Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 929

768.5–MAP/10–851: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia ¹

secret
priority niact

Washington, October 9, 1951—7:18 p.m.

374. Re mil aid bilateral (Embtel 436 Oct 8²) Dept believes that in interview with Tito you shld stand firm on our fundamental objectives and stress importance US Govt attaches to fol genl points which are at issue judging from Mates–Beam exchanges (Embtel 429 Oct 6³)

A. US Govt has no desire intrude into internal affairs YuGovt, which fact is amply demonstrated by record US assistance provided Yugo to date. US Govt is fully mindful Yugo susceptibilities, particularly after experience with Sov mil “advisers’ before 1948. However, in seeking together with other countries of free world to provide for individual and common defense, US is not in position to draw upon its resources for this purpose and make equipment available to receiving countries without also taking at least minimum steps which its experience in such matters has consistently demonstrated must be taken in order ensure its maximum effective use.

B. US Govt in reviewing recommendations contained in Popovic–Eddleman memo⁴ came to conclusion that, in as much as nr personnel required for new functions out of proportion size of customary Attaché staffs, functions differ and arrangement wld present difficult internal admin problems, undesirable attempt handle aid program through augmented MilAtt office. Essential point is that, regardless what aid group is called, Yugos shld recognize that because of nature its functions its operations must be conducted apart from affairs office MilAtt and in more different channels from those customarily available MilAtts.

In view special Yugo polit situation US has taken particular care to determine (a) absolute minimum requirements for mil personnel and (b) functions which it regards as essential in order assure that proposed assistance is used most effectively; on these points US proposals were designed to meet special Yugo situation. Represent considerable modification gen US position vis-à-vis countries receiving mil aid.

C. As to initial size and composition group, 15 officers will be divided 9 Army (including genl officer as group chief), 4 Air, 2 Navy. US invites further discussion in order that Yugos may see actual need this number. Regret Yugo Govt has not seen fit avail itself of opportunity observe Paris MAAG, which we feel wld clarify situation. Also unacceptable to US to have mil aid unit strength and status frozen by bilateral agreement in manner desired by Yugos, although we are willing to agree informally on nrs and make increases only with Yugo approval. In picture expanding US mil aid programs elsewhere, we cld not accept such a precedent. Furthermore, fixing of strength is not in keeping with tenor Popovic–Eddleman conversations which envisaged initial aid group arrangements as temporary measures.

D. US sees no need specify mil aid unit functions in written agreement, particularly since in interest both govts maintain necessary flexibility in cooperative endeavor to achieve agreed objectives set forth in bilateral. So far as carry out MS act is concerned, US must of course be judge of functions and adequacy of arrangements needed. Functions involving contact with Yugo staff personnel and mil establishments wld be regulated through arrangements with Yugo staff as outlined to Yugos by Emb. Functions listed in Beam letter of Sept 4 to Mates, submitted FonOff in order help obviate future misunderstandings, are those which US considers appropriate and necessary. Several internal functions included in order indicate reasons prompting US view re size personnel requirements. If Yugo proposal is that group’s consultations with reps of MinDef on contents aid program be held only annually, then there is serious misunderstanding continuous advisory role of US mil personnel, particularly as regards planning contents program and priorities of deliveries, as well as regarding necessity for coordination mil and econ aid programs and for observation in the field of end use and maintenance of US aid, not merely on proving ground.

II. Re specific proposals by Mates contained in Embtel 429 Oct 6:

Para I(1)—Request you press our original proposal (see para I(B) above.)

Para I(2)—Yugo proposal acceptable with insertion of “of the” fol “agreed number”.

Para I(3)—You may assure Yugos special application wld be made and mutual approval obtained in each case.

Para II—(see para D above).

III. Request you also raise points set out in Deptel 361 Oct 5.⁵ Mutual Security Act as sent to White House Oct 8 for signature identical with conf report (copy pouched Oct 4⁶) except for deletion sec 501 (e) 3 re membership of MS Director on Board Directors of Exim Bank.

IV. Dept will advise re handling this matter in connection Collins visit fol indication results ur interview with Tito.

Acheson

1. Drafted by Gannett and cleared with Higgs and Colonel Dziuban of Defense. Repeated to Stockholm for General Collins.
2. Telegram 436 informed the Department of State that Ambassador Allen had requested an interview with Tito on October 10 to discuss the number and duties of the U.S. military group provided for in the mutual assistance agreement. (768.5–MAP/10–851)
3. Telegram 429 reported a conversation between Mates and Beam concerning disagreements over various parts of the text of the proposed mutual assistance agreement. (768.5–MAP/10–651)
4. See footnote 2, Document 908.
5. Telegram 361 instructed the Embassy in Belgrade, in light of the expected passage of the Mutual Security Act by the Congress within the next few days, to attempt to secure several changes in the text of the draft mutual assistance agreement in order to fulfill the eligibility requirements which were effective 90 days after the law was enacted. (768.5–MAP/9–2151)
6. Not printed.