768.5/9–551
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Reinhardt)
Subject: Proposed Bilateral Discussions Regarding Military Support for Yugoslavia.
| Participants: | Deputy Under Secretary, Mr. H. Freeman Matthews |
| General Omar Bradley, Chairman, JCS | |
| Mr. Bonbright, EUR | |
| Mr. Reinhardt, EE |
General Bradley came in to discuss the confused situation that had developed with regard to the bilateral staff talks which Admiral Carney has been instructed to carry on with the United Kingdom, France and Italy on the subject of military support for Yugoslavia. This matter is the subject of EE memorandum of August 301 and memorandum of conversation between Mr. Bonbright and Mr. Burrows of the British Embassy of the same date.1
After a discussion of the problem of the bilateral talks General Bradley indicated that the JCS would probably proceed along the following line: (1) not push the Yugoslav paper which had been submitted to the Standing Group (NATO) and to which the British were objecting; (2) resume as soon as possible the politico-military talks (Bradley–Franks); and (3) endeavor to have Admiral Carney proceed if possible with the bilateral talks as planned, but on the original limited agenda, not the very broad agenda which he had recently submitted to the British in London. In reply to his question General Bradley was told that this procedure would be acceptable to the Department. Mr. Matthews handed General Bradley a letter which the Department was addressing to Mr. Frank Nash in this matter, requesting the Defense Department’s views as to the best manner in which to proceed.2
[Page 1846]In connection with General West’s recent conversation with Marshal Tito, General Bradley stated that it was quite clear that this had been done without General Eisenhower’s knowledge, but he was not sure whether or not General Irwin had had any advance notice.3 General Gruenther was in communication with the JCS on this subject.
With respect to the British desire to keep any quadripartite military planning outside of NATO, General Bradley asked whether it was our feeling this could be done without incurring the displeasure of the other NATO members. He was told that it was the Department’s view for the time being at least that it would be possible.
General Bradley said that any visit which General Collins might make to Yugoslavia in response to Tito’s invitation would be outside the framework of these other talks and would have essentially an information-gathering purpose.
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- The letter explained the problem concerning the proposed bilateral talks with the British and asked for the Department of Defense views as to the manner in which to proceed. (768.5/8–2851) On October 9, Secretary of Defense Lovett sent a letter to the Department of State which had an attachment from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning these bilateral talks with the British. The JCS memorandum, dated September 19, recommended that the Department of State explain to the British that plans developed on a bilateral basis should be considered only as an interim emergency measure since NATO would ultimately provide the appropriate military support when its capabilities permitted that General Eisenhower would direct the development of emergency plans evolving from these bilateral talks, and that General Eisenhower and Admiral Carney would act as military representatives of the United States. The JCS repeated their desire that the bilateral talks proceed as soon as possible. (768.5/10–951)↩
- No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.↩