691.93B/6–751: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

3541. [Here follows a discussion of the Sino-Tibetan treaty of May 23, 1951, and of a radio broadcast from Sofia.]

3. We do not believe we wld be justified regard Nehru’s stated willingness accept US grant aid as appreciable change in degree his friendliness towards US.1 We think it does indicate his advisors, particularly Bajpai and Deshmukh, have persuaded him that GOI must make economic progress if India to have polit and econ stability and econ progress impossible without US econ aid and cooperation. Dept will recall Nehru permitted himself be persuaded 1949 indicate his desire for million tons US wheat and was sharply resentful both with advisors and US when he got nothing. Similarly with much hesitation he agreed allow GOI asked for 2 million tons food grain some six months ago. His advisors then thought this meant he had [Page 2168] finally decided on policy closer economic cooperation with US. Delays and criticisms of India and self-encountered during consideration this request, made him again irritated with his advisors and with US Congress and press. His irritation this time not directed against exec branch govt as in 1949.2 Highest officials GOI with whom I have discussed matter in confidence say Nehru showed great reluctance agree to acceptance US aid on ECA terms but when he finally capitulated did so with good grace. They think his agreement of great significance in that he has come around for third time to view India needs econ cooperation US. Does not mean his general attitude towards US will undergo marked change at least for time. He likely continue on occasions make remarks sharply critical American way life and US governmental policies. Nevertheless they hope if US econ assistance is extended in manner which wld not irk Nehru or his advisors his unfriendly attitude toward US might gradually change. Much will depend on kind personnel ECA sends to India and instructions under which they are working. If officials administering US aid take attitude they know better than Indians what India needed and try to decide for India course its economic development US economic aid program for India might injure rather than strengthen relations. On other hand, tactful aid officials who show respect for GOI point of view and desire cooperate rather than dominate might do much to remove suspicions US motives which still exist.

Factors other than economic aid will of course also continue influence attitude towards US. His resentment against both UK and US over their policies re Kashmir is rather deep and may become deeper if US and UK continue firmly adhere their present position in SC. Similarly PriMin still unhappy about our Far Eastern policies although recently he has been inclined be somewhat more reserved in his comments with regard to them. We have impression he is not so confident as formerly that if only US would be more reasonable he could find formula for general Far Eastern settlement.

Henderson
  1. This portion of the telegram was in response to a question in telegram 2048 to New Delhi, June 2, not printed, as to whether the Embassy believed Nehru’s apparent willingness to accept an aid grant from the United States reflected any change in degree of friendliness toward the United States (691.00/6–251).
  2. For documentation on Nehru’s views in 1949 and on his visit to the United States in the course of that year, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, pp. 1686 ff.