Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty
Memorandum Prepared by the Dulles Mission1
Provisional Memorandum
Subject to further consideration and subject to further consultation with the interested Parties, the United States contemplates a peace treaty along the following lines:
[Page 850]preamble
The Preamble would record the determination of the Allies and of Japan henceforth to order their relations on a basis of friendly cooperation as sovereign equals. Japan would indicate her intention to conform to the principles of the United Nations Charter; to realize the high principles embodied in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights;2 and to develop the conditions of stability and well-being envisaged by Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, and already initiated by postwar Japanese legislation. Japan accordingly would intend to apply for membership in the United Nations and the Allies would welcome that intention.
peace
The state of war between the Allies and Japan would be pronounced at an end.
sovereignty
The Allies would recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people and their elected representatives over Japanese territory.
territory
Japan would renounce all rights and titles to Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, and accept a United Nations trusteeship with the United States as administering authority over the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parece Vela and Marcus Island. The United States would retain control of these islands pending approval by the United Nations of the trusteeship agreement or agreements. Japan would further renounce all rights, titles and claims deriving from the mandate system and from the activities of Japanese nationals in the Antarctic area.
security
Japan as a prospective member of the United Nations would accept in advance the obligations of Article 2 of the Charter, and the other parties would undertake reciprocally to be guided by those same principles with relation to Japan. The Allies would recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses what the Charter refers to as “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense”, and would agree that Japan might voluntarily enter into a collective security [Page 851] arrangement or arrangements participated in by one or more of them. Such arrangements would be designed solely for defense against armed attack from without, and any forces contributed by any Allied nation pursuant thereto would not have any responsibility or authority to intervene in the internal affairs of Japan. Assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan would not be deemed intervention in the internal affairs of Japan. Japan would agree not to permit any foreign nation to have military facilities in Japan except pursuant to actions or recommendations of the United Nations or to a collective security arrangement or arrangements referred to above.
political and economic clauses
(a) Japan would agree to adhere to existing multilateral treaties designed to prevent the misuse of narcotics and to conserve fish and wildlife.
(b) Japan would agree to enter promptly into negotiations with parties so desiring for the formulation of new bilateral or multilateral agreements for the regulation, conservation and development of high seas fisheries.
(c) Each of the Allies would agree to notify Japan within a year of the effective date of the treaty which of its prewar bilateral nonpolitical treaties with Japan it wished to keep in force.
(d) Japan would renounce all special rights and interests in China.
(e) The power to grant clemency, reduce sentences, parole and pardon with respect to war criminals incarcerated in Japan would be exercised jointly by Japan and the Government or Governments which imposed the sentences in each instance and, in the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, by Japan and a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal.
(f) Pending the conclusion of new commercial treaties or agreements, Japan, during a period of three years, would (1) extend most-favored-nation treatment to each of the Allies in all matters pertaining to the importation and exportation of goods, and (2) accord national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment, whichever is more favorable, with respect to the commercial vessels, nationals and companies of the Allies and their property, interests and business activities in Japan. Japan would be entitled to withhold from any Allied nation more favorable treatment in respect to any of the above matters than that nation, subject to the exceptions customarily included in its commercial agreements, was willing to accord it in that respect. Japan [Page 852] would also be entitled to apply measures dictated by its balance-of-payments position or by its essential security requirements, and to reserve the exceptions customarily contained in commercial agreements. “National treatment” would not be deemed to include Japanese coastal and inland navigation. Pending the conclusion of civil air transport agreements, Japan, during a period of three years, would extend to each of the Allies not less favorable civil air traffic rights and privileges than those they enjoyed at the time of the coming into force of the treaty.
claims arising out of the war
All parties would waive claims arising out of acts taken during the war prior to September 2, 1945, except that (1) each of the Allied and Associated Powers would retain and dispose of Japanese property within its territories, except diplomatic and consular property and a few other limited categories; and (2) Japan would restore, upon demand, Allied property in Japan, or, if such property, whether or not taken under the control of the Japanese Government, is not restorable intact, would provide yen to compensate for the lost value. (An elaboration of these two exceptions is provided in Annex I.) Japan would waive all claims arising out of the presence of the Occupation forces in Japan since surrender.
settlement of disputes
Disputes concerning the interpretation or execution of the treaty not settled through the diplomatic channel would be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice, all of the treaty signatories undertaking to comply with the decisions of the Court. A specially established Arbitral Tribunal appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice from nationals of countries which were neutral in World War II would settle claims disputes. (An elaboration of these provisions will be found in Annex II.)
final clauses
(a) The right of adherence to the treaty would be extended to any nation at war or in a state of belligerency with Japan which had not been an original signatory thereto.
(b) The treaty would not confer any rights or benefits upon any state which did not execute and ratify or adhere to it, and Japan would not make a peace settlement with any other state which would grant that state advantages not granted to the parties to the treaty herein described.
[Page 853]general observation
It is to be observed that if peace were made along the foregoing lines, it would involve a very complete restoration of sovereignty to Japan free of onerous restrictions. Japan would express its intention to maintain and advance the high purposes, principles and standards of the post-surrender years, but would not be subjected to treaty compulsions in these respects. There would be no restrictions upon Japan’s right to rearm. The Allies would demand no reparations either out of the industrial assets, current production or gold stocks. There would be no continuing right to reclaim looted property. There would be no treaty restrictions upon Japan’s commercial activity, including shipbuilding and fishing, other than such as Japan may voluntarily adopt in the interest of promoting international good will. The Allies’ right to “most-favored-nation” commercial treatment would be dependent upon reciprocity on their part. The question of any repayment of Garioa indebtedness of some $2,000,000,000 is not made a matter of treaty compulsion, but left for mutual adjustment.
With respect to all of these matters, there is very considerable difference of opinion as between the Allies and there is within the United States a considerable body of opinion which questions the desirability of the kind of peace which is here outlined.
It may be that public opinion either within the United States or within the Allied Powers may render it necessary, in order to get peace, to add certain restrictions and burdens not enumerated in the above outline of projected treaty and it is suggested that the Japanese Government, in dealing with the people of Japan, should avoid giving any impression that it can now be taken for granted that the final treaty will be free of restrictions and burdens of the character mentioned in these General Observations.
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