Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 858

660.68/2–951: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State

secret

Belgrade, February 9, 1951—6 p.m.

1072. Embassy’s best estimate (Deptel 763, February 3¹), based on experience US and foreign diplomatic and military personnel, US food observers, and news correspondents, is that morale of Yugoslavian population in Macedonia, Vojvodina, and all other exposed areas is high with reference to possible Cominform attack. Re specific questions in last sentence reference telegram, Embassy believes:

(1) Yugoslavians all areas aware possibility Cominform attack, but are not jittery. These people have survived many disasters, and have not suddenly lost their nerve through fear of Cominform attack. (Erroneous flight report from Macedonia believe to be result of one Tanjug correspondent’s irresponsible reporting, and not of widespread apprehension). Yugoslav populace shown remarkable stolidity in face of present situation.

(2) Croats, Macedonians, like all Yugoslav groups, will fight Cominform invaders by any means possible; and will not accept Moscow domination as long as Yugoslav Government has army opposing invaders and has Western support.

Embassy’s confidence in reaction of Croats, Macedonians, and all other Yugoslav groups heightened by these facts:

(1) Croats, Macedonians, other Yugoslavians, have hatred for Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, born of old animosities and sharpened by cruelty these satellites occupation Yugoslav areas on behalf Germans during last war.

(2) Factors dividing Yugoslavians, such as national and religious animosity between Croats and Serbs, gradually weakening. Animosities still exist, but they are not the same decisive factors they once were. Several US food observers report anti-Serb feeling in Croatia not nearly as intense as they had expected. Minority groups in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosmet believed reacting favorably to regime’s permission have own separate language schools and cultural autonomy. Macedonians particularly gratified over attaining republic status and cultural autonomy. Bulgarian efforts destroy Macedonian loyalty to FPRY, by promise of unified and sovereign Macedonia, not meeting success. For example, Handler New York Times, just returned from Macedonia, considers morale of population there best in Macedonian history. Regime’s policy of economic assistance to backward areas, such as Macedonia and Montenegra; and local government through separate republics and regional autonomy, have reduced considerably traditional opposition to Belgrade.

(3) Communism distasteful to most Croats, but they prefer national brand to Moscow domination. Most Croats are loyal Catholics; they would certainly not aid Cominform gain control over them.

(4) Tito undoubtedly has high degree personal popularity among Yugoslavs, even among many bitterly opposed to Communism. In emergency, his presence will tend to unify populace, and minimize national ideological differences in face of common enemy.

(5) Yugoslavs have vast respect for US. Knowledge that we support Yugoslav resistance would add to their determination oppose invasion from East.

These factors, together with oft-proven Yugoslav love of independence and willingness fight against odds, convince Embassy that Yugoslav Army and populace will give very good account of themselves if attacked by satellites.

Assumption, evident in reference telegram, that Yugoslav Government would abandon northeast plains if attacked by satellites, not necessarily true. While evidence on this point not conclusive, and Yugoslav war plans not known, Embassy considers it not unlikely that Yugoslav Government would attempt hold plains if attacking force limited to satellites, without direct Russian participation. No evidence of feeling among inhabitants Slavonia, Macedonia, Vojvodina that they fear army would abandon them without a fight.

Allen

1. Telegram 763 urgently requested the Embassy’s estimate of (1) morale of the populations in those areas of Yugoslavia most likely to be overrun in a satellite attack on Yugoslavia (Vojvodina, Slavonia, and Macedonia) both currently and in the event of a satellite attack, and (2) the probable reaction of Croat and Macedonian populations to satellite attack. (660.68/2–351)