Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

320/1–451: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

New York, January 4, 1951—9:25 p. m.

Delga 482. Korea: six-power meeting. Sponsors six-power resolution met again this afternoon in our offices to continue discussion. It developed that Jebb (UK) had not been in contact with Entezam group and had merely learned that Rau, still without instructions, had been unwilling to have group’s six-principle supplement circulated.

I read those present the memo as cleared by Department, stressing it was secret and was intended to be used by our colleagues and ourselves with view to reaching agreement on some common position.¹

I reported I had talked memo over with LA group, with good reactions.²

Quevedo (Ecuador)³ stated it will be necessary to adopt resolution terming CPR aggressor and effort should be made to get greatest unanimity therefor. He said Ecuador will vote for such resolution but believes it better make one more try at peaceful settlement. He feared if support for a resolution not great enough UN will be further weakened. For this it is necessary to have time for consultation. He was inclined to think that best intermediate step would be to build a resolution around Entezam group principles. If group makes no report of said principles, he suggested for discussion that a resolution might be drafted by someone else along same lines. He felt it not possible to adopt resolution in tomorrow’s Committee 1 meeting because of need to consult governments.

After Ross told Jebb we had consulted with few of Asian-Arab group and had found them interested in Entezam principles and also in 12-power resolution although did not mean necessarily to put it up tomorrow, Jebb said his delegation had it on good authority Asian-Arab group most reluctant to vote for an aggression resolution before a final effort at peaceful settlement along one of four following lines: (1) Entezam group principles, approved by Assembly and sent to Peking; (2) resolution based on principles, whether or not they are put forward by Entezam group; (3) resolution along lines of Israeli draft;⁴ and (4) 12-power resolution (which Jebb did not find “very recommendable” we generally agreed, only more so). So UK felt “very strongly” effort should be made along one of first three lines. Mr. Bevin would not object to “some measure of condemnation” being included in intermediate resolution but not formal designation of CPR as aggressor. Main consideration to Jebb in choice of one of above methods would be number of votes that could be obtained, with or without some clause containing measure of condemnation.

Chauvel (France) pointed out various groups working with desire to achieve greatest unanimity and as yet UN had not officially announced approval of principles as contained in 12–power resolution or Israeli draft. This should be done to clear record and an agency already exists in form of Entezam group to enunciate them. It would be shame not to provide the short time necessary to have these principles enunciated.

Blanco (Cuba)⁵ said his government thinks CPR has very clearly stated its conditions for negotiations and they are completely unacceptable to UN because they would mean surrender by UN. For instance, we could not accept admission CPR to UN. Since CPR holds all action illegal if taken in its absence, new effort to negotiate for cease-fire useless. He thought best course for Committee 1 would be to adopt 6-power resolution amended to condemn CPR aggression and set up CMC to study sanctions. However, if governments bearing brunt of effort acceded to delay, Cuba would go along.

Ross wondered whether there was any point in having Committee meeting tomorrow, in view of possibility no supplementary report from Entezam group. Jebb thought it impossible cancel meeting and I said I saw no harm in having meeting. Chauvel concurred saying it would not be advisable to come to a decision on 6-power resolution tomorrow and that sponsors could use Committee’s full time commenting on developments affecting it, thus paving way to action on Entezam principles.

Jebb indicated opposition to ultimate use of sanctions, saying he thought they would not affect CPR but merely those applying them. I countered saying it is necessary to react to USSR charge that US is aggressor. I pointed out US public opinion is wondering, in absence of official UN pronouncement, whether other members are admitting charges may be true, Quevedo deprecated this possibility, saying number of members have contradicted charge and people are listening to them as well as to USSR.

Chauvel wondered what Committee should do about Soviet proposal to show atrocities film.⁶ Jebb and I agreed it should not be shown in Committee room, but we could not vote against its being shown elsewhere if anyone cared to see it.

Sunde (Norway) stressed that it is of “paramount importance” that any resolution have greatest possible unanimity. His investigations showed that aggression resolution, if voted on now, would not obtain more than 30 votes, but would probably gain many more if intermediate step was tried first and failed. He felt we should act on assumption Rau would get authorization to present principles and he thought it would be good thing to vote on principles tomorrow and reach aggression resolution several days later. He said Fawzi (Egypt) this morning had told him Asian-Arab group animated by common desire for unanimity and will not press 12-power resolution unless others agree.

There was general disagreement with Sunde regarding reaching vote tomorrow.

Gross spoke briefly of impressions gained from meeting with several Asians earlier this afternoon (reported in separate telegram). He drew conclusion Asian desire to be conciliatory posed real problem of how to get any resolution, hard or soft, which would command high majority in GA. He thought steps of intermediate nature with which Asians were toying were only so many formulae for delay. Jebb admitted UK wants delay but [only?] until Commonwealth Conference finishes.

I summed up saying obviously no resolution can be voted tomorrow and hoping Committee might be recessed at call of President in order give time for consultations among members. Chauvel and Jebb concurred, latter urging we use recess to try to build up votes for one of first three alternatives he had mentioned earlier.

Jebb pressed for decision on whether SC should meet to dis-seize itself of whole Korean item. Chauvel thought this was logical. I said I would be able discuss this probably tomorrow.

Austin

1. The memorandum under reference is not printed. It set forth 10 points, embodying no draft resolution, but reflecting areas of agreement within the U.S. Government centering on the idea that the United Nations would have to, within the near future, condemn the People’s Republic of China as an aggressor in Korea. (795.00/1–451)
2. The report of Mr. Austin’s meeting with the Latin American group is contained in telegram Delga 481, January 4, not printed (320/1–451).
3. Antonio Quevedo, Ecuadoran Representative at the United Nations.

4. The Israeli draft resolution had been passed on to the U.S. Delegation on January 2. The substantive portion of the text, as transmitted to the Department in telegram Delga 474, read as follows:

   “The GA …

   “Recommends that the following successive steps be taken to put an end to the fighting in Korea and to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem:

   • “a) An immediate cease-fire,
   • “b) An affirmation by all governments concerned that they accept the UN objective in Korea, namely, the establishment of a unified and independent Korean state by free nationwide elections supervised by the UN,
   • “c) The participation of representatives of states bordering on Korea in the work of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea which shall henceforth be charged with the supervision of the elections and the progressive withdrawal of the non-Korean forces,
   • “d) An agreement for the progressive withdrawal of all non-Korean forces from Korea within a defined period,
   • “e) The initiation of projects for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Korea under UN auspices,
   • “f) A guarantee by the UN and the CPG of the PRC that the independence and integrity of the reconstituted state of Korea shall be respected by all states,

   “Declares that upon acceptance by all parties concerned of the above recommendations (a-f) and upon agreement on their implementation, consideration should be given as a matter of urgency to all questions affecting the relations of the CPG of the PRC with the UN.

   “Calls upon all governments to cooperate with the UN for the achievement of these objectives and emphasizes the responsibility for the peace of the world resting on those governments withholding such cooperation.” (320/1–251)

5. Carlos Blanco, Cuban Alternate Representative at the United Nations.
6. At the First Committee meeting on January 3, the Soviet Representative, Yakov Malik, had suggested the Committee devote 15 or 20 minutes to seeing a documentary film “exposing the actions in Korea of the American interventionists”. (U.N. document A/C.1/SR.419)