690B.93/11–2851
The Chargé in Burma (Day) to the Secretary of State
No. 490
Ref: Deptel 461 Nov. 23, 19511 repeated Bangkok 1142, Saigon 705, Taipei 424; Saigon tel 1038, Nov. 16, 1951, to Department.2
Subject: Viewpoint of Burmese toward relation of United States Government to activities of KMT troops in Burma.
Paragraph 3 of Saigon’s telegram 1038 November 16, 1951, to the Department informed the Department that the Chinese Consul [Page 314] General in Saigon had reportedly learned that General Hsiao Yi-Su, Nationalist Vice Minister of Defense might make a visit to Nationalist guerilla units in the frontier area along the Burma–Yunnan border.
While the obstacles to such a visit by a high Nationalist official seem great enough to suggest that it is not likely to happen, it is believed desirable to explain in greater detail this Embassy’s comment in its telegram 490 of November 213 that such a visit would be considered by the Burma Government as a further indication that the United States Government is involved in the operations of KMT troops in Burma.
Apart from what action can be taken to dispel unfounded impressions in the minds of Burmese officials, it seems necessary to report further the definite impression officers of this Embassy have gained of the viewpoint of many officials of the Government on the influence which it believes the United States Government could exert on the Chinese Government at Taipei for the purpose of bringing about, by degrees, an end to alleged violation of Burma’s sovereignty by use of Burmese soil for operations of KMT guerilla troops led by General Li Mi.
Although reports of Chinese Communist methods of ruling have caused unfavorable reactions among some conservative Burmese with a corresponding change to a more favorable attitude toward Chiang Kai Shek’s4 regime and the possibility of it being eventually restored to power on the mainland of China, most Burmese have been inclined to regard the Nationalist Government of China as a defeated, exiled regime depending for its existence on the support of the United States Government. They understand the United States Government is furnishing military supplies and equipment. The Burmese authorities have found modern rifles and other equipment of American manufacture in the hands of KMT soldiers captured in Burma. Captured KMT officers have stated America was helping them. The Burmese have assumed that these arms are from supplies furnished by the United States to the Chinese in Formosa. For the past year there have been repeated reports that at least two Americans in uniform have been seen with KMT units in Burma. These stories have gained widespread credence. The Burmese draw the conclusion that if the United States Government is not an accessory to the supplying of arms from Formosa to General Li Mi’s forces it could at least prevent this traffic by bringing pressure to bear to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. In the same manner, they reason that the United States Government could take firm and effective measures to induce the Chinese military [Page 315] authorities in Formosa to break the link which they are firmly convinced exists between General Li Mi and the Chinese Nationalist military authorities in Formosa through regular exchanges of communications. The Burmese believe that General Li Mi is acting under direct orders from Taipei.
Burmese officials have also repeatedly given evidence of the belief that the United States Government can exert decisive influence upon the Chinese Legation in Bangkok, and on the Thai Government (e.g.: Embtel 312 of September 24, 1951), both of which are believed to be in close contact with the American military in Bangkok. It is perhaps for this reason that General Li Mi’s visit to Bangkok, airdrops from short-ranged planes ostensibly based in Thailand, and visits by important individuals from Bangkok to the Kengtung area are considered evidence, if not of our complicity with the KMT troops’ activities in that area, then of our complaisance in the premises.
Many Burmese officials thus hold the view that the United States Government is in a position to act effectively to prevent smuggling of arms from Taipei and put an end to aid from the Chinese Nationalist Government to General Li Mi’s forces on Burmese soil.
In addition to the belief of Burmese that we are aiding the KMT troops in Burma, some British officials in Burma hold this opinion. A member of the British diplomatic mission in Burma recently argued in the presence of a Burmese army officer that the United States was helping these troops.
As long as these beliefs remain firmly rooted, it will be difficult to satisfy the Burmese authorities that the United States Government is doing all it can to resolve the problem of KMT troops in Burma by pointing out that the Government at Formosa is sovereign and independent and that the United States Government does not control and has no responsibility for the movements and activities of Chinese Nationalist Government officials.
While the logic or accuracy of the reasoning of the Burmese may be weak, the belief that the United States Government is involved is so widespread, despite official denials, that the smallest item of information that permits interpretation of possible United States involvement, however remote, is likely to be viewed in a light unfavorable to our interests.
For this reason the Embassy thinks that if Chinese Nationalist officials manage to visit KMT guerilla forces under General Li Mi’s command in the China-Burma border area many Burmese authorities would find it difficult not to believe that in some way the United States Government was involved, either because the United States helped arrange it or approved it or did not prevent it.
The Embassy has no reason to doubt that the Prime Minister has accepted the positive assurances of the Ambassador that the United [Page 316] States is not in any way involved in the alleged infringement of Burmese sovereignty by KMT troops and that other high offici.als are satisfied we have not been involved. Some officials are no doubt satisfied that the United States Government desires to help as best it can in solving the problem. Conversations of Embassy officers with officials and others have shown, however, that the belief in American involvement is widespread among Burma army officers and among officials in the Shan States, including the Sawbwas who are heads of the States. This belief appears to be not entirely the consequence of Communist propaganda, although the Communists have no doubt fostered it. The comments of the Foreign Minister, reported in my despatch 461 of November 20, 1951, indicate that he believes firmly that the United States could act effectively to break the link between the Government at Taipei and General Li Mi and prevent support of Li Mi’s troops by Chinese Nationalist military elements in Formosa. It may safely be assumed that other high officials are with him in holding this view.
As previously reported, the Burma Government has become more concerned over the KMT troops since the pro-Communist leftist opposition, acting through the Burma Workers and Peasants Party and the World Peace Council (Burma) have publicly advocated stronger Government measures against KMT troops in Burma.
That this problem, which so strongly affects our relations with Burma, is likely again to become acute, seems likely from a report which the Army Attaché received of a reviewed concentration of KMT troops under General Li Mi’s command at Menghsat in Kengtung (Embassy despatch 466 of November 20, 1951.)5
Action requested: Please send copies of this despatch to Bangkok, Saigon, Taipei, New Delhi, and Paris.
- Not printed. In this telegram, the Department informed the Embassy in Rangoon that the United States could not prevent visits by high ranking Chinese Nationalist officials to the KMT forces operating in northern Burma. Moreover, the Embassy was to indicate clearly to the Burmese Government that the United States had no control over the movement and activities of Chinese Nationalist officials, as the government on Formosa was a sovereign and independent entity. (690B.93/11–2151)↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- President of the Republic of China.↩
- Not printed.↩