through the demilitarized area under terms and
conditions to be established by the Committee;
-
h.
- Nothing in the agreement shall preclude commanders in
the field from providing for the security of their
forces, supplies, and installations, except that no
security forces for this purpose will be permitted
within the demilitarized area;3
-
i.
- The Committee shall be responsible for civil
government, including police functions, in the
demilitarized zone; and
-
j.
- Refugees shall not be allowed to migrate in either
direction into or across the demilitarized area.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Hoyt S. Vandenberg
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force