Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 878

768.5–MAP/3–2051

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] March 20, 1951.

Subject: Aid to Yugoslavia

The Problem:

To obtain Secretary’s instructions as to whether he approves of appropriate officers of the Government consulting with Congressional leaders and also with members of NATO with a view to a possible finding by the President that the extension of further aid to Yugoslavia under the MDAA contributes to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area.

Discussion:

At the meeting of ISAC on March 16,¹ agreement was reached to recommend the immediate extension of economic assistance to Yugoslavia in a sum up to $29 million from MDAP funds for the purchase of raw materials immediately required by Yugoslavia, as based on the needs of its armed forces. The ISAC decision was made pursuant to NSC 18/6,² which reads in part:

“2. In the light of the preceding paragraph and of the increased threat of an attack on Yugoslavia, the United States should as a matter of urgency:

“a. Expedite the provision of economic assistance to Yugoslavia under NSC 18/2,³ taking the necessary steps, including possible use of funds appropriated to foreign aid, to avert danger of serious deterioration or collapse of the Yugoslav economy.”

In order to extend aid to Yugoslavia under the MDA Act we must comply with Section 408(c) which provides:

“Whenever he determines that such action is essential for the effective carrying out of the purposes of this Act, the President may from time to time utilize not to exceed in the aggregate 10 per centum of the funds and contract authority made available for the purposes of any title of this Act for the purposes of any other title, or in the event of a development seriously affecting the security of the North Atlantic area for the purpose of providing military assistance to any other European nation whose strategic location makes it of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area and whose immediately increased ability to defend itself, the President, after consultation with the governments of the other nations which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty, finds contributes to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and is vital to the security of the United States. Whenever the President makes any such determination he shall forthwith notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives”.

It is thus apparent that the normal procedure for supplying aid under this Section of the Act would be (1) the President would consult with members of NATO for the purpose indicated, and (2) he would notify the appropriate committees of the Congress of his finding that aid to Yugoslavia contributes to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and is vital to the security of the United States. There is no requirement for Congressional consultation prior to the Presidential finding—the Committees are merely notified of the finding after it is made. It is nevertheless the view of ISAC, in which I concur, that leaders of the Committees should be consulted informally before such finding is reached.

The question has been raised whether these consultations with the NATO and with the Congressional leaders should be undertaken without prior clearance with the President, particularly as the consultation under the Act with the members of NATO must be in his name. One argument against this prior clearance is the time element. It is important to get the consultative machinery started, as the NATO deputies as well as Congress will soon leave for an Easter recess. Another argument is the probability that the President’s approval of NSC 18/6 is sufficient for our present purposes. Nevertheless, if you have any doubt as to the President’s possible reaction to the use of MDAP funds for this urgent and immediate purpose, you may wish to raise the matter with him before we proceed further.

Recommendation:

1. It is recommended that you indicate on the attached copy of this memorandum whether or not you wish to consult the President before we, in turn, raise this question with the NATO countries and the Congressional leaders.

2. If your answer is in the affirmative, it is recommended that, in light of the urgency expressed in NSC 18/6 and of the impending Easter recess, you seek to obtain the President’s approval by telephone.⁴

1. Regarding the recommendation of ISAC on aid to Yugoslavia, see the memorandum by the Foreign Aid Committee, Document 874.
2. Not cleared for publication at the time this volume went to press.
3. Regarding NSC 18/2, see the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. v, p. 868.

4. A marginal notation on the source text indicates that this memorandum was included among the briefing materials prepared for the Secretary for his meeting with President Truman on March 23. According to a brief memorandum, the Secretary of State discussed aid to Yugoslavia with the President:

   “I acquainted the President with the steps which had been taken, including the request to Mr. Spofford to consult with the NATO Deputies and the action of Messrs. Perkins and Coolidge in consulting with Congressional Committees.

   “The President approved of these steps and said that he would be prepared to act on the matter next week when we had a final report to make to him.” (Secretary’s Memoranda, lot 53D444)