661.00/8–751: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 1
222. Emb greatly interested in Depintel July 23 1 a.m.2 and Emb London’s comments (London’s 8, July 27, sent SecState 562 rptd Paris 2033). Emb believes OIR and London have discussed “peaceful co-existence” in 2 different concepts and assumes that OIR under its point one considered the presumed Sov emphasis on diplomatic means in immediate post Korean armistice period as tantamount to “peaceful co-existence” for current period dealt with London’s 8. Of course, permanent “peaceful co-existence” means Sov abandonment of world Communism which is unlikely in foreseeable future and is thus impossible as long as Sovs retain this objective. This Amb therefore assumes there is agreement that Sovs may take some measures in current period to relax tension, hamper Western rearmament and unity and make possible consolidation of present territorial limits of Sov orbit.
These measures will probably not involve concessions of a specific tangible nature however. Sovs can probably go far in direction of relaxation of tension by refraining from military action through satellites for an extended period, promote cultural and informational exchange (on controlled basis, of course), offer attractive trade deals, throw out prospects for negotiated settlements on such issues as Indo China etc. In this connection, Emb London’s suggestion regarding another meeting of Austrian deputies provides means for sounding out Sov intention along this line.
Although we are not in position to estimate effect of such program abroad, we feel that reaction of countries other than US can conceivably alter the conclusion in OIR’s point 2.
[Page 1633]OIR’s point 3 appears to place USSR in position of deciding on mil showdown with West at about time US policies if persisted in would result in mobilization of adequate mil force to deal with any Sov action.
Although it is early in the game, it is possible that the Sovs hope to bring about a situation through their current “peaceful co-existence” campaign in which there are for sometime no actual hostilities going on between the 2 systems. They may have recognized that further attempts at territorial expansion through force may be just too dangerous in light of West progress in mil preparations. They wld hope then to relax tension and slow down West rearmament efforts appreciably in order give themselves opportunity to proceed unmolested for necessary time with development of resources already under their control. Considering their centralized direction and control of human and physical resources they may well feel they can eliminate dispariture mil-econ potential between 2 systems and arrive at better position to challenge mil might of West in 10 or 15 years than they will be in perhaps 1954. This is convincing reason for them to pursue course toward relaxing tension which they will certainly attempt achieve with minimum of specific concessions, if any. Outcome may be different from what they expect in view of their inability to comprehend flexibility and strength inherent in capitalist system, but such program if they are indeed embarked upon it provides us with opportunities from strong diplomatic and psychological offensive of our own.
Along this line we agree with idea Emb outlined in London’s tel that we should be quick to seize upon opportunities to clarify Sov intentions and positions. If there is substance to them we stand to gain thereby, if there is not we gain in keeping world public alive to Sov menace. Paris talks were good example of what can be done.