Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

751G.5/3–1751: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State

top secret
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Saigon, March 17, 1951—10 p. m.

1653. Deptel 1188, March 15¹ was Legation’s first intimation that project of De Lattre visit to Washington had been revived. When I was in Washington a month ago, some consideration was given to De Lattre’s making a brief visit of a purely military consultation but the time was then judged inopportune. Certainly it rankles in De Lattre’s mind that he has never been asked to visit the States whereas Montgomery² and his competitor for French military honors, General Juin, have made such visits. I learned at my dinner for De Lattre three days ago, De Lattre said to Brady,³ Public Affairs Officer, that most countries had invited him to make a visit, only the US had not extended an invitation. De Lattre went on to say that he knew the reason which was that he had the reputation of “being difficult”. Brady, who is liked by De Lattre, inquired with a deadpan expression, “Is there any justification for this reputation, My General?” De Lattre hesitated a moment and answered, “No.”

We do not know whether it is contemplated that De Lattre might accompany Auriol on latter’s visit to States⁴ or make trip separately. Visit would doubtless contribute to De Lattre’s improved understanding of US and American motives but I am very pleased Bruce intends review our policy and intentions with De Lattre for De Lattre both likes and respects him. This should be most helpful in relieving his mind of unfounded but persistent misgivings.

I am less certain about advisability our pressing for De Lattre visit to US at this particular time for following reason:

(1) Next six weeks will be very critical time with probability major Vietnamese offensive fairly well confirmed by all our intelligence. If large-scale attack comes De Lattre’s leadership will be needed here.

(2) Whether De Lattre proposes make visit alone or with Auriol, he will doubtless expect to receive at least all military honors and full publicity as wartime chief Rhine-Danube Army and present French opposite number to MacArthur in Pacific. I suspect he will also expect political recognition as High Commissioner with receptions by appropriate US officials. If time does not permit such program to be arranged, visit might well boomerang.

(3) Inasmuch as visit by King Cambodia was declined last year, visit of Huu was discouraged in January, and no invitation has ever been extended to Bao Dai, local political effect might be most unfortunate in our own relations with Associated States at this time.

(4) De Lattre would probably desire bring back some tangible evidence of successful trip, either increased MDAP, activation tripartite staff talks, or definite US guarantees assistance in event Chinese Communist invasion. Unless we prepared offer one or more we probably would have to contemplate somewhat affronted De Lattre.

(5) I must finally express some foreboding that De Lattre’s fairly unpredictable personality might in his discussion of US aid with Pentagon officials not advance his cause. From point view our overall policy, it would be most unfortunate if present smooth operations were to be temporarily jolted.

Our own thinking inclines to view that if impending Vietnamese attack in north occurs and De Lattre is successful in repelling it, he might then appropriately be asked to pay visit to US as victorious French Commander in Far East, as builder Vietnamese National Army, and as one of outstanding military leaders World War II. US visit might at that time be arranged for De Lattre enroute to Paris for new consultations and conceivably could be coordinated with joint Far East staff talks.

At same time announcement this De Lattre visit made, we might also state that we look forward to early visit Vietnamese monarch or Prime Minister or Chief of Staff as case might be. We would thus seek to emphasize that De Lattre was making visit in a military capacity, while political visit would be made by official of independent Vietnam. If Department approves this project, some intimation of forthcoming invitation might be given De Lattre in Paris at this time.

Sent Department 1653; repeated information Paris 716.

Heath

1. Telegram 4820 to Paris (repeated to Saigon for information as telegram 1188), March 15, read as follows:

   “Urtel 5380 Mar 14. Dept concurs in your stated intention to use occasion De Lattre’s visit to Paris to reiterate our position and aims in IC. Dept is equally pleased with forthright manner Heath has defended our position and believes your efforts toward same end with De Lattre will facilitate task considerably.

   “Your discussing this matter particularly helpful in light of possible visit to Wash for we wld seek, insofar as possible, to have Gen disabused of any remaining misgivings in advance of rather than during Wash sojourn.” (751G.5/3–1451)

2. Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Western Union.
3. Leslie Snowden Brady.
4. President Auriol visited the United States from March 28 to April 4. Documentation on his visit is scheduled for publication in volume iv.