Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

641.74/12–1251: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State ¹

secret
niact

Cairo, December 12, 1951—2 p. m.

861. I again counseled Acting Min Fon Aff not to break relations with Brit. He said that govt to save its face with Egypt people must do something. He said, “As a friend tell us what to do”. I skipped that one. He then said, “The very least we can do is to recall Amr as a protest. Can we do that?” I said, “Do not dare tell anyone that I told you but if you can have your cabinet buy that one I say go ahead; but promise me not to do anything against Stevenson or Embassy here”. He replied, “All right”.

He then again made his unusual heated appeal for us to do something to hold down Brit mil in zone. I told him that most effective things Egypts cld do in that connection was to call off their own terrorists.²

Caffery

1. Repeated to London, Paris for MacArthur, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Tehran. Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda.
2. In telegram 873, niact, from Cairo, December 13, Caffery reported that the Egyptian Government had just dispatched a note to the British Embassy protesting British “‘atrocities’” and ending with the announcement that, in order to publicly show its indignation, Egypt was immediately recalling its Ambassador (Amr) to the United Kingdom. The Egyptian note was accompanied by a public communique announcing (1) preparation of legislation establishing sanctions against anyone who collaborated or had transactions with British military forces in the country; (2) modification of existing legislation to permit anyone to carry firearms on condition that the Minister of Interior was notified and did not object within a stated time; and (3) transfer of the Egyptian technical bureau, then in London, to Central Europe, with offices in Switzerland. (641.74/12–1351) In telegram 875 from Cairo, December 13, Caffery added that the actions announced by the Egyptian Cabinet “probably minimum Wafd thought it cld get away with and remain in power.” After assessing the impact of these measures, Caffery added that considering the fact the Egyptian Government had considered a complete break in Anglo-Egyptian relations and/or the recall of Stevenson, “we have not come off too badly with tonight’s actions.” Caffery admitted that he was not certain why Farouk “has gone along with this” but guessed the King was unwilling to throw the Wafd into opposition “at this juncture.” (641.74/12–1351)