641.74/11–3051: Telegram
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State 1
788. Deptel 784 Nov 21.2 Our two Embs have devoted great deal of time to preparation of joint evaluation of present situation and are reasonably near agreement on “background” and “conclusions” sections. Stevenson has had consultations with Brit mil but in view of their attitude and London’s too, he seems to have trouble in fol through at least to commit himself on paper. Admittedly situation here is complex as well as perplexing and I have sympathy with his difficulties. (Stevenson and I still work in close coop and harmony.)
In view of delay I go ahead with my recommendations as fol:
Palace and Wafd are presently only forces in Egypt with sufficient power to govern.
Brit are prone to believe that somehow or other new govt can be formed with which they can deal. There may well come a time when this will be true and I hope it is soon; but time has not yet come. We shld therefore do our best to hold Brit back on this until time is ripe. We shld agree, however, that Salaheddin should go, preferably while still in Paris: Palace and Serageddin urge this; but they won’t act until we agree with Serageddin.
While Serageddin is unwilling to put anything on paper he says that he stands on paras 2 and 3 of mytel 689, Nov 12,3 in other words that Brit troops left in zone shld be called technicians and that number shld be subj to prior agreement. In regard to the airplanes he wants them to fly Egyptian flag. I asked if he cld get away with [Page 429] this, having in mind the super-inflamed anti-Brit atmosphere hanging over Egypt. He replied, “Yes, but on the condition Brit agree on something satisfactory on the Sudan”. I am not convinced that he can get away with it but if anybody in Egypt can he can.
Everything Dept says in connection with Egypts being always ready to reject proposals made to them but never producing any serious concrete suggestions is only too true and only too logical. However we must face reality, and they won’t come up with anything beyond what Serageddin has already said and with which the King is in accord. The Egypts still believe that one way or another they will be able to worry Brit out of the zone and fortunately they don’t realize how difficult the Brit position is: and Brit position may be described as “lamentable”.
After considerable conversation with Stevenson on the subj he put forth the suggestion in mytel 785, Nov 29,4 “to find some formula in regards to the Egyptian crown which cld be reconciled with the right of eventual self-determination of the Sudanese”.
As law offices of the crown have apparently decided that juridically Egypt claim to title of King of Sudan is well-founded, we cld suggest to Egypts to recognize title subj to “referendum” under supervision of three mutually agreed-upon friendly powers. Brit Sudanese officials wld immed bring up multiple arguments why referendum is not practical but that is not pertinent. If we can get Egypts to agree to such a formula we will have progressed considerably and they might find it difficult to reject it. If it is true, as Brit say, that Egypt supporters in Sudan are in a small minority there is no reason for them to win such a referendum. Nor wld it be necessary to have the referendum take place immed. (I apprehend Brit believe Hague Court wld decide against them on title question.) These suggestions, of course, will need a lot of polishing.
With regard to Dept’s specific inquiry whether Brit have consulted with Sudanese leaders on how far they cld go to meet Egypt demands, it is not my understanding that there have been any such consultations.
I realize that it will be difficult for the Brit to face facts on the Sudan, first of all for domestic polit reason, but if the Brit maintain their stand as recently set out in London and Paris we must resign ourselves to the fact that the canal zone may, unless something unforeseen turns up, explode with a loud bang at no distant date, an explosion with a potential chain reaction of occupation revolution eventual Commie domination. We must also face the fact that with nothing on the Sudan this govt or any other govt the King might set up cld not agree on any defense proposals we might put forth.
[Page 430]At same time we must do everything possible to encourage Egyptian Govt to take positive steps towards controlling terrorists as this should ease problems of Brit mil and help to avoid situation which might result in their taking drastic (and probably disastrous) reprisals.