611.51G/7–2051: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State 1
niact
Unnumbered. Personal and eyes only for Lacy. No distribution. Pls refer to Legtel 2355, June 29 and Saigon Toeca 841, July 12.
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Our primary objective in Indochina at present time, our first consideration, is real estate. There are aims of Fr policy and aims of Viet policy but the aim of Amer policy here, now, is to see to it that the land and the resources of IC do not fall into the Soviet sphere. We are interested above all else in seeing to it that the strategic position, the rice, the rubber, and the tin of SEA shall be denied, as long as is possible, to the Commie world. What contributes to that end must be protected, what detracts from it must be discarded. We are thus neither pro-Fr nor pro-Vietnamese; we have no permanently fixed ideological position in Franco-Vietnamese politics, we will support whatever we think advances def of the area against Communism, we will oppose whatever inhibits that def. We are prepared as we have been in past to caution or to advise either party. For the immed future and against, at the very least, this year’s Commie onslaughts Fr arms and Fr resources will have to do the job of def if it is to be done at all. I regard this position in all its bluntness as neither militarist nor materialist. The defense of Vietnamese liberties and aspirations, the only hope of an independent and viable Vietnam lies in the def of its geography and in resolute perseverance in the war. These facts are no more unpleasant than those which govern life in other parts of the world mid-way in the Twentieth Century.
Now the Fr have in Indochina not only a mil position to which we are supplying arms but also a polit position represented by the still nascent Fr Union. For this political position they also expect and bespeak our assistance. They see in the Fr Union concept both the best hope for a continuing def of Indochina and the only basis on which the Fr public, Fr political parties and the Fr Parliament will consent to make the sacrifices of men and substance necessary to carry on this war. The only authorities we have on Fr politics tell us that on this latter point the Fr are not mistaken. The existence of the Fr Union is at once a fact of polit importance and a fundament for all third-power relationships.
[Page 458]If we were prepared for a withdrawal of Fr forces from Indochina or ready to supplement or replace them with US or UN or other forces we might logically and practically challenge the Fr Union idea. If we are not, if the continuance of Fr forces in Indochina is vital to our own Asian policy, and if condition for the continuance of Fr troops here is maintenance of Fr Union formula, then the claims of the concept of independence within the Fr Union demand the most careful consideration. And procedures and relationships already agreed to within the Fr Union must largely shape our own approach in this period of Indochina dependence on France.
I think the record shows that Dept has generally understood and has defined its own policies within limits of Fr Union formula. I have read most of, not all of, the record of ECA policy formulation to which Toeca 841 refers and fail to find any similar depreciation [appreciation?] or allowance of the political claims of the Fr Union concept.
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How seriously present divergence in views between Dept and [ECA] is to be taken is moot.2 I think Fr regards STEM more distrustfully and more resentfully than ECA has been willing acknowledge. Already there have been criticisms made officially by highest Fr rep in IC to US Min, there has been one official protest on publicity, there is what Toeca 841 describes as “a worsening relationship” and use official Fr censorship to alter ECA publicity releases. There has been postponement economic aid bilateral motivated in my opinion as much by suspicions entire program and its objectives and by lack continuous consultation at highest levels as by procedural and substantive objections subsequently advanced. If ECA programs stood alone we cld perhaps view these manifestations with more complacency but Fr resentment of absence of framework agreed premises with STEM threatens involve whole fabric our relations with Fr in IC and to imperil attainment our policy objectives. Mr. Blum writes that disintegration Fr authority and growth of Fr unpopularity started long before STEM arrived in IC. I agree and wld add that suspicions of Amers and distrust US intentions in IC also have history which ante-dates STEM. Problem is not to maintain but to create confidence between US and Fr in IC. The record of OSS–VM relations during war, virtual US embargo on assistance to France in IC immed after war, our reluctance make commitments as to extent our engagement in IC in hypothetical circumstances, activities certain irresponsible Amer journalists in area all form background to present mistrust, exacerbated as well by current Fr [U.S.?]-Fr tension elsewhere. Against this background and current Fr uneasiness re our undercover and economic [Page 459] programs I have urged, for accomplishment our policy ends, period of fuller cooperation and more ample consultation. I have no reason to withdraw that recommendation.
2. Final considerations must influence determination these issues.
First, we must recognize that cardinal aim Communists policy in this present phase is to split US and Fr, that IC almost ideally suited for attempt because of its own internal contractions [contradictions?] and because once successful here, effects or rupture wld quickly embitter further aspects of Franco-Amer policy. To resist this design and very considerable effort of propaganda already devoted to it in Fr, US and IC, will be tests of statesmanship. As stronger member of partnership we can perhaps bear little more than our share, but I am confident that once we give them lead, Fr will not be lacking. But task is clear: To maintain and perfect our understanding and cooperation with Fr.
Secondly, pressures will mount in Fr and IC for negotiated appeasement in Vietnam with forthcoming negots on post armistice political settlement in Korea. Problem may soon become one not of attempting persuade Fr to intervene less in IC but to continue their exertions beyond politically popular level. As indicated in Legtel 159, July 183 there have been and are significant forces in France and IC that seek such compromise settlement. I can think of no more influential tool for these appeasers than situation in which they cld claim that US either has no real faith in or is actively opposed to Fr Union and that choice in any event is whether IC [belongs?] to Russians or to Amers. Now is time above all where all our divergencies, to extent possible, shld be minimized. I think we must concentrate our energies and our plans on staying the course in IC, that we shld cease to bemoan even to ourselves necessity for program of support to Fr but shld welcome fact that they here carrying major load, that we shld stop worrying about what our position will be in what will be left of IC if Fr withdraw and instead give them and ourselves confidence that together we can hold the pass. (End msg.)
Sent Dept unnumbered, rptd info Paris eyes only for Bruce unnumbered.
- This telegram, transmitted in six secret and one top secret parts totalling 15 pages, contained Heath’s objections to aspects of Economic Cooperation Administration policy in Indochina which he considered at variance with Department of State policy.↩
- This extract is taken from the top secret portion of the telegram.↩
- Not printed.↩