IO Files
Minutes of Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, November 13, 1951
US/A/M(Chr)/197
[Here follow list of persons (47) present and discussion of a prior agenda item. The Secretary of State was in the Chair.]
2. In a continuation of the Human Rights Covenant discussion, Mrs. Roosevelt offered background information on the C.3 situation. This, she felt, would serve to explain why the US had so many possible [Page 766] positions. The US and the western Europeans had been outvoted by the underdeveloped countries on the basis of emotion rather than reason. For example, the Indians had behaved quite irrationally in not carrying out their instructions and in voting against their previous stand. The day before, Professor Bokhari of Pakistan had told Mrs. Roosevelt that he did not favor trying to draft the Covenant over again in C.3. But he still wished to put all the economic and social rights into a single Human Rights Covenant. The Egyptians had taken the lead on this position in the UN. Even the NGO’s from the US had disagreed with the US position on this matter, wanting to go much further, and in particular opposing the limitation of the right of petition to governments only. They did not seem to realize the practical difficulties involved, especially in connection with ratification by Congress.
Another point which the underdeveloped countries had insisted upon was that there would be no difficulty in having economic and social “rights” which were not justifiable. To avoid difficulties the US had devised a way of saying that these were not really “Rights”, but only objectives to be sought. Mrs. Roosevelt would warn the other countries that the US would have a serious problem in trying to obtain ratification, and probably would not succeed. Furthermore the Federal-State clause, which was highly unpopular was of major importance to the US. It would probably be voted down just as the UK’s territorial clause had been.
Mrs. Roosevelt added that she was aware of the tremendous legal difficulties encountered by the US, but she also feared the danger that the US might seem to be opposed to the cause of Human Rights. We would have to go along with the majority if it insisted on a single covenant, and we would leave it up to Congress to make whatever reservations they felt were needed. Above all we should not give the impression that the US was afraid to broaden the application of Human Rights provisions either at home or abroad. She said that a two-covenant situation would make it possible for the US to consider favorably the adoption of the one with civil and political rights.
In answer to a question by Miss Strauss, Mrs. Roosevelt said that the 5th GA had voted for a single covenant. ECOSOC had obtained a vote recommending reconsideration of this decision; but C.3 was far more representative of the Human Rights Commission than it was of ECOSOC.
Ambassador Sayre asked why the US position was not to oppose but to vote in favor of a single covenant, including the economic, social and cultural rights, when we did not think it was right and when we did not believe in it. Mrs. Roosevelt responded that we should not again be completely against a large majority. We should show that we were not trying to dictate and that we would go along, provided it [Page 767] was very clearly understood just what our position was. The Department felt that it would hurt the US more to be adamant when it would obviously lose anyway, than to go along with the majority and let them know of our objections. We would have to gauge the temper of the majority at the time the matter came up for a vote, and at that time decide whether to abstain or vote in favor. Replying to Ambassador Gross’ question, she said that the USSR was always in the lead on this matter, but it tried to amend everything to give more enforcement power to individual states, rather than to retain the international flavor.
Dr. Tobias asked if the US was only supporting two covenants from a feeling that Congress would just [accept] the civil and political one Mrs. Roosevelt said that it was very important that we should ratify the civil and political rights covenant, even if it were necessary to have a big debate in the Congress on the anti-discrimination clause. This would be a good thing for the US. She felt we would never ratify economic and social rights in a treaty. Such rights meant all things to all peoples. We would be getting something if we achieved a ratified covenant on civil and political rights.
Senator Cooper wondered if the Delegation were to take final action that morning on the US position. Mrs. Roosevelt said that was not expected, but that since C.3 discussion toward the end of the week might conceivably get to this matter, it was wise for the Delegation to be thinking seriously about it. Mr. Cooper asked to reserve his rights to comment later when he had had time to study the matter further.
[Here follows discussion of another agenda item.]