PSA Files: Lot 54 D 316, Box 1753
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge, Swiss and Benelux Affairs (Scott)
Subject: Netherlands New Guinea
| Participants: | G—Mr. Matthews |
| FE—Mr. Allison | |
| EUR—Mr. Bonbright | |
| PSA—Mr. Lacy | |
| WE—Mr. Scott |
Following is a summary of the discussion in Mr. Matthews’ office on December 12 regarding Netherlands New Guinea.
Mr. Allison and Mr. Lacy briefly reviewed the growth of Indonesia’s determination to acquire sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea. It was pointed out that Indonesian authorities had come to regard their acquisition of sovereignty over this territory as necessary to the completion of their independence movement. For this and possibly for other reasons, it now appeared that the stability of the present or any future moderate government in Indonesia could be jeopardized by failure to acquire sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea within a reasonable time.
Over against this, it was pointed out that there was no real hope that the present Netherlands Government, faced with general elections next Spring, could accede to Indonesian demands for western New Guinea. Although it is expected that the government which comes into being following the elections next Spring will have pretty much the same composition as the present Government, it would nevertheless be more [Page 754] possible then than it is now to get the Dutch to consider a compromise solution for the New Guinea issue.
The Australian interest in the determination of the future status of western New Guinea was discussed, and it was observed that from the point of view of security, Australia probably has more of a vital interest in the future status of western New Guinea than have the Dutch. It was nevertheless noted that from the Dutch point of view, this was a prestige issue and was thus real enough to prevent their taking any action at the present time to accommodate the Indonesians.
Mr. Allison and Mr. Lacy thought the time was approaching when we should consider the desirability of taking a substantive position regarding the disposition of western New Guinea. It was recalled that since March 30, 1950, our position had been one of strict neutrality, namely, that the New Guinea question was one to be settled by negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesians as provided in the Round Table Conference Agreements which transferred sovereignty over Indonesia. Prior to March 30, 1950, we had favored Dutch administration of the territory, possibly in the form of a United Nations Trusteeship, and had so informed the Dutch and the Australians. We did not so inform the Indonesians.
The argument was put forward that if the present moderate Government in Indonesia could acquire sovereignty over western New Guinea, this would increase the Government’s prestige and thus add to its stability. Conversely, it was also argued that if it were not successful in its efforts, the present Government might be succeeded by a radical and leftist government. Against this argument it was noted that our Australian and Dutch friends continued to worry over the possibility that, even if Indonesia were now to acquire sovereignty over western New Guinea, a radical, leftist government might still at some later date come into power in Indonesia for some now unforeseeable reason. To this, Mr. Lacy replied that it was up to the United States to see to it that this did not happen.
It was agreed that for the time being we should use our influence with both parties, the Dutch and the Indonesians, to avoid a head-on collision over the New Guinea issue; in other words, to continue more effectively, if possible, present United States policy aimed at encouraging both sides to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution through negotiation.
It was also agreed that we should study the possibility of suggesting at an appropriate time, after Dutch elections, a substantive solution. It appeared that what the Dutch seem primarily to want in New Guinea is security for the development of their commercial interests in the area and that what the Indonesians seemed to want is some sort of pro forma sovereignty. These primary concerns of the Dutch and the Indonesians did not appear to be mutually exclusive. This suggested [Page 755] the possibility that one of the solutions the Department might study would be a trusteeship arrangement under which Dutch and other commercial interests in New Guinea could be guaranteed over a reasonable period of years and at the same time Indonesia could be provided with sufficient evidence of ultimate sovereignty over western New Guinea to meet its minimum demand. It was recognized, however, that while such an arrangement might eventually take care of Dutch and Indonesian interests, it was not clear that it would take, care of Australia’s primary concern regarding security.