Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

790.5/1–1651

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

secret

Washington, 16 January 1951.

Dear Mr. Secretary: With reference to your letter of 15 November 1950¹ regarding proposed United States-United Kingdom-French military talks concerning the defense of Indochina, I am transmitting herewith, for your information, a memorandum of 10 January 1951 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject. In this memorandum the Joint Chiefs of Staff refer to a previous memorandum to me, dated 8 December 1950,² in which they then stated that “additional military staff talks should not be undertaken at this time.” I am also enclosing that memorandum for your information.

In view of the opinion which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reaffirmed in their memorandum of 10 January 1951 that, from the strictly military point of view, no additional military staff talks are desirable at this time, I believe that the holding of such talks now depends on whether or not the Department of State believes that there are overriding political considerations. I realize that the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have the effect of indefinitely postponing your agreement reached with Mr. Schuman and Mr. Bevin on 14 September 1950.³ Yet, I believe that, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense can only recommend that, unless there are overriding political considerations, the French and British Governments be informed of the present U.S. military position regarding these talks.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

secret

Washington, 10 January 1951.

Subject: Proposed Military Talks Regarding Defense of Indochina.

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum of 21 December 1950⁴ dealing with the matter of proposed military talks regarding defense of Indochina.

2. In view of the present United States military position in the Far East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the following to be basic:

a. The United States should not permit its military forces to become engaged in French Indochina at this time, and

b. In the event of a communist invasion of Indochina, therefore, the United States should under current circumstances limit its support of the French there to an acceleration and expansion of the present military assistance program, together with taking other appropriate action to deny Indochina to communism, short of the actual employment of military forces.

In light of the above, and in view of the considerations expressed in their memorandum to you of 8 December 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel, from the strictly military point of view, that no additional military staff talks are desirable at this time.

3. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the political considerations raised in your memorandum of 21 December 1950 may be regarded as overriding. Under such circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not interpose further objection to the holding of additional tripartite military staff talks at this time. Any such talks, however, would be restricted in scope by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and would not be permitted to deal with matters of strategy affecting United States global policies and plans.

4. In the event of a global war, the major United States measures in support of the French in Indochina would of necessity also be limited to the acceleration and expansion of the present military assistance program as feasible, and, operationally, to matters connected with convoy, routing, and protection of shipping. If the decision is made to hold the proposed additional military talks involving military operational commanders, it would be appropriate, therefore, that the chief United States military representative should be an officer designated by the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), and that he should be assisted by General Brink.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. C. Davis

Rear Admiral, USN
Director, The Joint Staff

1. Secretary of State Acheson’s letter to Secretary of Defense Marshall, November 15, 1950, not printed, suggested that preparations be completed for the earliest possible meeting of high military officers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France regarding Indochina (790.5/11–1550). For documentation on the question of staff talks, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol, vi, pp. 690 ff.
2. Not printed.
3. At a meeting on September 14, 1950, Secretary Acheson informed Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, and Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, that the United States wished to commence military staff talks on Indochina. For documentation on consideration of Indochina at the New York Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, September 12–14 and 18–19, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, pp. 880 ff.
4. Not printed.