Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

894.501/2–1551

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] February 22, 1951.

Subject: Heavy Armament of Japanese Divisions

Problem:

In his letter of February 15, 1951, the Secretary of Defense transmits for “your information and consideration” a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which recommends immediate approval and shipment of U.S. heavy divisional equipment (tanks, artillery, etc.) requested by General MacArthur to equip four divisions of the Japanese National Police Reserve. The recommendation also contemplates the approval of funds to support a program for equipping six additional divisions so as to make an eventual total of ten divisions. In making this recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff state that they “consider that the gravity of the current threat to the security of Japan (which is expected to become particularly acute by early May)” makes it urgent to ship the equipment immediately. In his letter, General Marshall states that he concurs in these recommendations and believes that “from the military point of view” they should be put into effect as soon as possible. However, in the light of the “international political implications” General Marshall requests your views before presenting the recommendations to the President for his approval.

Background:

Potsdam Declaration—Paragraph 6 of the Potsdam Declaration² states that “a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world”. Paragraph 7 provides for the occupation of Japan until such a new order is established and until “there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed”.

Initial Post-Surrender Policy—The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, issued on August 29, 1945,³ stated that “Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, …” and “Japan’s ground, air and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded …”

Far Eastern Commission—Decisions in the “Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” unanimously approved by the member governments of the Far Eastern Commission on June 19, 1947,⁴ were to complete the task of physical and operational demilitarization of Japan by measures including “total disarmament”. It was further agreed that Japan would be completely disarmed and demilitarized, that the authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism would be totally eliminated, and that all institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression would be vigorously suppressed. This policy was set forth in great detail in the policy decision of August 14, 1947, entitled “Reduction of Japanese Industrial War Potential” and the policy decision of February 12, 1948, entitled “Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment”.

Japanese Constitution—Article 9 of the new Japanese Constitution adopted with the enthusiastic approval of SCAP reads that “… land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained”.

Japanese Attitudes—Following the end of the war the Japanese people generally embraced the demilitarization program of the occupation and the preponderant sentiment of the people was strongly in favor of complete disarmament and “neutrality”. While the Korean affair, statements by SCAP, Mr. Dulles’ visit, and other developments are bringing a growing realization to the Japanese that it will be necessary for them to contribute to their own defense, there is not yet any considerable sentiment in favor of general rearmament. There is little doubt but that the equipping of four divisions with heavy equipment would constitute a considerable shock to Japanese public opinion.

SCAP Authorization for National Police Reserve—On July 8, 1950, in a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida, SCAP authorized the Japanese Government to establish a “National Police Reserve” of 75,000 men. It is the understanding of the Department that the National Police Reserve is organized and trained along the lines of a military organization although there is an attempt to use nonmilitary nomenclature for ranks and elements within the organization.

Estimate of Soviet Probable Intentions Toward Japan—A National Intelligence Estimate of February 10, 1951,⁵ concluded that “There are no positive indications that the USSR intends to attack Japan by mid-April 1951, but it has the capability of doing so and could launch such an attack without any appreciable warning.”

It is our informal understanding that the statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the effect that the current threat to the security of Japan is expected to become particularly acute by early May is not based upon any new information of a positive character, but is a conclusion based primarily on the factors of estimated Soviet capabilities, weather conditions at that period, and presumed Soviet intentions.

The existence of the National Police Reserve, which is presently equipped with light arms, would appear to preclude the possibility of a successful covert attack on Japan (e.g. by indoctrinated Japanese prisoners taken by the Soviets at the time of the Japanese surrender and not repatriated).

Thus it must be assumed that a successful Soviet attack on Japan would require a full-scale military effort which would involve at the least Soviet attacks upon US vessels and aircraft, and US military installations in Japan.

Sino-Soviet Reactions to Japanese Rearmament—Responsible officials of the USSR have in effect declared in public statements and speeches in the UN and Allied Council for Japan that they consider the rearmament of Japan as intolerable. The Chinese Communists have taken the same line. Both have officially and in their propaganda repeatedly charged that the rearmament of Japan is already taking place and that the manpower and material resources of Japan are being used by the United States to support the “war of aggression against the Korean people.”

Article I of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 14, 1950,⁶ provides that “Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly, in acts of aggression.”

On the anniversary of that pact this year Chou-En-Lai charged the United States with rearming Japan and directly linked the charge to the Sino-Soviet treaty. At the same time Moscow and Peiping commentaries, as well as Pravda, gave particular emphasis to the charge that the United States was rearming Japan for aggressive purposes and that the Sino-Soviet treaty is a “counterweight” to these “unlawful” activities.

