Lot 54D423
Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald)
Subject: Japanese Relations with Chinese Nationalist Government.
| Participants: | Prime Minister Yoshida |
| Mr. Sadao Iguchi, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs | |
| Ambassador John Foster Dulles | |
| Ambassador W. J. Sebald |
Ambassador Dulles explained to the Prime Minister some of the difficulties which he anticipates will arise in the Senate in connection with the ratification of the Peace Treaty and, especially, the necessity for an early resolution on the part of Japan of the China problem. He stated that he had prepared a letter, essentially embodying the present Japanese position, which he suggested that Prime Minister Yoshida might send to him soon.
Mr. Dulles explained that he had thoroughly discussed the letter with Senators Smith and Sparkman who felt that such a letter from Mr. Yoshida would be the minimum without which it would probably be impossible to obtain ratification of the Treaty.
(Copies of the proposed letter1 were then handed to the Prime Minister and to Mr. Iguchi, who carefully read its contents. Mr. Dulles also explained the contents of the letter after they had completed reading it.)
The Prime Minister said that he saw no objection to writing such a letter but he wished to know when negotiations should be taken up with the National Government of China. Ambassador Dulles replied that the purpose of the letter is to have it in hand for future publication, and that under no circumstances would it be made public until the Prime Minister had been advised that this would be done. He said that in any event the letter would not be published until after the conversations with Messrs. Churchill and Eden in Washington,2 at which time it was hoped that the United States would be successful in changing the British attitude toward China. He wished it to be clearly understood that even if the British do not change their attitude, the United States would take the “blame”, so that Japan would not be subject to counteraction on the part of the British, although he failed to see how the British could apply pressure on Japan at this time.
In consequence of further discussion, it was agreed: (1) that the Prime Minister would address the letter to Ambassador Dulles and send it to Ambassador Sebald at an appropriate time; and (2) that the existence of the letter should remain confidential until such time as Prime Minister Yoshida is advised that it is about to be made public.
Prime Minister Yoshida said it would be necessary for him to prepare public opinion in Japan based upon the contents of the letter.
Mr. Yoshida said he wanted to speak of another subject, and raised the possibility of showing a continuing economic interest by the United States in Japan, e.g., a Government loan, in order to still opposition criticism that the Security Treaty is a one-sided affair and that Japan [Page 1445] might, in the not too distant future, be abandoned by the United States when it serves the purpose of the United States to do so.