768.5/8–2751: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 1
1058. Personal for Pres and Secy from Harriman.2 No dist except as directed by Secy’s Office. I spent some six hours with Tito on Saturday Aug 25. At luncheon we had interesting roundtable talk and after lunch I had long talk with Tito personally. Amb Allen and Gen Landry were present and also Kardelj, Min of Fon-Affs, Kidric, Min for Econ Affs, Rankovic, Min of Interior, and Vilfan, Dep Min for FonAffs, who translated. Tito and Kidric outlined their priority requirements which all centered around mil equipment and raw materials and other industrial equipment to increase domestic mil production. I expressed our desire to be of assistance but underlined shortages which now exist. I pointed out [Page 1843] however that at a later date required equipment might be in better supply.
We then had a gen talk about Kremlin intentions. Tito expressed his opinion that Stalin did not intend to become involved in a gen war but that real danger existed from miscalculation of Western reaction, particularly that of US, to local aggression by Sovs. He had of course directly in mind aggression by satellites against Yugo.… He and his associates showed determination to do everything within their power to increase their mil strength as the first requirement to “survival”. They were concerned however over the balance of payments problem and the ability to obtain the needed imports to sustain the mil effort.
… He said he cld not understand why so many people in the West continued to inquire whether his break with Stalin was irrevocable. He was obviously in good health and vigor and gave the impression of confidence and determination. I will report on my conversation more fully upon my return.
At my press conf in Bled Sunday, after explaining in detail that there was no special significance in my visit I said that we had discussed a broad range of subjects, including Kremlin objectives and the manner in which war cld be prevented; that we agreed the policy of our 2 countries in strengthening their mil forces was the surest way to prevent war and that one of the principal dangers came from a possible miscalculation by the Kremlin of the reaction of West Eur countries and especially that of the US to local aggression inspired by Sovs. I said that Tito’s recent statement that “an attack on Yugoslavia cld not be localized” came up in our talk. In answer to a question of a correspondent I replied, “All I can say is, I did not dispute it”. I further told the press that “Tito expressed his hope that the relations between our 2 countries wld develop, with increased cooperation and understanding of our mutual interests. He expressed respect for Pres Truman and the wisdom and foresightedness of his policies in dealing with the worldwide threat from the Kremlin.”
My other statements to the press were of a gen nature.3 [Harriman.]
- Repeated to Moscow and Belgrade both eyes only for the Ambassador.↩
- In response to the invitation from Yugoslav Ambassador Popović to visit Belgrade, offered during Popović’s conversation with Secretary of State Acheson on August 3 (see Document 919), W. Averell Harriman agreed to stop in Belgrade on his way back from Tehran where he was holding consultations with Prime Minister Mosadeq concerning the British-Iranian oil controversy. In addition to his visit to Yugoslavia on August 25–26, Harriman also traveled to Paris and London before returning to Washington.↩
- A copy of the verbatim transcript of Harriman’s press conference in Bled, Yugoslavia, on August 26, is in file 611.68/9–1451.↩