A CIA Special Estimate of February 21, 1951,⁷ with which all the intelligence organizations concurred, concludes that the Soviets “would not resort to direct military action merely to prevent the conversion of the Japanese National Police Reserve into fully equipped divisions”, but that “should the USSR decide to invade Japan, even a partial rearmament of Japan would of course provide a convenient pretext to justify such aggression”. The Estimate also concludes that the equipping of the divisions would be seized upon to intensify the campaign of propaganda and intimidation against Japanese rearmament which would, in any event, be continued.

Effect on Soviet Capabilities—The above-mentioned Special Intelligence Estimate of February 21, 1951, also concludes that “the creation of four fully equipped, combat-efficient, and tactically disposed Japanese divisions would limit, but could not in itself effectively reduce, Soviet capabilities to invade Japan. However, the existence of such a Japanese force, supplemented by available US Forces, would make a Soviet invasion of Japan a major military operation.”

Attitudes of Friendly Powers—The Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, in particular, are very concerned over the question of the rearmament of Japan and the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism and may be expected vigorously to oppose any such moves except in the context of what they would consider satisfactory guarantees on the part of the United States. One of the principal objectives of Mr. Dulles’ present trip is to secure the cooperation of those countries in the type of peace treaty with Japan desired by the United States.

Whatever rationalization might be used to defend the action, the furnishing of heavy armament to the National Police Reserve would unquestionably be regarded by most, if not all, of the members of the Far Eastern Commission as a clear violation of the policy decisions of the Commission largely drafted and fully supported by the United States at the time of their adoption. Apart from the exercise by the Soviets by their right of veto of any changes in those decisions, it is very doubtful whether there would be any support whatever in the Commission for a proposal to amend those decisions so as to permit the heavy armament of the Japanese Police Reserve.

Council of Foreign Ministers—If the present discussions lead to the decision to hold a CFM it is likely that such a meeting would be in session during the period that the equipping of these Japanese divisions would inevitably become generally known.

Discussion:

From the foregoing background it is evident that a unilateral decision by the United States to fully arm four Japanese divisions prior to a treaty of peace might well lead to the breaking up of the Far Eastern Commission with mutual recriminations and prejudice to our relations, even with our best friends. This danger could to some extent partially be minimized by prior bilateral consultation with a few of the countries most likely to be receptive. However, such consultations would not be productive unless we were able to persuade those countries that the danger of a Soviet invasion of Japan is “real and present”. However, it would be very difficult to convince them that the danger of Soviet aggression against Japan is markedly greater than the danger of such aggression against several other areas, or so great as to justify extraordinary measures prior to such time as Japan can be rearmed in accordance with orderly international decisions.

While the break-up of the Far Eastern Commission would not in itself seriously affect United States interests, the effects flowing therefrom would unquestionably seriously jeopardize the ability of the United States to obtain support for the type treaty we desire to see concluded with Japan, and otherwise tend further to isolate the United States in its policy toward Japan.

It can only be assumed that in making this request General Mac-Arthur gave full consideration to the political effects in Japan. However, the information available to the Department indicates that while there is a growing sentiment in Japan favoring some rearmament following a treaty of peace there is not now such a sense of emergency as to cause Japanese public opinion to accept rearmament prior to a treaty in complete contradiction to the principles accepted by Japan at the time of their surrender and, until recently, inculcated by the occupation. It should also be noted that in his public statements while in Japan Mr. Dulles placed the question of Japanese rearmament in the context of a free decision to be made by a sovereign Japan joining in collective security arrangements. Unless presented in the context of an immediate and extreme emergency admitting of no choice (with the repercussions that would flow therefrom) there is likely to be a considerable degree of revulsion by the Japanese to their being rearmed at the unilateral decision of the United States during the occupation and without their being given any opportunity whatever to participate in the decision. In this connection, on February 22 Premier Yoshida stated to the press that “To rearm at this time would cause a split among the Japanese people. Because of such considerations I am opposed to rearmament at this time.”

There would unquestionably be a marked deterioration in the moral position of the United States vis-à-vis the Japanese people. The Communists would also be given an additional base upon which to build an intensified campaign of propaganda and intimidation that would unquestionably have increased effectiveness in Japan. While it is impossible to estimate the eventual political results in Japan they cannot, at the least, but be inimical to the accomplishment of the long-range objectives of US policy toward Japan.

In connection with our discussions with the Department of Defense during the past few months leading to the decision to dispatch the Dulles Mission, it was implicitly recognized that among the principal purposes of a treaty were: (1) removing the very restrictive Far Eastern Commission policy decisions regarding Japanese armament; (2) obtaining the widest possible degree of international support for arrangements that would permit Japan to contribute to its own security; (3) securing genuine acceptance by the Japanese of the necessity for at least a degree of rearmament.

For the United States now and prior to a treaty to take an action that internationally and within Japan will only be interpreted as a rearming of Japan entirely ignores and to a great extent vitiates the purposes underlying the decision to expedite the conclusion of a treaty.

