Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

Sandifer Files, Lot 55 D 429

Memorandum of Conversation, fry Mr. James Simsarian of the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs¹

secret

[Washington,] May 29, 1951.

Subject: Position of United States Concerning Draft Covenant on Human Rights in ECOSOC and General Assembly

Participants:	Mrs. Roosevelt
	Mr. Hickerson
	Mr. Sandifer
	Mr. Sanders2
	Mr. Tate3
	Mr. Meeker4
	Mr. Green5
	Mr. Simsarian

At Mrs. Roosevelt’s request she came to Washington on Tuesday to report to the President and to the Department concerning the session just closed of the Human Rights Commission. Mrs. Roosevelt met with the persons above listed in the morning and again at lunch. At noon she saw the President and in the early afternoon the Secretary.

By way of background for the discussion of the problem of the position to be taken by the United States on further Work on the Human Rights Covenant in the Summer session of the Economic and Social Council and in the sixth session of the General Assembly, Mrs. Roosevelt summarized some of the impressions she had gained on broader related questions in conversations with various members of the Human Rights Commission, particularly with the new Chairman of the Commission, Dr. Charles Malik, Representative of Lebanon. Dr. Malik stressed heavily and at length the needs and aspiration of the under-developed countries. He pointed out the tremendous social and cultural problems in the countries of the Middle East and in all the under-developed countries, the incompetence and corruption in the governments, and the need on their part for leadership and technical assistance. He said this leadership and assistance must come from the United States and that the United States must both tell these countries what to do and how to do it. This same view was expressed to Mrs. Roosevelt by other members of the Commission but in a less articulate fashion. As applied to the Human Rights Covenant, Mrs. Roosevelt said that in the minds of Dr. Malik and others this meant that the Economic and Social Articles had become a symbol of the aspirations and needs of these countries. They did not understand or attach the same importance to civil and political rights as does the United States and some of the more developed countries. They may not fully understand the Economic and Social Articles but they look to them as a lever which may help to raise them out of their present depressed condition. They do not understand the concern of the United States over the question of whether these “rights” shall be stated and treated as legal rights and obligations. In most of these countries the rights are definitely regarded as goals or objectives— as something to be achieved and not as legal obligations. They do not understand, and in fact resent, the unwillingness of the United States to state them in terms of rights. These matters are covered in the Constitutions of most of these countries but the attitude there toward the effect of such constitutional provisions is different from the attitude in the United States. Most of the other members of the Commission therefore insist tenaciously on stating these propositions in terms of rights and including them in the Covenant with Civil and Political Rights.

One point that Dr. Malik stressed was that the leaders in many of these countries, and especially the leaders of the opposition, want and need these economic, social, and cultural international guarantees as a standard with which to challenge and prod their own governments and the leaders in their countries to greater effort in the direction of attaining social improvement.

In terms of future policy on the Human Rights Covenant, Mrs. Roosevelt felt strongly that this general situation confronted us with a very difficult problem. It is a first-rate propaganda problem an relation to the Soviet Government and its reckless propaganda campaign. Mrs. Roosevelt felt that it means that we must find some way to protect our interests and maintain our position in an affirmative way. For example, she thought that we could not win a campaign, no matter how hard we pressed diplomatically, to separate the Economic and Social Articles from the Civil and Political. By such an effort we would generate a great deal of ill will, lose our position of leadership and end by failing to attain our objective. She fully recognized the difficulty the Covenant with the Economic and Social Articles presented in this country. In the general language in which they are drafted, they can cause us a great deal of trouble both in terms of public opinion and in terms of their actual application. Unless very carefully safeguarded, their inclusion in the Covenant would mean the rejection of the whole Covenant by the Senate.

In the ensuing discussion, the general problem as presented by Mrs. Roosevelt was very thoroughly canvassed. There was reluctant agreement that a campaign to separate the Economic and Social Articles from the present Covenant would be unproductive and unwise. There was discussion of the maturity and completeness of the present Covenant, particularly the Economic and Social Articles, and of the strategy that might be followed with respect to the timing of consideration of the Covenant in the General Assembly. This included discussion of the question of possibly having the Assembly send the Covenant back to the Human Rights Commission for further study and of the problem of having the Covenant debated in the General Assembly in New York in 1952 during a Presidential election year in the United States.

The substantive discussion concentrated on the question of the method by which we might deal with the problem of stating the economic and social rights as “rights” with the implication in American law of their being binding legal obligations. This was still a problem, it was felt, despite the general introductory Article to the economic and social rights. Mr. Tate suggested that this problem might be handled by a reservation (which might take the form of a unilateral reservation by the United States or by a general Reservation Article) stating in substance that the economic, social, and cultural rights represented objectives to be attained by progressive action and not legal obligations. This reservation would have to be very carefully worded to make quite clear the different character of these rights as contrasted with the political and civil rights in the Covenant. There was general agreement, after some exploration of this suggestion, that it might offer a satisfactory approach that would have the advantage of making it possible for the United States to go along with the development of the Covenant as a whole and also of making it unnecessary for the United States either to press for the separation of the economic and social section or to press for an Article providing for adherence to separate parts of the Covenant.

There was agreement that the Economic and Social Council should not get into the substance of the Covenant and that it would probably have to send the Covenant forward to the General Assembly for action. There was no clear agreement as to the form which the Report and Recommendations of the Council to the Assembly should take. There was uncertainty as to the approach which the United States should take in the General Assembly on further action on the Covenant. It was finally agreed that Mrs. Roosevelt should raise with the President the question of the timing of consideration by the General Assembly, particularly the question whether consideration of the question by the General Assembly in a Presidential election year in the United States would cause serious difficulty. Mrs. Roosevelt would also explain to the President the nature of the problems involved in the Economic and Social section of the Covenant.

At lunch Mrs. Roosevelt reported that the President expressed the positive view that the United States should not hang back in going forward with the Covenant. He saw no difficulty in having the Covenant debated in the General Assembly in the United States in 1952. He thought, in fact, there might be some advantages in having it debated then since in an election year neither party would be in a position to oppose a program of economic and social improvement. At the same time the President felt that it was important for the United States to take an affirmative position in the handling of the Covenant in the General Assembly this Fall and that we should go along with the general sentiment in the Assembly on the question of timing.

It was finally agreed tentatively, subject to further study in the Department and discussion with other agencies, that an effort would be made to develop the reservation procedure suggested by Mr. Tate. The United States would support action by ECOSOC forwarding the Covenant to the General Assembly. We would go along with the development of a Covenant including economic and social rights. We would also go along with the consideration of the Covenant in detail in this session of the General Assembly if that were the general sentiment. If opportunity offered, we would point out the incompleteness of the Covenant in its present form and the fact that the Commission had not had time to carry out all of the directions from the fifth session of the General Assembly. In the end, if this seemed feasible, we would support action by the Assembly returning the Covenant to the Human Rights Commission for further study and report to the next session of the Assembly. However, we would not get out in front on this question or put any pressure on to bring about this result. We would, as in the past, insist on the inclusion of a federal state clause in the Covenant. If an adequate federal state article is not included, the United States would at the appropriate time make a reservation setting forth an adequate federal state provision.

1. The source text reflects general drafting changes made by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer). On June 1 it was forwarded by Sandifer to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson).
2. William Sanders, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary (Hickerson).
3. Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser.
4. Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs.
5. James F. Green, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs.