Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

894.501/9–1951

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 25, 1951.

Subject: Heavy Armament for the Japanese National Police Reserve.

The Problem

In his letter of September 19, 1951² the Secretary of Defense requests Department of State concurrence in the release of heavy military equipment to the Japanese National Police Reserve at the discretion of the Commander in Chief, Far East.

This proposal is a renewal of one made last March by the Secretary of Defense and finally resolved by agreement upon recommendations³ sent to the President by the Secretary of Defense on May 1. Essentially, these recommendations provided that heavy military equipment for four divisions would be stockpiled in Japan but not placed in the hands of the Japanese without specific prior agreement by the Department of State, or approval at the highest government level. In addition, the Department of the Army was to undertake planning and budgeting to provide equipment of this nature for ten divisions by July 1, 1952.

The argument for now releasing this equipment to the Japanese National Police Reserve rests upon the increased tension in the Far East, the seriousness of the threat to Japanese security posed by Soviet capabilities, and the consequent necessity for increasing as rapidly as possible Japan’s ability to contribute to her own defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff point out that additional United States forces cannot be sent to Japan without accepting unwarranted risks in other vital areas and that it is therefore necessary to develop the full combat capability of the National Police Reserve.

Discussion

There is no question that the security of Japan is of vital importance to United States security interests in the Pacific. There are, however several serious difficulties presented by the action proposed by the Department of Defense:

1. The proposed action violates decisions of the Far Eastern Commission which are international commitments of the United States Government. The FEC decision most directly applicable is FEC 017/21 of February 12, 1948 which specifically limits Japanese civil police agencies to “rifles and pistols and the necessary ammunition for them and other small arms exclusively used by civil police”. This decision remains effective until the effective date of the peace treaty.

This difficulty could be avoided by denouncing either the Moscow Agreement,⁴ which created the FEC, or the specific FEC decisions which are relevant. However, we are not likely to be able to secure the support of other FEC members in such action. In addition, the denunciation of an international commitment is a serious step which should be taken only on the basis of an immediately present threat and a clear demonstration that no other course of action is available.

2. One of our most important current objectives is the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Because several of the Pacific powers which have signed the treaty retain lively fears concerning the Japanese rearmament, the problem of securing ratification in these countries would be made considerably more difficult by the proposed action. Ambassador Spender of Australia⁵ recently emphasized to an officer of the Department that rapid movement in the direction of the rearming of Japan would cause serious political difficulties in Australia and might delay or possibly even prevent Australian ratification of the treaty. Similar representations have been made by New Zealand.

3. Both Mr. Morrison and Mr. Schuman in the recent discussions here¹ included a too-rapid rearming of Japan in the list of actions which might inadvertently precipitate a third world war. Whether or not these views are correct, it is certainly true that the proposed action would make it more difficult for us to secure international support for the defense of Japan in the event of a localized Communist attack on Japan.

The weight of the foregoing considerations is such that every effort should be made to find an alternative course of action which will secure the objectives desired by both Departments.

There is another problem involved which goes to the underlying philosophy of our relationship with Japan on security questions. What the Department of Defense proposes amounts to a unilateral determination by the United States of the action which the Japanese should take to contribute to their own defense. The unilateral character of this determination is wrong. If the United States is to be successful in rapidly developing the ability of Japan to contribute to the security of the Pacific, the United States must treat Japan as a partner and not as an occupied power.

Japanese press comment and public statements by various semiofficial Japanese sources indicate a growing interest in Japan in the action which Japan should take with respect to its defense forces. However, Prime Minister Yoshida in a press conference upon his return to Tokyo said, “As I have said repeatedly, there will not be rearmament for the time being”. The Japanese Foreign Office informally explained to our Mission in Tokyo that they have no doubt that Yoshida plans at the propitious time to undertake effective rearmament. However, he is concerned about building up public opinion in Japan and awaiting further economic recovery before doing more than providing for some strengthening of the National Police Reserve. This would therefore seem to be the right time for the United States to seek to discover official Japanese thinking on the subject of the eventual rearmament of Japan and to engage with the Japanese in joint planning of the steps which must be taken to insure the security of Japan.

Recommendations

I believe that a solution can be found which meets the Department of Defense objective of a rapid increase in Japanese defense capabilities but which does not involve a violation of the relevant FEC decisions. The heavy military equipment can be put in the hands of the United States forces at their bases in Japan, and the members of the Japanese National Police Reserve can be brought in rotation to these bases to undergo training in its use. Within four to six months the peace treaty should be effective, and the equipment can then be turned over to the Japanese. Although this proposal does not involve a violation of the FEC decisions, it must be discussed first with other governments most concerned, especially in view of the attitudes they have expressed with respect to the rearming of Japan. However, once that discussion has taken place, if no violent objection has arisen, the Department of Defense could proceed at once to authorize General Ridgway to take the proposed action.

This suggestion has been informally discussed with officials of the Department of Defense. In their opinion, while it will not be regarded as completely satisfactory, it will probably be found acceptable.

In addition, I believe that we should use this opportunity to stress to the Department of Defense that our basic approach to the problem of Japanese security involves discussion with the Japanese and joint planning at all stages. We should, therefore, suggest that as soon as possible a high level mission composed of representatives of both the Department of Defense and the Department of State should go to Japan to discuss with the responsible officials of the Japanese Government their plans as to the timing of Japanese rearmament and the size and nature of the forces they contemplate. Since the Administrative Agreement implementing the bilateral security pact must be negotiated with the Japanese in the very near future, that negotiation might offer an excellent opportunity for carrying on such discussions.

Attached is a letter to the Secretary of Defense expressing the points of view and making the suggestions embodied in this memorandum. I recommend that it be signed.⁷

1. Memorandum drafted by Mr. McClurkin. Submitted to the Secretary through Francis E. Meloy, Jr., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat.
2. See footnote 3, p. 1350.
3. For text, see the enclosure to Secretary Marshall’s letter of April 20 to Mr. Acheson, p. 1001.
4. For text of the Communiqué of the Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Moscow December 16–26, 1945, released December 27, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 815–824.
5. Mr. Percy Spender presented to President Truman his credentials as Ambassador to the United States on June 8.
1. Reference is to the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States held at Washington September 10–14. Documentation on the Conference is scheduled for publication in volume iii.

7. On September 28 a letter, not printed, embodying both the considerations and the recommendations set forth above was sent to Mr. Lovett over Mr. Webb’s signature. In it the paragraph equivalent to the first paragraph under “Recommendations” above reads as follows: “First, the heavy military equipment might be retained in the possession of the United States forces at their own bases in Japan. Personnel from the National Police Reserve could then be brought to those bases in rotation for training in the use of the equipment. In this way we would avoid violation of Far Eastern Commission decisions. We believe that it is essential that this step should be discussed in advance with certain friendly members of the Far Eastern Commission; however, if no serious objections develop, the training program could commence immediately after such discussions have taken place.” (894.501/9–1951)

   In his reply of November 6 to Mr. Acheson, Mr. Lovett wrote:

   “With respect to the letter of 28 September 1951 from the Acting Secretary of State regarding Japanese defense forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, on 29 October 1951, and I concur, that you complete as soon as possible the necessary discussions with friendly members of the Far Eastern Commission. This action is recommended in order to permit early initiation of National Police Reserve training with heavy armament in the manner suggested in the letter referred to above.

   “The Department of Defense would appreciate being informed as promptly as possible of the results of these discussions.” (894.501/11–651)