Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Lot 54D423

The British Embassy to the Department of State ¹

undated

Aide-Mémoire

post-treaty security and rearmament of japan

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are of the opinion that the Peace Treaty with Japan should contain no provisions prohibiting Japanese rearmament or limiting the size or nature of any armed forces which she may eventually raise. They consider, and they believe the Government of the United States to hold the same view, that a restrictive Peace Treaty with Japan is undesirable on general political grounds, particularly because the enforcement of any military restrictions which it might contain would present great, if not insurmountable, difficulties. H.M.G. consider it most important however that some safeguards should be provided outside the Treaty to ensure that Japan does not once more become an aggressor. This question has been examined by the U.K. Chiefs of Staff, a statement of whose views is attached at Annex. These views have been approved by H.M.G., who will be glad to learn in due course whether they are shared by the Government of the United States.

[Annex]

Views of the Chiefs of Staff on the Rearmament of Japan

top secret

General

1. An approach to the problem of Japanese rearmament must be based on the following factors:—

(a) Within the next few years

(i) Japan has not the military means or economic resources to become by herself an aggressor.

(ii) Military arrangements are necessary for internal security and against external threats.

(iii) Military arrangements must be sponsored and economic help must be provided by the Allies to prevent Japan from falling a prey to Communism.

(b) Long Term

(i) Permanent restrictions on rearmament can only be imposed by permanent occupation; this is politically impracticable and militarily unacceptable. Therefore Japan must become an independent sovereign Power.

(ii) The continued alignment of Japan with the West can only be achieved on a voluntary basis, which would mean the establishment of an identity of interest politically, economically and militarily.

Threats to Allied Security.

2. Communist Threat.—The main threats to Allied security in the Far East in the period for which it is possible to plan are from Communism:—

(a) In Peace.—Japan is a major East Asian objective of Russian imperialism. The most effective medium which Russia can use to achieve her aim is that of international Communism, the formidable exponent of which in the Far East is Communist China. There is already a Communist Party of some strength in Japan; an Allied withdrawal would greatly facilitate Communist infiltration into Japanese life.

(b) In War.—In the event of War, it has been estimated that there will be an external threat to Japan from Russia, regardless of any assistance to the latter from Communist China.

We consider that if Japan is to be kept in the Allied camp her internal security must be assured both in peace and war and she must be protected from the external threat in war; there must be no “power vacuum” in Japan after the signing of a Japanese Peace Treaty.

3. Japanese Threat.—Japan is a highly-populated country with considerable industrial resources and capability. In the long term her desire to establish her industrial prominence and her necessity to expand either territorially or economically must be appreciated. This economic fact will inevitably provide a motive for Japanese military aggression which cannot be disregarded in considering our general policy towards Japan in the post-peace period.

4. In the short term, Japan is not capable of military aggression. Japan has not the indigenous resources necessary to support her own economy, let alone to back an aggressive policy. Her military successes in 1942 depended on the exploitation of raw materials of the Asiatic Mainland and to the considerable stockpiling that she had achieved. She is, in fact, dependent on the Asiatic Mainland and other countries for the supply of the vast majority of her raw materials. Thus, Japan in isolation does not represent a military threat. Should she become a party to any combination of Powers in the Far East, such as is now represented by the Communist bloc, she might develop sufficient strength to threaten Allied territories throughout the Pacific and Far East.

5. In the long term, she will only be capable of conducting an aggressive war if she possesses major naval forces and has secured the necessary economic resources.

Allied Strategy.

6. In Peace.—Allied strategy in peace in the Far East, as elsewhere, is to oppose the spread of Communism and in particular to deny the resources of Japan to Communism.

7. In War.—The North Pacific is an American zone of responsibility. Allied strategy in war is to secure Japan and the Ryukyus; to use Okinawa as a base for the strategic air offensive; to maintain sea and air lines of communication; to deny the China Seas to the enemy; to adopt a defensive land strategy with minimum forces so as to deploy maximum forces elsewhere.

