Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 890

668.81/4–1251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece ¹

top secret

Washington, April 12, 1951—8 p.m.

3746. Eyes only Ambassador. Embtel 3312 Apr 4 rptd Belgrade 78.² Suggest you inform PriMin that, as he knows, this Govt attaches highest importance to closer friendly and cooperative relations between Yugo and Greece and that we have extended such appropriate help to that end as we cld. We feel accordingly it is highly desirable Yugo and Greece come to mutual agreement earliest possible moment on actions which each wld take in event attack on either. We therefore hope they will undertake discussions to clarify and coordinate their actions in such eventuality. You might also indicate that, of course, US wld not consider such bilateral discussions as proper forum in which attempt formulate new basic polit, terr settlement in Balkans (i.e. Alb) except only so

far present Grk-Yugo terr involved. Naturally we wld hope be kept currently and fully informed concerning course of discussions.

Grk response to Yugos cld be along fol lines:

1. Greece naturally expects UN wld lend support to Yugo or Greece in event aggression.

2. Greece of course prepared honor her obligations as member UN in participating UN action in support Yugo and assumes Yugo would do likewise in support Greece.

3. Greece therefore considers it would be in mutual interests Greece and Yugo examine in detail possible mil polit measures which might be taken in event attack against either and is ready participate further exchange views with Yugo at convenience Yugo Govt.

FYI only we expect have in near future more detailed views this gen subj and foregoing designed largely encouragement to Greece and Yugo to initiate convers. Although suspicious possibility one objective Venizelos’ request for advice may be force disclosure US security plans for the areas, we wld hope, through close relations existing between Grk Govt and US Mission in Athens, provide guidance which wld produce Grk-Yugo arrangements in harmony with US plans without unnecessary embarrassment to US. If question integration Grk-Yugo plans with US Balkan and Med plans is raised you shld indicate you feel certain Wash wld consider discussion such plans premature but that it wld undoubtedly wish review situation in light Grk-Yugo agreement.

Re Sulzberger report in Belgrade’s 1431 Apr 5 rpt Athens 102³ we have no info here confirming such understanding. However, we wld not favor any move partition Alb between Greece and Yugo. Re proposal Belgrade’s 1431 include Turks in conversations we consider inadvisable complicate situation to this extent. Turkey has demonstrated reluctance engage bilateral or regional security discussions except on basis direct US participation. Shld Grks and Yugos establish area real understanding, thereby providing basis extending scope discussions and plans, question Turkish participation might be considered.⁴

Acheson

1. Drafted by Norbert L. Anschuetz of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, and by Higgs and cleared with Matthews, Berry, McGhee, Perkins, Bonbright, Cabot, Ohly, Emery, and Colonel Hartshorn of Defense. Repeated to Belgrade.
2. Telegram 3312 reported that Greek Prime Minister Venizelos told Ambassador Peurifoy that the Yugoslav Minister to Greece had just made a formal démarche inquiring as to what action Greece would take in case Yugoslavia was attacked. After he described the conversation, Venizelos “in effect asked what US wishes him to reply to Yugoslavs.” (768.5/4–451)
3. Telegram 1431 informed the Department of State that Sulzberger asked Ambassador Allen whether he had heard anything about a high-level Greek proposal to Yugoslavia concerning the possible division of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia. (768.5/4–551)
4. In telegram 3497 from Athens, April 18, Ambassador Peurifoy reported that he presented the views set forth in this telegram to Prime Minister Venizelos on April 17 and that Venizelos said he would give his reply to the Yugoslavs along these same lines emphasizing the U.N. framework but making it clear that the Greek Government will provide support to Yugoslavia in case of attack, just as the Greeks hoped the Yugoslav Government would extend aid to them if Greece were attacked. Venizelos told Peurifoy that he would inform the Yugoslavs of Greek willingness to carry on detailed military-political negotiations along these lines but that the initiative would be left to Yugoslavia in light of their well-known sensitivity about not provoking the Cominform. Venizelos also denied categorically that any discussion had taken place with Yugoslavia concerning the division of Albania. (668.81/4–1851)