Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 873

768.5/3–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Higgs)¹

secret

[Washington,] March 12, 1951.

Subject: Col. Ellery Huntington’s Impressions of the Yugoslav Situation.

Participants:	Col. Ellery Huntington, former Chief, US Military Mission to Tito
	EE—Mr. Higgs
	EE—Mr. Marcy
	R—Mr. Howe

Colonel Huntington called to give the Department his impressions of the situation in Yugoslavia derived as a result of a recent three-day visit there and several conversations with Marshal Tito.

Colonel Huntington opened the discussion by remarking that his observations and conclusions coincided almost exactly with those so ably presented by Ambassador Allen. As a consequence, he would not himself discourse on the Yugoslav situation, but would welcome and discuss any questions as to particular aspects thereof. In the ensuing discussion, the following specific points were brought out:

1). Tito informed the Colonel that his major troubles today are with reference to his own party: the ideological purists who resist what they consider a swing to the right. Tito, however, knows the identity of the dangerous individuals in this category, and said that he is prepared to deal with them. In this context, Colonel Huntington impressed upon the Marshal the desirability of strengthening his representation in the United States with more men of the calibre of Velebit. In response to a query by Mr. Higgs, the Colonel stated that when making this suggestion to Tito he had refrained from mentioning specific persons, as for example Ambassador Popovic. Tito had been receptive to his suggestion.

2). Tito does not anticipate an attack by the Cominform at this time, although if the economic situation within Yugoslavia continues to deteriorate, Yugoslavia may soon become too “tempting a morsel”. Failing this, Tito believes that Stalin himself is the best insurance there is against an early attack. Stalin knows that in a war into which the West would inevitably be drawn, the USSR in its present form could not hope to survive. As he regards the conception and creation of the USSR as his personal accomplishment, he will not risk its almost certain destruction. The real danger will arise when Stalin is succeeded by a “younger and more impetuous” man. Tito does not anticipate that there will be any difficulty as regards the succession.

3). Yugoslav intelligence in the neighboring states is such that Tito will have “ample” warning of an imminent attack. Pressed by the Colonel to be more precise, Tito implied that there would be time to obtain from the West the arms and matériel he requires. He does not wish (dare) to accept arms now, despite the fact that present Yugoslav equipment is old, heterogeneous and insufficient. (Tito admits that, as a result of this situation, his present defiant stand is primarily “bluff”).

4). Tito is cognizant of and reconciled as regards the probability that congressional debate on any proposed Yugoslav aid program will involve all manner of unpleasant statements and assertions, which in addition to being distasteful will make him vulnerable to cominformist propaganda. He is prepared for this in reference to economic and other civil aid, but does not wish at this time for such discussion to involve military assistance. He would, however, now like and would now accept Western (American: Colonel Huntington states that Tito distrusts the British) training of his officers, primarily in modern weapons. Colonel Huntington was not specific as to the origin of the suggestion, but did state that Tito would like training facilities prepared on some neighboring territory such as Trieste.

5). Tito welcomes US interest and influence. He does not resent American observation of the Food Program, and the US can look forward to increasing cooperation from him, “beyond our expectations”.

6). In endeavoring to describe Tito’s attitude towards the abandonment of the Five Year Plan and the other manifestations of the “swing to the right”, Colonel Huntington recalled a conversation he had had with Tito in the summer of 1944. In the course of this conversation, Tito remarked that he would personally be reluctant to see the communization of Yugoslavia proceed to the point that all individual initiative and enterprise were obliterated. The West did not understand that a certain degree of communization was necessary for Yugoslavia, in order that it might “pull itself up by its bootstraps” and industrialize; but no more. The apparent frenzy with which the communist program was pursued in Yugoslavia in the early days was forced upon Tito by the political necessity of placating the ideological purists whose support he required. Although it was not so stated, Colonel Huntington gave the impression that the present “swing to the right” was, if anything, welcome to Tito personally.

7). As a consequence of his recent trip, Colonel Huntington has two projects to which he is devoting as much time as he can spare, (a): persuading individual members of Congress that aid to Tito should not be conditioned upon a commitment on his part to fight on the side of the West. For Tito to remain neutral, thus tying up a number of Soviet divisions, would be of sufficient military advantage to the United States to warrant considerable expense, (b): promoting an American program of training Yugoslav officers in modern weapons along the lines suggested in paragraph 4, above.

8). In response to a suggestion from Mr. Higgs, Colonel Huntington expressed himself as willing and desirous of assisting the Department in its presentation to the Congress of its Yugoslav program. Colonel Huntington will be glad to testify, if desired, provided he is adequately briefed beforehand.

L. Randolph Higgs

1. Drafted by Marcy.