8. The requirements of Allied strategy will to a certain extent be met by the United States trusteeship of the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands, but forces will be required in Japan for internal security and defence against external threat. Taking into account all the other commitments of the Allies, it is evident that they cannot provide these forces unaided. For this reason and because, as an independent nation, Japan must take an active part in her own defence, she should provide the necessary forces.

9. Type of Japanese Armed Forces.—In the light of the above we consider that Japan should provide conventional armed forces with the exception of major naval forces, strategic bombing forces and special weapons which would be provided by the Americans in accordance with Allied strategy and would not be required by Japan. Her forces, which should be of a size suitable to carry out her obligations for internal security and defence, would therefore consist of:—

(a) Naval vessels up to frigates, excluding submarines;

(b) Balanced land forces;

(c) Balanced air forces, except strategic bombing forces.

Instrument for Effecting Japanese Rearmament.

10. The United States had proposed a few months ago a Peace Treaty restoring full Japanese sovereignty. In considering any Peace Treaty, however, account must be taken of the repercussions on the German situation.

11. We consider that there should be a Defence Pact separate from the Peace Treaty, since—

(i) It will thereby be possible to restrict the signatories to friendly Powers;

(ii) The Defence Pact can be voluntarily agreed to by Japan after her sovereignty has been restored by the Peace Treaty;

(iii) It is the only method we can see whereby some safeguards can be provided.

Restrictive Clauses and Controls.

12. In pursuance of the need for a liberal treaty it is undesirable, if not impossible, to impose or to suggest that Japan agree to detailed defence restrictions and a concomitant inspectorate. It will therefore not be practicable to include restrictive clauses in the Defence Pact.

We consider that Japan would agree both on military and economic grounds to certain forces and weapons as in paragraph 9 above being provided by the Allies. We consider, disregarding political and economic considerations that the possession and building of merchant fleets and civil air fleets cannot be denied to Japan on purely strategic grounds.

13. No firm military safeguard limiting Japan’s capability for aggression in the future is practicable. The only means of achieving any restrictions are:—

(a) Japan’s voluntary acceptance of the provision of certain forces and weapons by the Allies for her defence and the restrictive influence of the presence of these forces in Japan. This is in fact our only safeguard.

(b) To a limited extent by the exploitation of Japan’s economic dependence on the Allies.

conclusions

14. We conclude that:—

(a) Japan in isolation does not represent a military threat.

(b) The threat from Japan lies in the danger of her joining an unfriendly Asiatic or Communist bloc.

(c) Allied Forces should not be withdrawn from Japan until Japan is capable of undertaking her own defence.

15. Safeguards against Japanese Aggression.—No firm military safeguard limiting Japan’s capability for aggression in the future is practicable. The only means of achieving any restrictions are:—

(a) Japan’s voluntary acceptance of the provision of major naval forces, strategic bombing forces and special weapons by the Allies for her defence and the restrictive influence of those forces in Japan;

(b) To a limited extent by the exploitation of Japan’s economic dependence on the Allies.

16. United States Proposals.—The proposals put forward by the United States as a basis for the Peace Treaty are satisfactory from the military point of view, on the assumption that the Treaty will be followed by a bilateral Defence Pact.

17. Type of Japanese Armed Forces.—Japan should be permitted forces of a size suitable to carry out her obligations for internal security and defence. They should consist of:—

(a) Naval vessels up to frigates, excluding submarines;

(b) Balanced land forces;

(c) Balanced air forces, except strategic bombing forces.²

[Washington, undated.]

1. Handed to Mr. Dulles by the United Kingdom Chargé d’Affaires on March 12 along with the aide-mémoire, p. 909.
2. Under a covering letter of March 21 the Secretary sent copies of both aide-mémoire and annex to Secretary Marshall. Mr. Acheson in part requested “such comments of the Department of Defense as would assist me to reply to this inquiry from the Government of the United Kingdom.” (Lot 54 D 423) An excerpt from the JCS comment on the annex, dated April 17, is quoted in a memorandum from Mr. Allison to Mr. Dulles, April 23, p. 212.