894.501/12–1551

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: The Department of Defense has carefully considered the second proposal contained in the letter of 28 September 19511 from the Acting Secretary of State to the effect that a high-level State–Defense mission proceed to Japan at an early date to discuss with Japanese officials their plans for Japanese rearmament, and that the negotiation of the Administrative Agreement might provide an appropriate context for such discussions. I wish to submit the following comments and recommendations on this proposal along the general line that the important discussions with the Japanese Government on rearmament should be kept separate from the negotiation of the Administrative Agreement.

The Department of Defense, of course, is vitally concerned in developing sound relationships with Japan on security matters, which is the general purpose of the second proposal in the above letter. Both the United States and Japanese Governments should carefully consider the size, composition and organization of Japanese defense forces. Since the United States Government should have a full understanding of the plans of the Japanese Government for its own defense, it is important to undertake discussions for this purpose in the next few months.

However, before informal or formal discussions on this subject with Japanese authorities can take place, it is mandatory for the United States to establish a firm position with respect to all substantive matters bearing on the subject of the rearmament of Japan. The Department of Defense is now studying several military questions regarding this subject. I seriously doubt that a firm position on Japanese rearmament can be achieved in the short time, according to present plans, before negotiations begin with the Japanese Government on the Administrative Agreement.

When the appropriate time comes, General Ridgway can do much to lay the groundwork with the Japanese Government by informal [Page 1440] discussions in advance of any formal negotiations. Such negotiations should not be undertaken until these informal discussions have been completed. If a group is sent to Japan in connection with Japanese rearmament, the function of this trip should be to advise and assist General Ridgway in the conduct of formal discussions with the Japanese Government authorities on this subject.

The question of a Japanese Ministry of Defense, or some appropriate organization for handling Japanese defense forces in connection with U.S. security dispositions in Japan, may be a question related to Japanese rearmament that might arise during the negotiation of the Administrative Agreement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a central agency on a cabinet level is essential in order to permit the Japanese Government to exercise proper supervision and control of the activities of its armed forces. It is considered that a Ministry of Defense in which the military is made subordinate to civilian control and which would be subject to constitutional checks and balances, would be appropriate for this purpose. Moreover, an arrangement of this kind would at the same time provide the desirable safeguards to preclude the Japanese military authorities from assuming political prerogatives.

In the light of the foregoing, the Department of Defense makes the following recommendations, all from the military point of view:

(a)
The Mission to negotiate the Administrative Agreement should not be authorized to initiate formal discussions with Japanese Government authorities regarding Japanese rearmament and the size and composition of the armed forces contemplated;
(b)
At such time (see subparagraph (c) below) as it may become appropriate to initiate formal discussions regarding Japanese rearmament and the size and composition of the armed forces contemplated, a separate group of United States military representatives should be designated to report to General Ridgway in order to assist him in these discussions;
(c)
Formal discussions regarding Japanese rearmament and the size and composition of the forces contemplated should not be undertaken until General Ridgway has completed necessary informal discussions with Japanese Government authorities;
(d)
It would be desirable for the Japanese Government eventually to establish a Ministry of Defense in which the military is made subordinate to the civilian control and which would be subject to the checks and balances provided by the Japanese constitution; and
(e)
The Mission to negotiate the Administrative Agreement should not initiate discussions regarding the establishment of a Ministry of Defense. However, if this subject is advanced by the Japanese Government authorities, that Mission should present, in general terms, the advantages which would accompany the establishment of such a Ministry organized as indicated above.

Sincerely yours,

William C. Foster
  1. See footnote 7, p. 1361.