694.001/11–2351: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
3095. Embtel 3080, November 22, to Dept1 rptd London 833. Fol two personal messages from Eden to the Secy received under cover informal letters from Brit Emb dated Nov 20 and 21 respectively:
(1) “I am sorry that owing to the pressure of business in Paris it was not clear to me from what you said to me there how far you intended that the talks with Mr. Merchant on this subj shld go. In the circumstances I am sure you will understand that I need more time to consider this difficult prob. I will communicate with you again on the subj as soon as possible.”
(2) “I much appreciate the frankness with which the US Govt have consulted us over this prob and I strongly agree on the importance of our maintaining a common front towards Japan as we have done on other questions throughout the peace treaty negots.
“On full consideration, however, I do not feel able to approve the draft formula which emerged from the official level talks in London last week. My predecessor and Dulles agreed in June last that Jap’s future attitude towards China must be for determination by Jap itself in the exercise of the sovereign and independent status contemplated by the peace treaty. I stand by this agrmt. I recognize that there are trade relations and other practical questions which may require contacts between the Jap Govt and the Chinese Nationalists. It wld be one thing for the Jap Govt, shld they so desire, to take preliminary steps aimed at a modus vivendi covering these matters. I wld not wish to discourage this. It wld be quite another thing for Jap to embark on any form of recognition of the Chi Nationalists, and if need arose I shld feel bound to endorse the advice already given the Jap Govt by Sir E. Dening against this action. I cannot help feeling that any such action might add to Jap’s and our difficulties in the future.
[Page 1410]“In answering your proposal on these lines, I wld not wish to be thought unconscious of the probable difficulties in regard to the ratification of the peace treaty in the US Senate. We must, however, also consider the parliamentary situation in this country and I shld be most reluctant to do anything to jeopardize the bipartisan acceptance which the Jap peace settlement has so far received in Parl.”
Following is the Secy’s ltr to Eden Nov 22:
“Dear Mr. Eden: I was glad to have had the opportunity to talk with you last evening on the matter of Jap’s relations with the Chi Nationalists which was the subj of the personal message I recd from you yesterday.
“I explained to you my concern in the matter and I am sure you understand there is no thought of attempting to coerce the Jap Govt or of its concluding an agrmt before it regains its sovereignty. There are, however, in the meantime, the very practical probs of trade, claims, representation and like questions with which Jap must deal. I believe that the Jap, if they so choose, shld not be discouraged from extending the discussion of these probs with the authorities on Formosa into preliminary talks looking toward an agrmt which wld conform to the realities, but which wld in no event be concluded before the multilateral treaty comes into force.
“I believe you and I were right in our decision to leave these interrelated probs for discussions in Tokyo next month between Dulles and Sir Esler Dening. I have great confidence that they will be able on the scene to work this out in such fashion as to maintain our common front and avoid giving the Jap any opportunity to play one of us off against the other. If any difficulties shld arise, you and I can communicate with each other. Sincerely yours, Dean Acheson.”
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