Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 875

768.5/3–1651

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 16, 1951.

Subject: Recommendation that British Proposal for Consideration of the Yugoslav List of Military Requirements by the Tripartite Working Group be Accepted

On March 8 the British Embassy conveyed orally to the Department (Lord Jellicoe to Mr. Huston)² the substance of instructions which it had received from the Foreign Office setting out the British proposals with respect to action to be taken on the list of Yugoslav military requirements which the British Government had received from Mr. Djilas. These proposals, which were confirmed by the British Embassy on March 16 (Mr. Burrows to Mr. Labouisse)³ with an indication that the British attach some urgency to their consideration, are as follows:

1. The British Government should inform the Yugoslav Government that it agrees in principle to endeavor to fill the Yugoslav requirements, subject to availabilities, at the same time suggesting that Yugoslav minimum essential needs be discussed either (a) by the service attachés of the three Governments and Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade or (b) by Yugoslav experts and representatives of the three Governments in Washington.

2. The British Government should seek United States and French concurrence in the foregoing, the list meanwhile being examined by the Tripartite Working Group in Washington to determine how many items can be supplied in the immediate future and the effect which the delivery of these items to Yugoslavia would have on other commitments.

3. In the light of these investigations the three Governments should determine what priorities should be attached to items to be supplied to Yugoslavia.

Preliminary discussions in the Department and with representatives of the Department of Defense support the conclusion that at least the central British proposal, i.e., that the Yugoslav list be submitted to examination by the Tripartite Working Group, should be accepted.⁴ We are committed to the policy of tripartite consultation on the question of military aid for Yugoslavia, and consideration of this list would constitute a logical continuation of the work done by the Tripartite Working Group last October, when it made an initial assessment of Yugoslav needs and Western availabilities on the basis of information then on hand. Moreover, it would be useful to have an opportunity to learn just what matériel the United Kingdom and France are able to supply, as well as their intentions with respect to terms. Both S/ISA and the MDAP Planning Staff of the Department of Defense have indicated that in their view the sooner the tripartite talks are held the better.

As regards the proposal for technical talks with Yugoslav experts, it is believed that the data on Yugoslav requirements which such talks would be expected to develop should be especially useful to the Tripartite Working Group. It would accordingly be desirable for any such talks to which the Yugoslavs may agree to be initiated at the earliest possible moment in order that their findings may be coordinated with the needs of the Working Group.

It is believed that the proposed tripartite technical discussions can and should go forward without awaiting developments with respect to possible staff talks and the broader problems of strategy, including the Greek and Albanian factors, which were raised in General Bradley’s talks with Sir Oliver Franks.⁵

I accordingly recommend that we seek concurrence of the appropriate Defense officials in our acceptance of the British proposals, the reply to be conveyed orally, as was the proposal, to the following effect:

1. The United States Government shares the British view that it would be desirable for the British Government to inform the Yugoslav Government that it agrees in principle to endeavor, together with the United States and French Governments, to supply the items mentioned in the Yugoslav list, subject to availabilities. As regards the proposal to suggest to the Yugoslavs that their minimum essential needs be discussed either by the western service attachés with Yugoslav experts in Belgrade or by Yugoslav technical experts with representatives of the three Western Governments in Washington, it is the United States view that the holding of such discussions in Belgrade would have many practical advantages. It may be that, whether talks with the Yugoslav experts are held in Belgrade or in Washington, it would be desirable, both from the practical viewpoint and in order to make it more acceptable for the Yugoslavs, to designate a representative or representatives of only one of the three Western Governments as the immediate contact for the discussions rather than to insist on the larger group which would be more cumbersome and more likely to attract attention. In this case, the representatives of the three Governments could coordinate among themselves the data obtained.

2. The United States Government agrees to the British proposal that the Tripartite Working Group be reconvened for a reassessment at the technical level of Yugoslav military requirements, including those indicated in the list provided to the British Government by Mr. Djilas, and of the present and prospective availabilities to meet those requirements. It is accordingly believed that any such technical talks as contemplated in paragraph 1 above to which the Yugoslavs may agree should be initiated as soon as possible in order that their findings may be available during the discussions of the Tripartite Working Group. From the United States point of view, it is considered that the tripartite discussions should be opened at an early date and the Department would welcome an indication from the British Government as to how soon it would be prepared to participate in such meetings. If there is no objection from the British point of view, the Department will inform the French Government that a reconvening of the Tripartite Working Group in Washington to study current Yugoslav military needs has been proposed and seek French agreement on setting the date for opening the discussions at, say, April 2, next.

3. The United States Government will be glad to examine with the British and French Governments, in the light of the above-proposed investigations, the question of priorities to be attached to items to be supplied to Yugoslavia. Although it is supposed that the Tripartite Working Group would not constitute an appropriate forum in which to determine priorities, it might make recommendations in this regard for the later consideration of the three Governments.

1. Drafted by Huston.
2. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
3. During Burrows’ presentation to officials at the Department of State, which is recorded in a memorandum of conversation of March 16, he stressed that the British Government felt strongly that consideration of the list should be on a tripartite basis and that the British were examining their own availabilities to see if they could usefully send anything to Yugoslavia in the immediate future. (768.5/3–1651)
4. Regarding the organization of the Tripartite Working Group and its report, issued in October 1950, see the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 1482.
5. This is a reference to the U.S.-British Politico-Military Conference of March 1.