IO Files
Minutes of Fiftieth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, January 31, 1952
US/A/M (Chr)/237
[Here follows list of persons (41) present. Mrs. Roosevelt presided. There was discussion of a prior agenda item.]
2. Tactics for Committee 3 Items. Mr. Green noted that the Oatis case had been effectively presented by Dr. Tobias the day before. In regard to the Plenary, he called attention to Document US/A/C.3/L.226,1 the first operative paragraphs of which requested two covenants, on human rights. This was the result of a joint amendment submitted by the United States, Belgium, India and Lebanon; the vote in Committee had been 29–21–6. He felt that a minority in the Plenary might attempt to invoke the two-third majority Rule. The Reference Section of the Delegation had found that no Committee 3 item had ever required a two-third vote. We could therefore argue, both from history and logic, that this was not a two-third situation. He urged, however, active liaison work to obtain as many votes as possible for the two covenant position.
In Document US/A/C.3/L.228,2 in regard to self-determination, Mr. Green noted that this resolution was based on the original 13 Power text which sought to insert an article in the Human Rights Covenant to the following effect: “All people shall have the right to self-determination”. The United States Delegation had tried to head [Page 782] off such a development, by avoiding such precise language. We had first offered an amendment to include a “reaffirmation” of the principle of self-determination. Thereafter, we tried to insert a “provision” which would reaffirm that principle. Finally, we had agreed to the Afghanistan amendment to “an article”, but all without success. By a vote of 33–9–10, this rigid language in L/228 had been adopted.
Mr. Green felt that the United States had come out of the situation with a maximum of goodwill. On the one hand, we had shown the Arabs and others our willingness to compromise; we on the other hand, had also demonstrated effectively to the colonial powers that we would not be pulled to the extremes that the majority demanded.
The last paragraph of L/228 contained a recommendation to the Human Rights Commission which contained incredible language.
The United Kingdom and France had urged us simply to vote against this resolution in Plenary, although we would be in a minority of nine, without making any attempt to change any of the language. Mr. Green pointed out that some of the Arabs, including the Iraqi, in addition to many Latin American Delegations, were dissatisfied with the language of the resolution. France had given the United States Delegation the “full treatment” in seeking to have us drop our efforts at a compromise. They were worried that this would be a new principle in international law, which would support expropriation in the economic field and render useless the principle of the sanctity of contracts.
Mr. Green pointed out a suggested revision of the resolution on self-determination, contained in Document US/A/5447. He asked the Delegation to decide whether we should vote with the UK and France against the resolution as adopted by the Committee, taking the matter next year, or whether to seek better language, over the serious concern of the United Kingdom and France, who preferred this “ambiguous monster”.
Mrs. Roosevelt said that France had gone beyond the economic threat, saying that the United States would one day find its military bases taken over. Mrs. Roosevelt had countered this by saying that one day she hoped the United Nations would be strong enough so that the United States would have no need for bases. She promised to repeat to the Secretary all their strongest feelings, suggesting however that their trouble may well have been brought about by their own slowness. They had brushed aside this argument. She added that even if we could obtain better language, she felt that we would not want to co-sponsor it. There was every reason to assist in obtaining a clearer recommendation and to have it introduced by means of better wording, but only with “behind-the-scenes” support from the United States. We had obtained considerable goodwill by not standing in the way of their reactions to what they felt was an incorrect situation. She also [Page 783] hoped that we could put across the idea that the vote on the covenant was not a two-thirds matter.
Mr. Allen noted the danger of urging our draft language upon others without co-sponsoring. This would leave us open to the possibility of even worse language than existed at present. He was inclined on balance to recommend relaxing and voting against the present language.
Mr. Sandifer felt that Mrs. Roosevelt’s analysis contained entirely sound and good procedure. However, we could not get too far ahead in drafting legal obligations. Mr. Cohen wondered about the idea of stating our real position on self-determination in connection with conditions existing in the world today. When bogged down by technical details, when ultimate desiderata become lost, we should take the opportunity to emphasize the important highlights in the whole matter which would take us out of the bog of language difficulties. Mrs. Roosevelt thought this could be done, but she felt we should be careful not to make “grand speeches” unless we could carry out what we say. She wanted it clearly understood that we were overwhelmingly in the minority because the rest of the world often think we do not mean what we say. For this reason, she was unwilling to make such a speech unless we would back it up. Mr. Cohen certainly hoped we would be able to carry out what we said. Mrs. Roosevelt stated that this would make the British and French very unhappy. She would prefer, however, to stick to what we believe to be right. She added that there was much truth in the idea that putting ourselves in such situations as this, in backing the British and French, was just what the Soviets wanted.
She suggested giving this language, as re-drafted by the staff, to the Arabs, as a much better draft, but telling them we could not go out and work for it since we had already exhausted our every effort. Both Miss Strauss and Ambassador Jessup agreed with this suggestion. Mrs. Roosevelt added that she would then be willing to think about a Plenary speech, but would want the help and the ideas of all the members of the Delegation.
Mr. Taylor announced that a joint meeting of Committee 1 and joint 2 and 3 was still scheduled for that evening at 8:30. Santa Cruz strongly opposed such a meeting, however. The Plenary meeting would be taken up all morning with the 20-year peace program. Thereafter, Committee 6 matters would come before it. The next group for Plenary consideration would be Committee 1 items.
Mr. McKeever recalled the plans for making a recording of the Delegation meeting the next morning. The subject would be an appraisal of the entire assembly.