Office of the Historian

694.001/12–3151

Handwritten Notes by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)1

[London?, undated.]2

Points

1.
Japan needs Nats friendship in UN etc.
2.
Formosa trade important
3.
Yoshida Govt anti-com.
[Page 1400]

Yoshida gave US or Dulles no assurance he wld deal with Formosa

US Senate will demand some indication Japs are negotiating or getting on with an arrangement with Formosa.

We have been thinking of some formula wh wld recognize the de facto limitations on CKS3 ability to bind China. We have talked to Chinese (but not Japs) along such lines.

Memorandum4

Taipei desp. 121 of 9/27/515

Yeh—alt. B—

“The present Treaty shall in respect of the Rep of China be applicable in all of the territories which are now or which may hereafter be under the control of the Govt of China”

(agreed minute at exchange of ratifications)

Per Deptel 334 to Taipei 10/176 2nd formula pfd—modified c.f.

“It is mutually understood that this treaty shall be applicable at any given time with respect to all areas under the actual control of either H.C.P.”

Tactics

1)
Recall & summarize Dulles–Morrison agreement.7
2)
We have a problem—Senate
3)
Natural factors at work
4)
* We have not urged Japs to negotiate with Formosa & we have no commitment [word “commitment” uncertain]
5)
We have tried to reason with Formosa to be realistic
6)
We wld like UK to go with us to Japs & say
i)
Provided it doesn’t be signed or [last three words interpolated] come into force before multilateral does & provided Japs can be satisfied by Chinese on content, we wld see advantages in Japs opening negotiations with Formosa looking toward Bilateral
7)
Despite difficulties arising from our different Ch Recog. policies, we have worked out in Treaty common public front with UK & are most anxious to retain it.
[Page 1401]

Essence—Dulles–Morrison Agreement (In writing?)

1)
No China go to San Fran.
2)
Japan when sovereign wld “conclude[“?] arrangements with China of its choosing

Note—China could negotiate now.

—US wld not be able to urge Japan to negotiate exclusive Tr. with F.

US can agree now with UK

1)
No bilateral come into force or be signed before Mult.
2)
Will not urge Jap. to deal exclusively with Formosa but can work out de facto deal [last seven words interpolated; word “deal” uncertain]
3)
UK similarly won’t urge excl. with Peiping
4)
Give Dening latitude to work out cooperative line with Dulles.

How frank be with UK?

  1. Attached to a covering note of April 11, 1958 (not printed), by Harold L. Skean, a Staff Assistant in the Executive Secretariat. The notes were presumably made before conclusion of the tentative agreement detailed in the document infra. Another portion of these notes, dated November 16, dealing with implementation of the agreement, is not printed.↩
  2. Mr. Merchant arrived in London November 13, 1951, for talks regarding a Sino-Japanese peace treaty with Robert Heatlie Scott, Superintending Under Secretary of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.↩
  3. Chiang Kai-shek.↩
  4. This word is printed on the notepaper.↩
  5. Not printed; with it is enclosed the Republic of China’s note paraphrased in telegram 419 from Taipei, September 27, p. 1362.↩
  6. See footnote 3, p. 1363.↩
  7. Mr. Merchant apparently had in mind a specific document. See footnote 15, p. 1414.↩
  8. We have urged Japs to set up overseas agency—We have not concealed our friendship for Nats & enmity for Commies. [Footnote in the source text.]↩