Subject: Minister Heath’s Comments on the National
Intelligence Estimate regarding Probable Developments in
Indochina.2
The Embassy encloses, for the Department’s information, a memorandum
prepared by the United States Minister to the Associated States, Mr.
Donald Heath, containing his comments on the National Intelligence
Estimate entitled: “Probable Developments in Indochina during the
Remainder of 1951”, published on August 7, 1951. This Estimate was
shown to Minister Heath during his visit to Paris en route to
Washington in connection with the visit to the United States of
General de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner and
Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in the Far East.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Minister at Saigon (Heath)
Comments of Minister Donald R. Heath on
NIE–35:
“Probable Developments in
Indochina During the Remainder of 1951”
I agree with the conclusions of the reference paper and
particularly with the final estimate that direct Chinese
Communist intervention in Indochina is unlikely to occur during
the remainder of 1951. The possibility of early intervention,
however, while unlikely during the next few months, should not
be entirely ruled out.
Par. 5 of paper. I question the statement
that French successes during the period since General de Lattre
assumed command are in part due to “(c)
the arrival of French reinforcements” or “(d) the inexperience at large-scale warfare of the Viet
Minh guerrillas.” As far as I am aware, no reinforcements of
French Union forces have yet arrived from France, only
replacements. Certainly this is the first time I have heard the
statement that the operations undertaken by the Viet Minh
guerrillas during the past ten months failed because of their
inexperience in large-scale warfare. The Viet Minh attacks
[Page 486]
were shrewdly planned
and energetically executed. De Lattre is of the opinion that the
operation against Vinh-Yen was planned by European officers.
I believe that the estimate that 10,000 Chinese personnel have
been infiltrated into the Viet Minh is somewhat excessive. The
French have no exact intelligence on this point but at a French
staff briefing in June the number was placed as “in excess of
5,000.”
Par 6. The statement that the slowness of
development of the Vietnamese Government is in part due to “(a) French reluctance to relinquish
ultimate control of political and economic affairs” in Viet Nam,
is not true today. Under de Lattre, intervention in internal
political affairs has been limited, and the French cannot be
said to be exercising ultimate control of economic affairs
beyond the fact that they are heavily subsidizing the
maintenance and equipment of the new Viet Nam national army, and
supporting the exchange rate of the piaster.
Par. 8. Present plans call for the
expansion of the Viet Nam army to 120,000 men, not to
100,000.
While in the past there have been differences of opinion between
the Vietnamese Government and the French over control of the
Viet Nam army, there is no such conflict at the present
time.
Par. 9. The statement: “we are unable to
determine whether the Viet Minh is actually losing any of its
popular appeal” is surprising. I do not believe that any
informed observer would deny that in the past twelve months
there has been a very considerable decline in the popularity of
the Viet Minh.
Par. 14. With regard to the estimate that
100,000 Chinese Communist troops could now be made available and
logistically supported for invasion of Indochina, I believe that
General de Lattre’s estimate is that a maximum of 150,000
Chinese troops could be employed in the Tonkin area.
