790.5/12–2051
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: Since I know your concern with formation of policy for Indochina, I believe you will be interested in the increasing role of American military agencies in this field, particularly since the Singapore Conference of May 15, 1951. I have written previously to Dean Rusk on this subject and I enclose copies of this correspondence.1
Very shortly after our recognition of Viet-Nam, the Department and the Legation at Saigon began to urge the utility of a tripartite military conference of the type eventually held at Singapore. In order to avoid the semblance of political commitments we conceived that the actual meeting should be confined to the military staffs. This did not seem to us to preclude political and diplomatic coordination. To our surprise, however, this conference was planned and conducted with practically no consultation with the Department; the report of the conference was only communicated to us after Dean Rusk intervened with General Bradley, as the enclosed correspondence shows.
[Page 565]We are still unaware of action taken upon the recommendations of the Conference.
American participation in this Conference contrasted sharply to that of France and Great Britain. Their Foreign Office and colonial officials worked closely with the Conference delegates and even took the lead in preparation of agenda and position papers.
The Chief of our MAAG, Brigadier General Francis G. Brink, participated in the conference as number two American delegate and as representative of the JCS. The precedent of the conference confirmed him in the latter capacity; as Joint Chiefs representative (but presumably not as Chief of MAAG) he sends reports to the JCS and receives papers from them which are not officially available to the Chief of Mission.
Since the Singapore Conference, and as a result of it, the first of what is to be a series of tripartite conferences for the exchange of information was held in Saigon on November 9–10, 1951. I received no advance notice of this conference until just before it was to convene and have not been officially advised of its agenda, conclusions, and recommendations. …
The French Foreign Office has a copy of the report of this meeting and showed it to our Embassy at Paris who have asked for a copy of it (Paris telegram 3458, December 10).2
The military attachés who participated in the most recent conference are enlarging their operations and staffs. From the outset the Navy has had its own ciphers and communications systems; so does MAAG and its powerful radio facilities handle our traffic; and the Army Attaché is now about to install his own codes and will transmit through his own channels.
The interrelation of military and diplomatic policy in this area is obvious and close. No basic military estimate of the situation can be made without an evaluation of political circumstances which I doubt that the military agencies have made in the past or are fully equipped to undertake in the future. The continuing representation of the United States by our military, alone in area conferences where sit diplomatic and intelligence officials of other governments will involve either an incomplete presentation of the American position or an attempt to assay matters not properly within the military competence. Similarly, the existence and the expansion of communication channels reserved for the private correspondence of the military on current Indochinese problems—and no such problem is today free of political substance or complexity—will, I fear, lead either to the formulation [Page 566] of Department of Defense policy without adequate attention to political circumstances or to the assumption by Defense representatives here of functions wholly inappropriate to them.
In all this, I have no criticism to make of the military officers here in MAAG or the Attaché group, who are acting properly within the scope of standing instructions.
I would make the following recommendations:
- (a)
- that this Legation be represented at any future conferences such as that recently held at Saigon;
- (b)
- that communications between the Joint Chiefs and the Chief of MAAG and between Defense and the Attachés be made available to the Chief of Mission whenever any matter concerning substantive policy or having political implications is involved;
- (c)
- that the whole question of the relation of the diplomatic and military branches in Indochina (which I believe is precedential for SEA) be kept under continuous review in the Department.
My recommendations would be somewhat different in form, of course, if the United States were definitely to assume military responsibilities in this area: for example, pursuant to the constitution of a Southeast Asian Command or if the military services were given a definite defense mission other than that inherent in the normal functions of attaches and of the MAAGs.
With all best wishes,
Sincerely yours,