668.00/2–1951: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State 1
1133. Pass Defense. Tito, addressing second conference, CP branch of guards division February 17,2 warned that CPY members must accept Yugoslav foreign policy and that dissension on this point would not be tolerated. Yugoslav cooperation with West dictated by Cominform attitude. Yugoslavia can work in harmony with West and still preserve socialist character. Those who question this basic policy, approved by CC CPY, “are, in present situation, a fifth column.”
Tito explained Yugoslav foreign policy by giving four specific examples—food aid, Korea, Yugoslav defense against aggression, and Western arms aid. Re food aid, Tito said Soviet Union boycotted [Page 1737] Yugoslavia, and had not sent significant aid even before 1948 break West, on other hand, “has shown readiness to send help.” Western aid not motivated by altruism but by fear that Soviet Union would become too strong if it conquered Yugoslavia. Accepting US aid will “strengthen us not only against East, but in all respects.”
Tito described Yugoslav stand on Korea as “active neutrality”, but opposed to North Korean-Chinese aggression. “The war was started by North Koreans. Why should we close our eyes to that fact?” Yugoslav UN delegate “has definite aim, to remove war threat and prevent Yugoslav isolation.” This policy has succeeded, and Yugoslavia has now averted danger of being isolated. As result correct policy, “an aggressor against us would have had better chance a year ago than today.”
Yugoslav defense against aggression based on hypothesis that any European war could not be localized. It helps Yugoslavia therefore to have word go out from West “that attack on Yugoslavia would lead to wider conflict”. This acts as deterrent to potential aggressors.
Rearmaments, Tito said he would not appeal to West for arms at present time, in order avoid lending substance to Cominform allegations that Yugoslavia has become capitalist satellite, but would concentrate for time being on developing own military industry. “The moment we see that attack against us is inevitable”, Yugoslavia will seek arms from West. “Today we consider that final moment has not yet come.” But Yugoslavia will not become anyone’s satellite under any circumstances. “I would prefer to fight barehanded than be anyone’s satellite.”
Speech closed with exhortation party members preserve “monolothic unity” of army and populace.
Comment: There is undoubtedly a minority among CPY members who find Yugoslav-Western rapprochement difficult to accept. Speech primarily directed at such elements, and is significant move in CPY campaign to convince all adherents that Western rapprochement aids rather than hurts Yugoslav effort achieve socialism. Another major step in this campaign has been reported issuance orders to all local CPY functionaries that they must sell rankand-file on idea that West not forcing Yugoslavs to give up socialism as price of material aid.
Embassy has long felt some danger that Tito, in reorienting Yugoslav Government to West, might get too far ahead of his following in CPY. Present campaign indicates CPY leadership aware of problem, and taking steps to meet it.
We do not interpret speech to indicate widespread or serious disunity in party’s ranks. At same time, it may be forerunner of disciplinary [Page 1738] action among party members who fail to adjust themselves to new party line.