694.001/7–2851: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State
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Topad 202. For Dulles and Allison. Re Deptel 118, July 25.1 Suggestion contained in reftel that Japan will be treated differently, however slightly, from other dels is a concept which appears entirely at variance with careful efforts made to date by General Ridgway, Dulles, yourself, important visitors to Japan, this Mission, and numerous other Americans to convince Japanese that subject to exigencies of regime of control and occupation we are dealing with them as equals. In past few months, especially since advent of General Ridgway as SCAP, hdqrs official social relationships with Japanese Govt officials and private individuals have been conducted on basis friendship and equality, and recent social functions by most diplomatic missions have also been conducted in same spirit.
Invitation to Japanese Govt to conference was couched in such terms as to leave no doubt that United States Govt shares above view. As host nation, United States should set tone of conference, and I wld greatly deplore any action which cld be construed by Japan as a slight or as revival of spirit of Versailles (which Dulles so graphically explained to Japanese while here).
It wld appear entirely reasonable to me, shld any del object to presence Japanese del at any stage of conference, to allow that del accept onus for slight. Certainly United States shld not become party to any procedure which wld align it with a complex of superiority which might conceivably place in jeopardy future of our entire security program for this part of world.
Suggestion in reftel that chairman at opening session suggest in absence objection Japanese participation in conference proceedings appears most undesirable in that Japanese del wld at very beginning of conference be placed in humiliating position of having to wait, hat in hand, for permission to enter conference, notwithstanding conference [Page 1230] has been called for sole purpose concluding peace treaty with Japan. Moreover, such procedure wld run risk that any objection voiced by even one del wld not only have adverse effect on United States publicly stated aim that treaty is designed to effect “peace of reconciliation” but would probably rekindle dormant desire perpetuate victor-vanquished relationship by some countries having little or no stake in Far East.
I need not cite instances of sensitivity and long memory of Japanese people as exemplified by past. At peace conference they will be all the more sensitive and tense, suspecting real or imagined discriminatory treatment as designed stigmatize them as inferiors. It behooves us, I believe, to take every possible precaution that no slightest ground arise whereby blame in this regard cld be attached to United States. We shld also constantly bear in mind that Japan is an Asiatic nation and that eyes of Asia will be upon San Francisco and upon manner in which each and every Asiatic nation, including Japan, is recd and treated by United States and other “white” nations.
Any discrimination against Japanese del at San Francisco wld moreover serve to undermine personal prestige of Yoshida and render that much more difficult his task of gaining general public acceptance of treaty in Japan.
I therefore most strongly urge that every effort be made to accord Japanese del treatment equal to that of every other del. Since details of treaty already completely finalized by diplomatic negotiations and conference is in effect only a signing ceremony, and therefore unique as peace conference, it appears from here most essential for conference open and proceed on basis of ceremony or function by which Japan being formally readmitted to family of nations as honorable and equal partner.
Accordingly, it is my earnest recommendation that Japanese del be allowed participate in all aspects of conference from moment of its arrival and that United States del take initiative in introducing Japanese del in spirit of friendship and equality, bearing in mind role of Japan as our future partner in Pacific.
No objection perceived your suggested timing public statement by head Japanese del and for psychological reasons shld probably be made last and just prior signature of treaty. This connection, Yoshida recently told me he desires voice gratitude Japanese people to United States for treaty concept and for assistance during occupation.
General Ridgway has read this tel, concurs fully and urges acceptance of views and approval of recommendation herein.2
- In that telegram, marked “From Allison,” the Department had stated in part: “Tentative thinking here is that Jap shld be given treatment [at the peace conference] nearly as possible equal to that of other dels. However, this raises certain delicate points and it will probably not be possible to have Jap officially present at opening session. Suggestion has been made that at some point during opening session Chairman of Conference will state that in view of spirit in which Treaty has been drafted and in view of strict compliance by Jap in terms of surrender over long period, he intends, unless there is objection, to invite Jap Del to be officially present during proceedings of Conference. Diplomatic preparation would have to be made beforehand to make certain that no objections were raised. It is probable that head of Jap Del wld only be expected to make one public statement, presumably at end of Conference and just prior to signature of Treaty.” (694.001/7–2551)↩
- For the Department’s decision regarding the procedural arrangements for the Japanese Delegation, see telegram 342, to Tokyo, August 28, p. 1299.↩