Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

656.56D/11–2851: Telegram

The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Djakarta, November 28, 1951—3 p. m.

767, Was recd by FonMin Subardjo 10 a. m. to present Wilson,¹ Shannon² and Weaver³ of Tin Mission. Remained behind to have short conversation with Subardjo. He said he had talked with Stikker just prior leaving Hague 24th for Djakarta. Had told Stikker he wld recommend Supomo commission proceed Hague shortly after Subardjo’s arrival Djakarta, provided Stikker wld agree include Irian on agenda. Stikker agreed. Did not close door to hopeful negots as firmly as he had at Paris but still said he was not optimistic as to outcome from Indo viewpoint.

Subardjo made his report of Paris and Hague visit to Cabinet mtg held Djakarta 27th with VP Hatta and certain additional officials attending. Subardjo said decision taken to send commission headed by Supomo to Hague about Dec 3. Composition commission not yet fixed. Commission to insist upon Irian question being point 2 on agenda with revision RTC agreements as point 1. Subardjo said govt strong and unified on both questions, but PNI favoring more drastic action than Masjumi. Instructions for commission already prepared concerning negot bilateral treaty to replace RTC agreement. Instructions on Irian question yet to be prepared. Present plan envisages informal conversations at first to be followed by negots at ministerial level for which purpose Subardjo wld return Hague. Sense of yesterday’s mtg was that Indo shld endeavor obtain decision on both points agenda by Christmas. As of that date Cabinet wld review situation.

Subardjo of opinion Neth will be sufficiently receptive to replacement RTC agreements to permit favorable report thereon within above time limit. If this shld not prove feasible he anticipates PNI pressure for unilateral action. He does not expect favorable action on Irian by that date but said he wld do everything possible to have conversations continued on orderly basis, if satisfactory progress has been made on point 1.

Subardjo said Brit and Australian Govts had approached Indo Govt with view influence latter toward keeping Irian question dormant for present. He said Indo Govt decision yesterday was to proceed with conversations, including Irian subject and that Brit and Australian Govts being so informed. Consequently there wld be no purpose in US associating itself with Brit move reported Hague’s 529 to Dept.⁴ Have just recd Canberra’s 159 to Dept.⁵ These Hague and Canberra msgs disclose harmful results that are following Stikker’s Nov 12 aide-mémoire⁶ containing serious misstatements and conveying entirely too pessimistic picture of Indo situation. I hope Dept officers may have opportunity discuss aide-mémoire with Casey when he arrives and perhaps with Brit and Neth Embs Wash in light reports I made orally when in US and observations on aide-mémoire telegraphed from Paris.

Dept pass Hague, Canberra. Sent Dept 767, rptd Hague 33, Canberra 3, London 6.

Cochran

1. Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Wilson, U.S.A.R., Special Consultant to the Administrator, General Services Administration.
2. Spencer S. Shannon, Consultant, Office of the Administrator, Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
3. George Weaver, Special Assistant to the Administrator, Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
4. Not printed.
5. In telegram 159 from Canberra, November 27, the Embassy reported the views of the Australian Government regarding the Netherlands New Guinea situation. The Australians basically believed that the Indonesian Government was not sufficiently strong or stable enough to take over this area, which was strategically significant to Australia. Moreover, they feared that if Indonesia obtained the western half of New Guinea, it might also wish to absorb the eastern half as well. The Embassy also reported that the Australian position might be subject to change in the future if Indonesia developed a strong and stable government solidly aligned with the West. For the present, the Australians hoped that the problem would be left dormant. (643.56C/11–2751)
6. Not printed; for references to and analyses of this aide-mémoire, see telegrams 2919 and 2968 from Paris, November 16 and 17, pp. 722 and 725, respectively.