IO Files
Minutes of Thirty-second Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 13, 1951
US/A/M(Chr)/219
[Here follows list of persons (41) present.]
1. Mr. Taylor called attention to Gadel 417, received the night before, in the last paragraph of which the Department’s views were set forth on the question of the election to the Yugoslav seat in the Security Council. The Department indicated that the Delegation should not drop all consideration of the possibility of a compromise candidate in the event that Greece’s chances seemed to be waning. Pointing out that this telegram would have been more helpful had it been received a week earlier, Mr. Taylor referred to a new complication in the situation as a result of new instructions being sent Dr. Politis from Athens (see niact 2728 Athens to Washington, repeated info to Paris niact 77). Although not completely clear, it seemed that Politis might withdraw the Greek candidacy for this seat if after the third ballot Greece no longer stood chance of getting the necessary I two-thirds vote. If the word were to get around that Politis had instructions to this effect Greece’s chances would be completely scuttled. Ambassador Gross had not been able to contact Politis the night before when we received word of this development. Mrs. Roosevelt thought the Delegation could not now shift its vote to a compromise candidate since there would be no time to reach agreement with enough delegations to assure success. She felt that the Department should have decided some time ago if it wished the Delegation to pursue the indicated course. Now the Delegation would have to vote [Page 126] for Greece and let the latter decide what it wished to do in the light of the new instructions.
Mr. Sandifer said that we should at least keep Greece in the running for three ballots. Much would depend on how Politis interpreted his instructions. Ambassador Gross thought there was too much defeatism since Greece stood excellent chances of winning. The voting situation had incidated a sizeable majority of votes were going to go to Greece. He noted that when the news arrived at the South African reception the night before that the South African Delegation was being instructed to withdraw from the General Assembly, he had tried to persuade Messrs. Donges1 and Jooste to stay in the plenary until they could cast their vote for Greece.
Mr. Cory reported that Kyrou had called him this morning saying that there was a rumor that the Philippines was a strong darkhorse candidate, and asking that the US talk to the Philippines and dissuade them from entering the race. Mr. Cohen suggested that we could contact Elizalde, since he had always been amenable to sound suggestions. Mr. Lubin agreed that this would be feasible. Miss Bacon asked why we wanted to persuade the Philippines to stay out of the race. Mr. Cohen suggested that we should avoid a snap judgment on this matter but that keeping the Philippines out would be avoiding the inevitable victory that Byelorussia would obtain if another candidate entered the race, and Greece were to drop out in favor of them.
Ambassador Gross was very disturbed about talk of withdrawal of the Greek candidacy. The prestige of the US was very deeply engaged in Greece’s candidacy. To give up without a strenuous effort to obtain the three or four extra votes necessary to assure a victory for Greece would be very undesirable.
Mrs. Roosevelt interpreted the final paragraph of Gadel 417 as meaning that the US would not begin looking around for compromise candidates until Greece withdrew. Mr. Sandifer did not think this telegram gave the Delegation an absolute instruction to that effect. He agreed with Ambassador Gross that we must stick with Greece, and should avoid any indications from us or from the Greeks that we were considering a compromise candidate. There would be no time to develop a strong alternative candidate. The UK position, furthermore, would not allow it to switch to a compromise candidate, and they would probably return to supporting Byelorussia, if they did switch to Greece, in preference to any compromise candidate. This corresponded to their position with regard to the so-called gentlemen’s agreement.
Ambassador Key reported a rumor he had picked up from the Chinese that the US was planning to withdraw its support for Greece. [Page 127] Having “stepped on” that rumor, he had attempted to have it killed in other quarters as well.
Mr. Cohen thought a considerable amount would depend on how the balloting stood when Greece withdrew, if it did, as to whether a compromise candidate would be possible.
Mrs. Roosevelt said that the consensus of opinion seemed to be that the US Delegation would stand firmly for Greece. If they did not come close to the necessary two-thirds majority, we would try to obtain a postponement in order to consider further the possibility of a compromise candidate, or whether to continue to support Greece and try to obtain the few more votes needed to ensure its election.
Ambassador Gross summarized the voting strength as follows: on the first ballot Greece should get about 32 votes. On the second, if the UK and others switched as they had indicated they would, Greece would get 37 votes. What happened on the third ballot would be extremely important. If the result were the same as on the second, the fourth would be even more important. He added that the instruction to Politis, as reported by Peurifoy from Athens, was not entirely clear as to what Politis would or could do.
Mr. Plitt suggested that all the political officers attempt to “knock in the head” all rumors to the effect that the US might withdraw its support from Greece. Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. McKeever agreed with this. Similar rumors had been circulating among the press people, too, and every effort had been made to squelch them.
[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]
- T. E. Donges, Chairman of the Delegation of the Union of South Africa to the General Assembly.↩