Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/7–2151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Burma (Key) to the Secretary of State ¹

confidential

Rangoon, July 21, 1951—noon.

82. Depcirtels 56, 57, 59 July 18.² Appointment with FonMin at which I will deliver revised draft Jap treaty³ with invitation to San Francisco conf postponed from July 21 to July 23.

After Cabinet decision July 20 FonOff sent note⁴ acknowledging Emb note July 7⁵ which enclosed memorandum⁶ and July 3 draft of treaty. FonOff note conveyed GOB observation that it cannot approve draft which wld permit Jap Govt evade responsibility paying reparations on grounds lack of capacity make payment. Considers theory injury Jap econ unjustified. Note summarizes extent damage inflicted on Burma points out no adequate contribution recd any source any stage hence justifiable Burm people feel strongly on reparations question. Note disclaims vindictiveness toward Japanese, outlines support given to admitting Japs to UN orgs and resumption trade relations and bases quest for reparations on necessity rehabilitate Burm from ravages war into which drawn because then part of a colonial empire. Concludes any draft omitting reparations to Burm cannot meet with GOB approval.

This is first official notice GOB attitude. Previously FonOff officials had expressed inability to speak for GOB but had given personal view that Burm desired some acknowledgment justice their claim reparations and that while appreciated none might be forthcoming it was desirable for domestic political reasons for treaty to provide some form of compensation whether described as reparations or econ aid or by another term. They did not suggest that GOB wld refuse sign treaty unless treaty definitely provided payment reparations to Burm.

Emb has pointed out that draft treaty does make provisions negots for reparations.

Emb believes GOB sincere in expressing strong feeling on reparations but possibility shld not be excluded that GOB in any case not anxious approve draft treaty because (1) It thinks haste with which it is being pushed to final form offers little opportunity for discussion with all countries interested and (2) unwillingness of GOB to take action which Commie Chi might term unfriendly unless there are clearly compensating advantages.⁷

Have not yet been able ascertain whether GOB views have been sent to GOB Amb in Washington.

Brit Emb Rangoon being informed of contents FonOff note.

Key

1. Telegram repeated for information to London and Tokyo.
2. Telegrams 56 and 59 not printed; for telegram 57, see p. 1199.
3. Reference is to the draft of July 20.
4. Not printed; it is enclosure 1 to despatch 83 from Rangoon, July 25, also not printed. (694.001/7–2551)
5. Not printed.
6. The covering memorandum to the July 3 text, not printed.

7. In telegram 89, to Rangoon, of July 25, drafted by Mr. Allison, the Department stated in part that it did not understand how Burma could contend it had been offered little opportunity for discussion of the treaty, as Burma had been brought into the treaty talks by Mr. Dulles the preceding October. “At no time since then when US has requested comments various countries, for example at time distribution Mar 30 draft, has GOB made any attempt to discuss problem with us. This is especially significant in view of fact that Mar 30 draft made no provision for reparations of any kind other than from Jap assets in Allied countries. We are of course ready to go into matter in detail at any time but frankly cannot be sympathetic to their alleged indignation at this late date when they have been on notice of US attitude toward reparations for almost a year.

   “Present treaty draft which apparently GOB had not closely studied prior to their July 20 note acknowledges justice of reparations claims and provides only method possible of satisfying these claims. Provisions of Art 14(a) included by US most reluctantly and only as result of discussions with other countries such as Phil who have taken position similar to that of Burma on this matter. As far as US is concerned if countries such as Burma and Phil are not willing to sign treaty with present reparations provisions we wld be inclined to recommend their elimination in final draft. … While Dept is aware of possible unwillingness of Burma to take action which Chi Commies might term unfriendly it is believed there is nothing in Treaty draft per se at which Commies can take legitimate offense.” (694.001/7–2551)

   The draft handed Burma under date of March 30 is identical to that printed under date of March 23, p. 944.