There is no basis for the intimation in the draft letter to the President enclosed with General Marshall’s letter that provision of heavy armament to the Japanese is approved by NSC 13/3⁸ and NSC 60/1. NSC 13/3 (adopted in 1948) [1949] refers to the strengthening of the Japanese police establishment by “reinforcing and re-equipping the present forces”. Taken in the context in which that policy was adopted, it clearly has no reference to the equipping of Japanese divisions with United States heavy armament. NSC 60/1 relates only to the agreement between the Secretaries of State and Defense with respect to the security requirements that should be considered in the conduct of negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty. While the Department was not consulted with regard to the formation of the National Police Reserve, we have supported any steps to strengthen Japanese security not clearly inconsistent with international obligations of the United States or which would produce overbalancing adverse reactions among the Japanese or our friends. As long as the National Police Reserve is equipped with “small arms” as permitted by FEC policy, and, therefore, can be defended, it presents no political problem to the Department. However, the organization and equipment of full Japanese combat divisions prior to a peace settlement is an entirely different question.

An additional factor to be considered is the effect of the action becoming known during the period the CFM is in session, if the CFM materializes.

Thus, it is clear that the likely political consequences of the action vis-à-vis our friends and the Japanese are of such a serious and far-reaching character that they can be overbalanced only by the most impelling military considerations.

Based upon the assumption that a successful Soviet attack on Japan would even now require a full-scale military effort which would involve Soviet attacks upon US vessels, aircraft and military installations in Japan, it is difficult to believe that the Soviets would attack Japan except within the pattern of an overall attack against the United States. Therefore the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would not appear to be significantly greater than a general attack upon the United States.

In the case of a general attack upon the United States, Japan would unquestionably be one of the primary targets of the Soviets. The intelligence agencies agree that the creation of four “fully equipped, combat efficient and tactically disposed” Japanese divisions would limit but “could not in itself effectively reduce Soviet capabilities to invade Japan”. Furthermore, as it is to be doubted that the Japanese divisions could be “combat efficient” by May with equipment not yet shipped, it does not seem that the equipping of these divisions would constitute in any degree a guarantee that a successful Soviet invasion of Japan could not be carried out.

However, if prior to our obtaining an understanding with our friends on the subject, the Soviets did initiate a localized attack on Japan on the pretext of violations by ourselves and the Japanese of the disarmament decisions of the Far Eastern Commission, they would be in a position effectively to exploit differences of opinion on the subject and we would probably encounter great difficultly in obtaining support in much of Europe and Asia for counteraction against the Soviets. Therefore, while it is not likely that the Soviets would resort to direct military action merely to prevent the establishment of four Japanese divisions with heavy equipment, if their purpose is to attack Japan, the equipping of the divisions prior to a treaty would enable them to do so under conditions of maximum disadvantage to the United States vis-à-vis its allies and confusion of opinion in Japan itself.

Conclusions:

It is not felt that the military reasons for taking this action at this time are sufficiently impelling to overcome the serious and far-reaching political disadvantages of the action. However, if the treaty is shortly concluded, it should be possible to take the action in cooperation with the Japanese very soon after the conclusion of the treaty. In order to plan for this eventuality it might be well shortly to begin shipment of such equipment to be held in the custody of the Far East Command until proper arrangements for its delivery to the Japanese can be made. In view of the length of time such shipments usually take and the possible imminence of a peace settlement, it may be desirable now to authorize shipment of the equipment with the decision as to its delivery to the Japanese being deferred.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached letter in the foregoing sense to General Marshall.⁹

1. This memorandum was drafted by U. Alexis Johnson, and was cleared by, among others, Mr. Dulles.
2. For text of the Proclamation of the Heads of Governments, United States, China, and the United Kingdom, July 26, 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), vol. ii, pp. 1474–1476.
3. Sent to General MacArthur August 29 but not given final approval by the President until September 6. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 23, 1945, p. 423.
4. Printed in Department of State, Far Eastern Commission: Second Report, pp. 49–58.

5. The mentioned document, “Estimate of Soviet Probable Intentions Toward Japan”, is not a National Intelligence Estimate but forms Enclosure B to Special Estimate 2, “Probable Effects on Soviet Intentions and Capabilities of Arming the Japanese National Police Reserve as Four Fully Equipped Divisions,” February 21, 1951. Neither of these Estimates is printed. (Files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research)

   SE–2 carries the following attribution: “The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available on 19 February 1951.”

6. For text, see United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), vol. 226, p. 12.
7. See footnote 5 above.
8. Titled “Report by the National Security Council on Recommendations With Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan,” and adopted at the NSC meeting held May 6, 1949. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 730.
9. Not found attached. A version of February 23, drafted by U. Alexis Johnson, not printed, is filed under 794.5/2–1551. For Mr. Webb’s letter of March 1 to Secretary Marshall, see p. 898.