Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

CFM Files: Lot M–88: WFM British and French Talks

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs¹

secret

Washington, August 30, 1951.

Means To Combat India’s Policy of Neutralism

Problem

Mr. Nehru’s foreign policy of “neutralism” militates against the achievement of collective security and therefore, in final analysis, is favorable to the Soviet Union. The Indian decision not to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty² is the latest manifestation of Mr. Nehru’s “neutralism”.

US Objectives

We seek to convince India that neutralism is a danger to India’s existence as an independent country, and hinders progress toward a free world order based on law and the peaceful settlement of international disputes; and that collective security and closer association with the non-Soviet countries, far from increasing the possibility of India’s becoming involved in war, are the best assurances that it will not.

Probable UK Position

In general the UK position coincides with our own. However, the UK is at special pains to avoid becoming a party to major issues with India and otherwise to do nothing which might harm UK-Indian relations and increase the likelihood that India will withdraw from the Commonwealth; and there is no clear evidence that the UK has entirely abandoned hope of establishing normal relations with the Chinese Communists—a hope to which Mr. Nehru continues to cling. We suspect, therefore, that the British Government is prone to be more tolerant of the Nehru aberration than we are.

US Position Which Should Be Presented by the Secretary

1. We believe Mr. Nehru conceives his policy as one which will both enhance India’s pretensions as an arbiter of peace in Asia and insure that India will not be drawn into a new world war. We believe Nehru at heart realizes that India’s interests lie in close association with the UK, US and the non-communist countries, and we have reason to believe he is becoming increasingly fearful of Chinese Communist intentions toward other Asian countries. Yet he considers that an unreserved and unequivocal association with other non-Soviet states will put India in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the US and the UK, and limit thereby India’s ability to play a pivotal role in Asian affairs. There is danger that other governments in Asia may be persuaded of the validity of “neutralism” although they may be even more vulnerable to subversion or attack than India and may not have the same close relations with western countries which India actually has with the UK. We recognize the importance of India’s remaining in the Commonwealth and of doing what we can to this end.

2. In the long run an effective means of combatting Indian “neutralism” lies in increasing the capacity of other non-communist Asian states to exert influence and leadership in building collective security. Success in this objective would presumably result in a commensurate limitation on the ability of Mr. Nehru to maintain India as the pivotal Asian state between what he regards as the “two power blocs”. This objective is in part the basis of the economic and military assistance which the United States is currently giving various Asian countries.

3. For the present, however, we believe special effort should be made to expose the error of India’s foreign policy of neutralism. We believe it should be our purpose to convince Nehru and those who have adopted his approach, that collective security measures can be applied not only to small powers which may have aggressive designs, but also to large powers, and that collective security is best calculated to give Mr. Nehru what he seeks, i.e., a period of peace in which India will have time to develop, and to solve some of its pressing domestic problems.

4. We should emphasize to the other countries of South and Southeast Asia which are even less prepared to resist subversion and aggression than India—particularly those inclining toward neutralism—the importance of collective UN security against aggression.

5. We have instructed our diplomatic representatives in South Asia to make a special point not only of defending our policies but also of countering or refuting notions held by Indians or others which give rise to the concept of neutralism. Since neutralism is damaging to our joint interests, it might be desirable for the UK and other countries which are concerned by India “neutralism” similarly to instruct their representatives abroad.

We would be interested in knowing British views in this regard and in learning how they think this general problem can best be dealt with.³

1. Prepared as a briefing paper for the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, held in Washington, September 10 through 14. In the records of the meetings the paper was designated as document WFM B–2/4. Minutes of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers are scheduled for publication in volume iii.
2. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 777 ff.
3. There is no indication that the subject of this paper was formally discussed at the meetings of the Foreign Ministers, although the Kashmir dispute was briefly considered at the meeting of September 10. See p. 1837.