Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 894

768.56/4–3051

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Burns) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

top secret

Washington, 30 April 1951.

Subject: Consultations with Yugoslav Military Authorities

1. Reference is made to your Top Secret letter dated 9 April 1951 to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹

2. The Department of Defense foresees, at this time, requirements for three categories of staff conversations with Yugoslav military authorities as follows:

a. The exploratory conversations discussed in the reference letter.

b. Technical, working-level conversations in connection with matériel assistance programs. These requirements are being transmitted in a separate concurrent communication.²

c. Working-level discussions on strategic and operational matters of joint interest in connection with planning pursuant to the decisions of NSC 18/6.³

3. The Department of Defense concurs in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, from the military point of view, the proposals outlined in the reference letter for conversations with General Popovic should be accepted. The world situation is such that an early date for these conversations is desirable. Appropriate action by the Department of State is requested.

a. The Yugoslav Government has indicated that the discussions should in the first stage be bilateral, but that at a later date, and upon mutual agreement, it would probably be desirable to bring in the British. From the military point of view, there is no objection to this arrangement.

b. The main topics to be discussed should naturally fall into the following broad categories:

(1) Military problems in Yugoslavia of mutual interest to that nation and the United States which would arise in the event of an overt attack against Yugoslavia. . . .

(2) Military aid matters in the light of a possible overt attack against Yugoslavia. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to ascertain the over-all status of Yugoslav equipment and to determine those areas of equipment in which deficiencies might most advantageously be filled from United States sources. An assessment of the ability of the armed forces of Yugoslavia to make effective use of such equipment as is furnished would be relevant to this phase of the discussion.

c. With respect to personnel, it is planned to have a senior Army general officer, assisted by one senior strategic planning and one senior logistic planning representative from each Service, participate in these conversations.

d. If desired, it will also be possible to arrange appropriate courtesy calls by General Popovic on top United States military officers.

e. It should be made clear to the Yugoslav Government that the proposed talks with General Popovic are exploratory in nature and will in no way involve any commitment on the part of the United States.

4. As regards the working-level discussions on strategic and operational matters (par. 2c above), it is desired that these discussions be arranged as early as practicable, and in any event immediately after the operational decision has been made to support Yugoslavia as contemplated by NSC 18/6 in certain contingencies.

a. These discussions should be held in Belgrade. If this is not practicable, they should be held at the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) in London.

b. It is not considered practicable at this time to state exactly how many personnel will be involved in these conversations. Under present conditions the number would be small, possibly not to exceed ten, including representatives from the European Command and U.S. Air Forces, Europe, headed by a flag officer designated by CINCNELM.

c. Since these conversations would be concerned with United States planning, there is no occasion for United Kingdom or French participation.

d. The purpose of these conversations is to provide for the coordination of United States military operations in support of Yugoslavia. The detailed subject matter will be developed by CINCNELM in light of developing world conditions.

J. H. Burns

1. The letter informed General Bradley of Velebit’s proposal concerning the possibility of General Popović’s visit to Washington, stated that from a political point of view this would be useful, and inquired if the suggested visit would be acceptable from the military point of view. (768.5/4–951)
2. This is a reference to Burns’ memorandum to Matthews of April 30 concerning technical working-level conversations with the Yugoslavs. According to this letter, the purpose of these conversations would be to clarify the content and priorities of Yugoslav requirements, justify deficiencies, examine problems of materiel delivery, relate assistance programs to Yugoslavia’s military supply and production situation, and examine the training and technical assistance requirements generated by the matériel program. (768.56/4–3051)
3. Not cleared for publication when this volume went to press.