Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/3–651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Messrs. Barbour and Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] March 6, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:	Australia	—Ambassador Makin and Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Mr. Taymans, Counselor
	Canada	—Ambassador Wrong
	France	—Mr. Millet, Counselor
	Great Britain	—Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
	Greece	—Ambassador Politis
	Luxembourg	—Minister Le Gallais
	Netherlands	—Mr. de Beus, Minister P.
	New Zealand	—Mr. Corner. First Secretary
	Philippines	—Ambassador Elizalde
	Thailand	—Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
	Turkey	—Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
	Union of South Africa	—Ambassador Jooste
	United States	—FE—Mr. Rusk
		UNA—Mr. Sandifer
		BNA—Mr. Raynor
		EUR—Mr. Allen
		UNP—Mr. Henkin
		FE—Mr. Hackler
		FE—Mr. Barbour
		Major Converse—Army
		Captain Maertens—Army

Major Converse stated that there had been recent confirmation from a number of sources of the movement of large bodies of Chinese and North Korean troops from the Manchurian border southwards. In the center of the peninsula north of the 38th parallel the build-up of reserves and the concentration of supplies was being continued, which led to the conclusion that the enemy had freedom of action to reinforce his defense or to launch a counteroffensive. New figures available on enemy strength showed that there were an estimated 73,000 North Korean and 160,000 Chinese Communist troops in action, with an additional 201,000 North Korean and 146,000 Chinese Communist forces capable of intervention. These figures represented a total increase of 73,000 over the figures given last week. The number of guerrillas south of UN forces was estimated to be 28,000. The North Korean VI Corps was now reported south of the Yalu River for the first time. There was no indication whether the reconstituted North Korean army units were equipped with Russian weapons.

Captain Maertens, reviewing UN operations, reported that the past four days had been relatively quiet. In the western sectors there had been patrol actions with few enemy contacts; heavy enemy opposition in the center of the peninsula had slowed friendly advances; and in the east coast area there were continuing slight gains, although one strong enemy attack had forced a South Korean unit to withdraw and regroup. He pointed out that although there had been instances of considerable advances against light opposition, UN units were not following through in any sort of breakthrough since they were trying to maintain a strong line across the peninsula, and great advances by any one unit would weaken this position. It was reported that the Philippine, Greek, and French battalions had been in action during this period as well as had the British Commonwealth Brigade. Air activity was at a maximum during the period with airdrops continuing to supplement the curtailed ground transportation facilities.

Mr. Rusk, reviewing political aspects of the present situation, stated that, on the basis of information available to us, we accepted the fact of a large enemy build-up in the battle area and just north of the 38th parallel, and we believed that the enemy was in a position to launch a counteroffensive if he so desired. On the political side we expected an additional enemy offensive, and we should not be unduly optimistic as to the outcome of such action even though the enemy has been hurt and General Ridgway’s forces are now in good position. Mr. Rusk pointed out that General Ridgway’s lines are relatively thin, and he did not have massive reserves such as were available to the enemy. Although we were not overly anxious about the situation, which General Ridgway had under control at the moment, Mr. Rusk said we did not consider that events of the past five or six weeks could be considered to set a pattern of anticipated results should the Communists launch another full offensive.

Mr. Rusk said that the United States had received no information that there had been any change in the attitude of those in power in Peking regarding the Korean military situation, the possibility of a cease-fire, or their original intent to drive UN forces into the sea. He said that he would be very glad to receive from any of the representatives present additional information on these points which they might have received. On the basis of our present understanding, it appeared to us that the build-up of very large enemy forces, our own relatively unfavorable military position, and the absence of any changes of attitude on the other side added up to sufficient reason for expecting the enemy to attempt another large offensive before being willing to consider a change of policy.

Mr. Rusk added that the United States was getting replacements in to our units to build them up to full strength. He reminded the members of the group that it was very important that their forces in Korea be kept up to strength and that replacement plans be formulated, if this had not already been done.

In response to a question by Ambassador Politis, Mr. Rusk indicated that the United States was not involved in the operations of the Good Offices Committee of the United Nations which, in our opinion, should have complete freedom of action and that we had not, therefore, received information of any recent activity. Although we had heard that the Committee had communicated with the Chinese Communist authorities, we had had no word of the results, if any.