Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

894.501/2–1551

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, February 15, 1951.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am forwarding herewith for your information and consideration a memorandum of 9 February 1951 in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff present certain recommendations regarding the National Police Reserve in Japan. I concur in these recommendations and believe that, from the military point of view, they should be put into effect as soon as possible.

In the light of their international political implications, I would appreciate your views as soon as possible before presenting these recommendations to the President for his approval. In order to hasten consideration of this matter I am attaching for your comment, a draft letter to the President recommending his approval.¹

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

[Attachment]

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

top secret

Washington, 9 February 1951.

Subject: National Police Reserve—Japan (NPRJ).

1. General MacArthur has reported to the Department of the Army that “the current situation dictates an urgent need for furnishing equipment to NPRJ [National Police Reserve—Japan],² priority to be co-equal with Korean requirements, with the least practicable delay.”³

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the gravity of the current threat to the security of Japan (which is expected to become particularly acute by early May) makes it urgent to ship immediately to General MacArthur the equipment he has requested.⁴ However, in view of the international and domestic political implications of the NPRJ problem, we feel that you may wish to discuss this matter with the Secretary of State and the President.

3. Because of the urgent necessity of avoiding premature disclosure of any action taken to loan heavy armament to the NPRJ, we suggest that this program hereafter be referred to wherever possible as the “Special Far East Command (FECOM) Reserve” program.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:

a. That you request the President to authorize the Department of the Army to dispatch the attached proposed reply to General MacArthur.⁵

b. That you authorize the Department of the Army, on the basis of the urgency of the project and the desirability of handling this matter through Department of the Army fiscal and administrative channels rather than MDAP to include in its FY 52 budget, under the heading of “Special FECOM Reserve”, a request for funds to support a program for equipping up to ten NPRJ divisions in a manner similar to that recommended by General MacArthur in the case of the four NPRJ divisions now in being.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Not printed.
2. Brackets in the source text.
3. Quotation is from telegram C–52610, from Tokyo, January 3, 1951, not printed. (Department of Defense Files)

4. In the telegram cited in footnote 3 above, General MacArthur had requested a detailed list of equipment for the NPRJ, including medium tanks and 155 mm. howitzers. In telegram DA–80467 to Tokyo, January 7, the Department of the Army had replied in part that its own analysis had indicated that “possibly a light div … would be preferable to divisional organization you are considering for NPRJ. In particular there has been doubt regarding inclusion of medium tanks, 155 mm. Hows, and other heavy loads in NPRJ Divs.” (Department of Defense Files)

   In C–52979 from Tokyo, January 8, the Far Eastern Command had replied as follows: “Planned NPRJ divisional structure considered sound and entirely suitable for any eventuality including even the all-out aggression against Japan proper by foreign forces equipped and trained in accordance with Communist tactical doctrine which experience has demonstrated invariably includes the extensive employment of tanks and artillery. Against such a force, an NPRJ lacking medium tanks and at least medium artillery would be utterly inadequate. A most recent and striking case in point was the complete inability of the light South Korean divisions to cope with the tank supported North Korean forces.” (Department of Defense Files)

5. Not printed.