Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

756D.5–MAP/10–2451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador to Indonesia (Cochran)

top secret

[Washington,] October 24, 1951.

Subject: Conversation between the Indonesian Ambassador and Ambassador H. Merle Cochran, October 24, 1951.

Participants:	The Ambassador to the United States from Indonesia;
	Ambassador H. Merle Cochran.

I called on the Indonesian Ambassador at 11:30 today. He said that when he left Indonesia a few days after I did (my departure was on October 13), the first section of the Indonesian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly was ready to depart for Paris and the second would leave on November 1. He told me that just before he left Djakarta, he had been informed of the aide-mémoire which Foreign Minister Subardjo had submitted to me.¹ I told him that I had acquainted a limited number of officials in the Department with the contents of this memorandum, and that we were already looking into the possibility of providing military equipment under reimbursable aid, and also selling Liberty ships from the mothball fleet.

I asked Dr. Ali if any list of military equipment had been prepared, or if he could be more specific as to what was sought on this point. He said that he had questioned Colonel Simatupang thereon while in Djakarta, but that the Colonel had said the list would be quite extensive, and would not be prepared and submitted until it might be ascertained that there was a possibility of arranging satisfactorily for procurement thereof in the United States. He said that the Colonel thought it might be feasible to work under some arrangement similar to that which had been consummated by Prime Minister Hatta and myself on police equipment.² I asked if Dr. Ali desired, therefore, that I revive this question, which had been raised on the occasion of my visit last autumn with the then Foreign Minister of Indonesia,³ and ascertain the most generous terms on which reimbursable aid could be procured. It was understood that Indonesia desired to pay cash, but to be excused as far as possible from undertakings which could be interpreted as destroying the “independent” policy of Indonesia. I told him I would inquire into this, and let him hear from us as soon as possible.

On the matter of Liberty ships, Dr. Ali agreed with me that it was not his task or mine to endeavor to procure ships for the Djakarta Lloyd or any other single shipping line, but that we might helpfully work toward procuring vessels for the Ministry of Communications itself, which could attend to allocating them as it might see fit for service in inter-island trade. I said I had already spoken to assistant Secretary Rusk, as well as Messrs. Lacy and Coerr, on this subject, and that we would report progress later.

With respect to the part of the aide-mémoire which dealt with negotiating a bilateral treaty to replace the Round Table agreements, and also with the Indonesian approach on the Irian question through arrangements with Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States, I told Dr. Ali that I had informed the Secretary of State in the premises. I had not filed this aide-mémoire formally, but would work with the appropriate officials in the Department who might consider it, and we would be available for consultation if the Indonesians might see fit to approach the American delegation at the UNGA in Paris. I said that I had only briefly summarized the aide-mémoire to the Secretary and that he would not, of course, be in a position to respond directly and immediately if he should be approached thereon at Paris. I asked, incidentally, whether the Indonesian Government had taken any steps towards submitting the proposition, through an aide-mémoire, or otherwise, to the Netherlands and Australian Governments. Dr. Ali thought this had not been done; that only the approach to us had been made. He agreed with me that this matter should be kept Top Secret and no discussion thereof undertaken unless and until the Indonesian delegation itself might make such approach as the Indonesian Government desires at Paris. I said it was understood I would be available for consultation in Paris if and when it might appear that I could be of any assistance. I said I had learned that Sudarpo had recently mentioned the idea of a multilateral security pact, on which we left initiative to Indonesia.

Dr. Ali said that Foreign Minister Casey of Australia had passed through Djakarta en route to Paris after I had left, and had established excellent relations with the Indonesian Government. He gave me a copy of a cable from Djakarta dated October 23 whereof he said a copy had also been passed to the Australian Embassy here. A copy of this communication is attached.⁴ I reminded Dr. Ali that Mr. Casey was well known to our Government, and particularly to Secretary Acheson. I expressed the hope that it might be possible for Messrs. Casey and Acheson to work closely together at Paris.

Dr. Ali said that the difficult problem would be to get the Dutch to see the light. He said Prime Minister Drees would be especially difficult. He said most of the other Dutch political leaders realized that the Union Statute was a dead issue and that the time had come for negotiating a new agreement. He said that many Dutch realized that the Irian question would also have to be solved in a way that would be acceptable to Indonesia. I expressed the hope that Indonesia would do its best to negotiate patiently with the parties concerned, just as the Republic had done when we had so many difficult problems to solve under the auspices of the Security Council. Dr. Ali said that he was against unilateral denunciation such as resorted to by Egypt, and against such measures as being taken with respect to Abadan. He feared, however, that if the Dutch continue to be stubborn and intransigent, Indonesia may resort to counter-measures, such as nationalization of important Dutch investments in Indonesia. I again told him that we should be calm, and conscientiously endeavor to work out the remaining problems in the same good spirit that we had tackled and surmounted earlier difficulties. I said Indonesia had moved forward tremendously in the past three years.

1. On October 12, Foreign Minister Subardjo handed Ambassador Cochran an aide-mémoire in which the Indonesian Government formally requested that the United States extend additional aid in the form of ships for interinsular trade and arms for the army. Specifically, the Indonesians wanted to purchase surplus Liberty ships, and they hoped to acquire arms on a reimbursable basis. In the second half of the aide-mémoire, the Indonesian Government took up the issues of altering the Round Table Agreement and resolving the impasse over Netherlands New Guinea. With regard to the Round Table Agreement, the Indonesians wanted to alter it in such a fashion to allow normal relations to be established between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The Indonesian Government also proposed that the Netherlands recognize Indonesia’s sovereignty over West Irian on the following terms: Indonesia would guarantee Dutch interests there for twenty-five years and similar treatment would be accorded to American and Australian nationals as well; Dutch, American, and Australian enterprises would be afforded the greatest possible opportunity to harness the area’s natural resources on a long term basis; and the Indonesians would invite the technical assistance of the Netherlands, the United States, and Australia in the social and economic development of Irian. (756D.00/10–1251)
2. The reference is to Dr. Hatta’s oral undertaking of August 1950, that Indonesia would not permit strategic materials to be exported to nations unfriendly to the United States. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, pp. 964 ff.
3. Mohammad Rum.
4. Not printed.