Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Under Secretary’s Meetings, Lot 53D250

Memorandum of the Under Secretary’s Meeting, Prepared in the Department of State

top secret
UM N–419

[Washington,] November 14, 1951—9:30 a. m.

[Here follow sections of the memorandum which summarize discussion of the Korean military situation, Communist propaganda activities, and the Iranian situation.]

Administrative Agreement with Japan

6. Mr. Rusk reported that he is working on the broad administrative agreement with Japan which basically covers conditions of stationing American troops in Japan. He pointed out that there will be many difficult problems which will follow the success credited to our occupation and the recent peace conference. In the solution of some of these problems there may be a let-down. It is anticipated that we will have some difficulties with the Japanese and the JCS. He suggested that S/P might wish to reexamine the broad underlying philosophy of our administrative agreement as to whether stationing of troops over a period of years will drain off our goodwill with the Japanese people. He pointed out that EUR has a similar problem with respect to Germany.

7. Mr. Rusk stated that this administrative arrangement will be signed by executive agreement and not submitted to Congress, in order to retain the necessary flexibility in administering such an agreement. Mr. Rusk expects to go to Japan for preliminary talks as soon as the security pact and the peace treaty are ratified by the Diet. Early in January, he expects to return to Japan for final discussions, and, at the same time, have the agreement in the hands of the Senate prior to its action on the ratification of the treaties.

8. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the Japanese will have considerable difficulty going from their present status to full sovereignty.¹ It will also be difficult for us. We must make every effort to preserve the forms of equality and sovereignty, so that Japan can become adjusted as quickly as possible to present world conditions. We must maintain U.S. prestige in Japan. This element of prestige has not been completely analyzed but it is a very important factor. We must persuade the Japanese that what follows is a common enterprise, a joint responsibility, and one in which they must make their contribution. Our success in these resultant actions will have an important effect on other nations in Asia. We cannot be put into a position of forcing our way into Japan. Mr. Rusk noted that there will be a problem of whether Japan can be given the “most-favored-nation treatment” similar to what is given NATO countries. When this question arises, Defense may wish to re-open the entire NATO question. The JCS at the present time does not accept equality of Japan and the NATO countries

9. Mr. Rusk stated that the following physical arrangements are suggested, on the assumption of no hostilities in Korea:

a. The number of American troops stationed should be limited to the requirements of Japan itself. Security requirements for the rest of the Far East should be handled by using bases outside of Japan.

b. We should use the facilities formerly used by the Japanese armed forces and get out of Japanese commercial facilities.

c. We should avoid large cities.

d. CINCFE should be located outside of Japan, so that Japan would not be brought into general Far East difficulties, and also so that CINCFE would not be cut off in case of an emergency.

e. American forces should be so located that they would have control over their own lines of communication.

f. In order to limit facilities, the number of dependents should be restricted.

g. Recreation facilities should be on a shared basis.

h. Standard of living should be similar to that in the U.S. and should not be ostentatious.

i. The U.S. should give up the Dai-Ichi building and other Japanese buildings.

j. An intensive information program among our troops stationed in Japan should be maintained.

10. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the above does not represent a final position and requires considerable more discussion, especially with Defense. Defense will have serious differences with us on many of the above points, such as quarters, location of CINCFE, etc.

11. As a corollary to the above discussion, Mr. Nitze² pointed out that we need Defense plans on how they plan to protect the Far East area. Apparently they have not looked at the problem of continued build-up of Chinese Communist forces and how we cope with this factor.

1. In a memorandum of November 9, Mr. Rusk had discussed in somewhat greater detail a number of the points touched on above. The first paragraph of that memorandum follows:

   “1. The overriding policy consideration affecting all post-Treaty arrangements with Japan is the necessity for obtaining and preserving a voluntary and strong commitment of the Japanese Government and people to friendship for and common action with the United States and the free world. Questions of cost, convenience or preference must be subordinated to this overriding policy, the failure of which would be disastrous and would produce incalculable costs for the American people.” (The source text is a copy of Mr. Rusk’s memorandum made on November 19 for distribution to members of the Policy Planning Staff; PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563)

2. Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff.